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In this thesis studies are presented that aim to find evidence that mental health clinicians 
reason causally when thinking about what is the matter with a client, and deciding on 
effective interventions. This introduction chapter first describes a metaphor that Paul Meehl 
(1920-2003) came up with in 1954. Meehl compares clinicians to box mechanics deriving 
their hypotheses from assumed internal mechanisms. Thus, Meehl depicts clinicians as 
reasoning causally. From this metaphor we move to the “clinical-statistical controversy”, and 
explain why clinicians’ reasoning processes should be investigated. We review literature on 
the importance of causal reasoning in different domains, and on causal reasoning 
specifically in the clinical domain. We end with an introduction to the studies in the next 
chapters of this thesis.  
 
Clinicians as mechanics? 
How do clinicians arrive at hypotheses about what is wrong with their clients? In his 
treatment of this question Meehl (1954) compares a clinician with a box mechanic making 
predictions about an opaque box. This box has ten buttons on one side and ten coloured 
lights on the other side. Pressing a combination of three buttons leads to lights flashing on 
and off. Inside the box is a complex mechanism of “interacting gears, brackets, pulleys, 
springs, sliding surfaces, and the like” (Meehl, 1954, p.57). Meehl distinguishes two ways to 
make predictions about what lights will flash on and off when a new combination of three 
buttons is pressed. One way to predict the box’s response is by deriving the most probable 
result from all previously observed combinations of button presses and light flashes, of this 
and perhaps also of other similar boxes. This he calls the actuarial or statistical way of 
prediction. Another way is that of an experienced box mechanic. An experienced box 
mechanic has not only observed combinations of button presses and light flashes, but also 
knows what the box may look like on the inside, because he has investigated the insides of 
many similar boxes before. Thus, using this knowledge a box mechanic can make highly 
specific predictions.  
Meehl, who was a practicing clinician himself, proposes that a skilled clinician 
generates hypotheses in a way similar to how the skilled mechanic would come to a 
prediction for an opaque box. Based on knowledge of psychological laws, experience with 
previous clients, and unique client characteristics, a clinician can arrive at highly specific 
hypotheses. A statistician could not infer such specific hypotheses, because often no prior 
observations are available to make the necessary deductions from unique characteristics. 
Meehl thus argues against Sarbin (1944) and Lundberg (1941) who seem to see clinicians as 
statisticians. The latter suggest that clinicians always derive hypotheses from comparisons 
with previous cases, with which a new client will always have something in common. These 
hypotheses may be made in an informal or unconscious way, but are still essentially 
statistical. With Sarbin and Lundberg however, Meehl argues that, no matter in what way 
hypotheses are generated, clinicians should always validate their hypotheses using statistical 
methods if these are available. 
In 1954 Meehl discussed 20 studies showing that predictions of human behaviour 
made using actuarial methods (such as calculating probabilities with regression analysis, or 
using frequency tables) are equally often or more often correct than predictions which 
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clinicians made using their own, unspecified clinical methods. Knowing this, Meehl argues, 
clinicians should always use actuarial methods to test hypotheses about their clients when 
these are available. Evidence for the superiority of actuarial methods above so-called clinical 
methods to make predictions about human behaviour has further accumulated. Recent meta-
analyses by Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson (2000) and Ægisdóttir et al. (2006) show 
that actuarial methods outperform informal methods used by clinicians in a range of 
predictions.  
Despite this large body of evidence favouring the use of actuarial methods, the 
“clinical-statistical controversy” (Meehl & Grove, 2006) is still actual (see e.g. Dawes, 2005; 
Grove, 2005). In practice clinicians do not seem to be convinced of the superiority of 
statistical methods (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Caspar, Berger, & Hautle, 2004; Meehl & Grove, 
2006). An explanation for this discrepancy might be that actuarial methods do not easily 
combine with how clinicians reason about their clients (cf. Caspar et al., 2004). The seeming 
discrepancy in Meehl’s (1954) discussion that clinicians arrive at the most specific 
hypotheses like mechanics rather than statisticians while at the same time they should use 
statistical methods to make the most accurate clinical predictions, might reflect this 
difficulty. Further, for much of what clinicians do in everyday practice statistical methods 
may not be available (Westen & Weinberger, 2005). Knowledge of how clinicians process 
client information and arrive at their decisions might help to understand this discrepancy 
and think of ways to improve clinicians’ judgments, by the development of decision aids and 
improved training methods (Caspar, 1997; Caspar, Berger, & Hautle, 2004; Galanter & Patel, 
2005; Garb, 1998, 2005; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986; Witteman, Harries, Bekker, & Van 
Aarle, 2007).  
Studies about how clinicians process client information and arrive at their decisions 
are scarce in comparison to studies which compare clinicians’ predictions with actuarial 
predictions (Caspar, 1997; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Nurcombe 2000). This may be due to the 
difficulty of studying thought processes, and especially thought processes of practicing 
professionals (Caspar et al., 2004; Chi, 2006; Ericsson, 2006). This thesis presents studies 
that investigate mental health clinicians’ reasoning, and their causal reasoning in particular.  
 
Causal reasoning 
In portraying clinicians as mechanics who derive predictions from assumed 
mechanisms, Meehl (1954) described clinicians’ thought processes as causal reasoning 
processes. Causal reasoning is central to human thought. Representation of causal relations 
enables us to predict what will happen, and more importantly: it enables us to predict what 
the effects of our actions will be, and thus to control our environment (Beach, 1992; Gopnik 
& Schultz, 2007; Pearl, 2000; Sloman, 2005; Woodward, 2003).  
People distinguish events that simply co-occur from events that are causally related 
(Keil, 2006; Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006; Woodward, 2007). For example, we 
know that although a seriously running nose and a fever often co-occur, with fever starting 
somewhat later than the running nose, the running nose does not cause the fever. Rather, 
there is a common cause, a virus, for both symptoms of influenza. We do not squeeze our 
noses, or fill them with handkerchiefs, to prevent fever. We combine information about the 
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co-occurrence of events with information about the temporal sequence of events, their 
spatial contiguity, and knowledge to distinguish causes and effects from merely co-occurring 
events (Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2002; Waldmann, 1996). People have reliable intuitions as to 
what is causally relevant and what is not. For example, we consider colour more likely 
causally relevant for a living kind (e.g. an insect) than for an artefact (e.g. a tool) (Keil, 2003). 
Even young children differentiate between causal relations and mere correlations, have 
intuitions as to what are possible causes in a domain, and they use causal representations to 
predict and explain events (Keil, 2003; Schulz, Kushnir, & Gopnik, 2007; Wellman & Liu, 
2007).  
Causal reasoning is used in the explanation of physical events, and it can be applied 
to all domains in which we intervene, or in which we can imagine interventions (Woodward, 
2003). We also understand people’s mental states and actions causally, by representing 
preceding events, feelings, and goals (Wellman & Liu, 2007). Causal representations can 
make it easier to comprehend and use probabilistic information, such as correlations and 
base rates (Dawes, 1999; Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 2006; Pearl, 2000; Sloman, 2005; 
Strevens, 2007). It is unsettled whether explanations are secondary in the sense that we need 
them because of the primary goal of predicting future events, or whether we have a 
fundamental tendency to explain, which we, subsequently, can use to predict (Wellman & Liu, 
2007). In both cases however, reasoning using causal representations, or causal models, 
appears an essential, fundamental human capacity.  
People use causal representations in a wide range of reasoning and decision tasks, 
such as diagnostic reasoning (reasoning about possible causes for problems), choosing 
interventions, making inferences about unknown properties and events, and classifying 
(assigning items to categories) (Sloman, 2005). It has even been proposed that in general we 
process information by constructing mental causal representations (Graesser, Olde, & Kletke, 
2002). We will discuss studies on causal reasoning in several different domains, and review 
what is known about causal reasoning in the clinical domain.  
Causal representations 
Pennington and Hastie’s theory of explanation-based decision making (Hastie & 
Pennington, 2000; Pennington & Hastie, 1993) states that in complex, dynamic situations 
people construct causal representations which explain available information. To complete 
these causal models they make inferences, using their background knowledge. People arrive 
at their decisions by choosing the decision alternative that has the best fit with their causal 
model. Confidence in a decision depends on how coherent the constructed causal model is, 
that is: how complete, consistent and plausible, how much of the information is covered by 
the model, the uniqueness of the model, and the goodness of fit of the model with the 
chosen decision alternative. Related to this theory is Sloman and Hagmayer’s (2006) causal 
model framework for choice. According to this framework, when people make decisions they 
also first construct a causal model of the available information. They then proceed by 
mentally simulating the consequences of alternative choices in this model, to see what 
option is most favourable. 
In the legal domain, deciding on a verdict is a complex task. Trial information comes 
typically in large amounts, in scrambled sequence, and is usually incomplete as to what 
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exactly happened. Further, different pieces of information often cannot be interpreted in 
isolation, but are interdependent (Hastie & Pennington, 2000; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). In 
a think aloud study Pennington and Hastie (1986) found that American jurors construct 
causal mental representations of trial information that have a story-structure. Jurors who 
arrived at the same verdict had constructed similar stories, which were different from the 
stories constructed by jurors who had arrived at other verdicts (see also Huntley & Costanzo, 
2003).  
Pennington and Hastie (1988) further showed that jurors construct causal 
representations while processing trial information, and that these representations precede 
their verdicts. In a memory study jurors more frequently falsely recognised items as 
information presented at trial when these fitted with their verdict than when they did not. 
Further, story construction was facilitated by presenting trial information in a chronological 
and causally consistent order, for either prosecution evidence or for defence evidence. The 
number of guilty or innocent verdicts appeared to vary with this manipulation.  
People also construct causal representations while processing information when no 
specific decisions need to be made. Researchers in text and discourse comprehension have 
proposed that processing information of texts, of discourse, but also for example of movies, 
is essentially explanation-based (Graesser, Olde, & Kletke, 2002). People, when they read, 
combine information which is stated in the texts with additional information from their 
background knowledge, in a mental situation representation. To fill in gaps in the 
representation readers make inferences. A distinction is made between inferences that are 
needed for local coherence, allowing comprehension of subsequent sentences, and for global 
coherence, allowing sentences in the whole text to be integrated meaningfully. It is proposed 
that readers generally arrive at global coherence by constructing causal mental 
representations (Magliano, 1999; Langston & Trabasso, 1999; Van den Broek & Gustafson, 
1999). Think aloud studies in which the inferences that readers make while processing texts 
have been analysed, have shown that indeed most inferences are causal (Trabasso & 
Magliano, 1996; Zwaan & Brown, 1996). Other methods, such as measuring sentence reading 
times, lexical decision latencies, or word recognition latencies also showed that readers 
make causal inferences while reading (Magliano, 1999; Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994).  
Clinical causal client representations 
Clinical decision making is an instance of decision making in complex, dynamic 
situations. The problems that clients present with are caused and maintained by different 
interacting psychological, biological, and environmental factors (Carr, 2006; De Los Reyes & 
Kazdin, 2006; Haynes, 1992; Kendall, Holmbeck, & Verduin, 2004; Wenar & Kerig, 2006; 
Kiesler, 1999). Problems usually extend over a longer period of time, and can take different 
forms in subsequent phases in life (Morton, 2004). Information that clinicians collect about 
their clients, from interviews, observations, and tests, will never be complete with respect to 
all possibly relevant causes in the client’s life that have resulted in the client’s current 
problems (Meehl, 1954). Given the complexity and the nature of the clinicians’ task it seems 
likely that clinicians will also construct causal mental representations of client information, 
in order to understand their clients’ problems and to decide about the most effective 
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interventions to diminish these problems (cf. Goldstein & Weber, 1995; Rettinger & Hastie, 
2003).  
From a prescriptive point of view, this is also how clinicians should proceed. It is 
recommended that clinicians construct a case formulation for their clients which “aims to 
describe a person’s presenting problems and use theory to make explanatory inferences 
about causes and maintaining factors that can inform interventions” (Kuyken, Fothergill, 
Musa, & Chadwick, 2005, p.1188), see for example the handbooks of Carr (2006), De Bruyn, 
Ruijssenaars, Pameijer, & Van Aarle (2003), Eells (2007), Groth-Marnat (2003), and Wenar & 
Kerig (2006). It is not clear however whether clinicians do construct client representations 
that explain the mechanisms underlying clients’ problems. Studies on diagnostic judgment 
and decision making processes are scarce, especially when compared to studies on 
diagnostic decision making outcomes (Caspar, 1997; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Nurcombe 2000).  
Think aloud studies have shown that the clinical judgment and decision making 
process is a process of generating and testing hypotheses (Nurcombe & Fitzhenry-Coor, 
1982) similar to the medical decision making process (Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka, 1978). 
Psychiatrists generate most hypotheses early, already in the first minutes of a diagnostic 
interview (Kendell, 1973; Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970). The nature of the hypotheses in 
these studies has not been specified, and they appear at least partly to be classifying 
hypotheses.  
Investigating the contents of case formulations may inform us about clinicians’ 
causal client representations. Eells, Kendjelic, and Lucas (1998) developed a coding schema 
to analyse the content of case formulations of clinicians with different theoretical 
backgrounds: the Case Formulation Content Coding Method (CFCCM). Analysis of intake 
formulations showed that these mainly summarised descriptive information, and that most 
formulations lacked a hypothesised mechanism behind clients’ problems. Most of the 
mechanisms that were specified were only rudimentary. Kendjelic and Eells (2007) replicated 
these findings, but also found that mechanisms became much more specified when 
clinicians had followed a two-hours training in case formulation, in which the importance of 
a hypothesised mechanism was emphasized.  
Kuyken and colleagues (2005) analysed case formulations which different cognitive 
therapists gave for the same case description, after training. They found that less than half 
of the formulations were of sufficient quality, with quality defined in terms of providing a 
mechanism on which interventions can be based. Kuyken and colleagues further found that 
reliability of descriptive aspects of the formulations was good, but of explanatory aspects it 
was poor. Persons and Bertagnolli (1999) similarly found that the mechanisms that 
therapists provided in cognitive-behavioural formulations had poor reliability. In the study 
of Kuyken et al. (2005) quality and reliability of the case formulations was higher for 
therapists who were more experienced and who had more professional qualifications. 
In short, clinicians do not generally provide elaborate mechanisms for their clients’ 
problems in their case formulations, and furthermore they often seem to disagree about the 
mechanisms they provide (see also Garb, 1998). It is possible however, that clinicians do 
endorse causal beliefs about their clients which they do not explicate in their written 
formulations. It seems in fact rather likely that clinicians will endorse causal beliefs about 
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their clients, given that they have to decide about effective interventions, and that people 
have been found to base their intervention choices on causal representations.  
Intervention choices  
An example from research by Hagmayer and Sloman (2005) shows how knowledge of 
underlying mechanisms affects intervention choices. Hagmayer and Sloman told students to 
suppose that research had indicated that men who do the dishes have a better health. They 
asked the students whether they would advise a friend who wanted to improve his health to 
do the dishes. Whether they did appeared to depend on how the improved health was 
explained. If the students were told to suppose that better health was a consequence of the 
fact that men who care for their health also care for equality issues, they were less likely to 
advise their friend to do the dishes, than when they were told to suppose that better health 
resulted from the extra physical activity that doing the dishes gave. In the last case, doing 
the dishes directly affects health. In the first case, doing the dishes does not affect one’s 
health but improved health is a consequence of a common cause that also causes doing the 
dishes. Thus, differences in the structure of causal models affected which advice students 
gave.  
Causal representations have also been found to influence which interventions people 
think are effective in more realistic situations. Students’ ratings of the effectiveness of 
actions to prevent coronary heart disease appeared to be strongly related to their causal 
models of the risk factors. When for example smoking was considered to strongly increase 
the risk of coronary heart disease, to stop smoking was rated as a highly effective preventive 
action (Green & McManus, 1995). Similarly, people’s action tendencies in scenarios of 
environmental risks, such as chemical pollution or a new epidemic, depend on their causal 
mental representations of these risks (Böhm & Pfister, 2000).  
Pliske and Klein (2003) modelled experts’ decision processes in several domains, such 
as warfare technique, fire fighting and nursing. They concluded that in complex, uncertain 
situations experts decide what to do by constructing causal representations of the situation, 
and envisioning the effects of an action by mental simulation (see also Klein, 1997; cf. 
Endsley, 1997). Their model for experts’ decision making in complex and unfamiliar 
situations is similar to Sloman and Hagmayer’s causal model framework for choice, except 
that Pliske and Klein believe that professional decision makers will not usually compare 
outcomes of different decision alternatives, but will choose the first alternative that leads to 
satisfactory consequences.  
Clinical intervention choices 
Many studies have addressed the question how clinician variables (e.g. experience, 
personality) influence the outcomes of interventions (Beutler, Malik, Alimohamed, Harwood, 
Talebi, Noble, & Wong, 2004), but it has hardly been investigated how clinicians arrive at 
their intervention decisions. Nelson and Steele (2008) asked for clinicians’ considerations 
when choosing interventions. They found that evidence for the effectiveness of interventions 
and flexibility of interventions were the most important considerations. Witteman and Kunst 
(1997) and Witteman and Koele (1999) investigated to what extent clinicians’ interpretations 
of client data predicted their intervention choices. They found no relation: clinicians who 
gave the same interpretation of client data chose different interventions, and clinicians who 
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chose the same interventions gave different interpretations of client data. Theoretical 
preferences turned out to be the best, though weak predictor of clinicians’ intervention 
choices. Witteman and Kunst (1997) and Witteman and Koele (1999) looked at group 
similarities in interpretation and intervention combinations. It therefore remains possible 
that on an individual level interpretations and intervention choices were matched.   
Furnham (1995) found that lay people’s theories about phobia and their beliefs about 
the effectiveness of treatments for phobia were coherently related. For example, people who 
believed in Freudian accounts of the aetiology of phobia were likely to also believe that 
psychoanalytic treatment will be effective. Yopchick and Kim (2008) presented psychology 
undergraduates with different causal structures for how symptoms were related in artificial 
mental disorders. They found that students’ ratings of the effectiveness of interventions 
depended on the place in the causal structures of the symptoms that were affected by the 
interventions. Interventions that affected symptoms that were initial causes were rated as 
more effective than interventions that affected symptoms that were intermediate causes. 
Thus, it seems that at least non-clinicians’ ratings of the effectiveness of clinical 
interventions are related to their causal beliefs. 
Classifications 
Causal representations also affect classifications. People have theories about how 
features of concepts of natural kinds (e.g. dogs, tomatoes) and artefacts (e.g. hammers, 
chairs) are causally related (Medin & Rips, 2005; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Features that are 
causally central in a concept’s theory are perceived as more important, and receive greater 
weight in the classification of something as belonging to a category, than features which are 
causally peripheral. This means that people rate features on which more other features 
depend, or: features that cause more other features, as more important in classification than 
features which have fewer other features depending on them. This is called the “causal 
status effect” (Ahn, 1998; Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 2000; Ahn, Kim, 
Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000). For example, having dog-DNA is rated as very important to 
categorize an animal as a dog, since dog-DNA leads to dogs having many of their 
characteristic features. Having four legs is rated less important, since having four legs does 
not lead to many other dog features.  
Rehder and Kim (2006) further found that objects with features that have multiple 
causes are sooner classified as belonging to a category than objects with features that have 
one cause. Also, when a coherent causal pattern of features is present, consistent with the 
causal knowledge one has, an object will be classified as belonging to a category sooner. 
Finally Rehder and Kim found a “primary cause effect”, which means that causes that initiate 
other features in a mechanism are perceived as stronger evidence for category membership 
than intermediate causes, or (final) effects (for a critical view relating the primary cause 
effect to the causal status effect, see Rehder & Kim, 2006). 
Clinical classifications 
Clinicians often classify clients’ symptoms and problems as representative of a 
disorder specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2000). 
To do so, it is required that specified criteria are met. In a theory-drawing task Kim and Ahn 
(2002) asked clinicians to indicate how they believed symptoms were causally related for 
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DSM-IV disorders. They found that clinicians weight symptoms that in the DSM-IV receive 
equal weights differentially, depending on the position of the symptoms in their theories. 
Specifically, hypothetical clients presenting with symptoms that are more causally central in 
clinicians’ theories, meaning that more symptoms depend on them, were more often 
diagnosed as having a specific disorder than clients presenting with symptoms that are 
causally peripheral or isolated in the theories. For example, in clinicians’ theories for 
Anorexia Nervosa the symptom “refuses to maintain weight” causes several other symptoms 
of Anorexia Nervosa (e.g. excessive exercise, dieting, preoccupied with food), while “absence 
of the period for more than 3 months” does not cause any other symptoms. The first 
causally central symptom was found to be more important for classification than the latter 
causally peripheral symptom. Further, causally central symptoms were recalled more often, 
and falsely recognised more often, than causally peripheral or isolated symptoms. Thus, a 
causal status effect from clinicians’ theories was found in clinicians’ classifications (see also 
Cobos, Florez, & López, 2008), similar to the causal status effect found in categorisation of 
natural kinds and artefacts (Ahn, 1998; Ahn, Gelman, et al., 2000; Ahn, Kim, et al., 2000).  
It should be noted that since the theories clinicians drew in the studies of Kim and 
Ahn (2002) contained only symptoms stated in the DSM-IV, and the DSM-IV refrains 
explicitly from specifying aetiological theories, these theories do not contain many deep root 
causes. On the other hand, Kim and Ahn’s findings are especially interesting given that 
clinicians are trained to use this atheoretical classification system.  
Theories about how symptoms are causally related may affect clinicians’ 
classifications in another way too. Students decided that patients with symptoms that 
stemmed from a common cause via separate causal paths were more likely to have a 
hypothesized medical condition than patients with symptoms that stemmed from this 
common cause via the same causal path. This is called a “causal diversity effect” (Kim & Keil, 
2003). Similarly, to investigate whether a patient had a medical condition students preferred 
to find out whether causally diverse symptoms were present rather than symptoms with 
similar origins (Kim, Yopchick, & De Kwaadsteniet, 2008). So far, this causal diversity effect 
has only been shown with psychology undergraduates reasoning about medical conditions. 
Experienced clinicians may however also show a preference for information which is causally 
diverse in theories about psychiatric disorders, above information with similar causal 
origins.  
Finally, Proctor and Ahn (2007) found an effect of the causal structure of knowledge 
on clinicians’ inferences, similar to the causal status effect in classifications. They found that 
clinicians make inferences from symptoms that are known to be causes rather than from 
symptoms that are known to be effects. For example, if clinicians learned that large mood 
swings cause excessive social anxiety in a client, they thought it was more likely that this 
client would engage in reckless behaviour, than when they learned that the excessive social 
anxiety caused the large mood swings. On the other hand, clinicians thought a client was 
more likely to have a tendency to blush when they learned that this client’s excessive social 
anxiety caused large mood swings, than when the relation was reversed (Proctor & Ahn, 
2007). Thus, the structure of causal beliefs affects clinicians’ classifications, and may affect 
their inferences. 
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Summary 
Causal reasoning seems basic to how people process information and make 
decisions, especially in complex situations. Research has shown that laypeople and 
professionals construct causal mental representations of information, that they make causal 
inferences while doing so, and that they base their judgments and intervention choices on 
them. Further, classification decisions are affected by the causal structure of people’s 
theories. It remains unsettled however whether practicing mental health clinicians engage in 
causal reasoning when they process information to understand their clients and to decide 
upon the most effective interventions. Knowledge of how symptoms are causally related in a 
disorder or with a specific client has been found to influence clinicians’ classifications and 
inferences. But at the same time, mechanisms explaining clients’ problems are hardly 
specified in clinicians’ case formulations. Also it is not clear how clinicians arrive at their 
intervention choices. The question how clinicians decide upon interventions has hardly been 
addressed. In all, evidence seems lacking for Meehl’s clinicians-as-mechanics idea. 
 
This thesis: Clinicians as mechanics? 
This thesis contains studies that aimed to learn more about how clinicians reason. So, 
in Meehl’s words their goal is “that of giving a behavioral description of what the clinician 
does” (Meehl, 1954, p.37). In particular, these studies address the question whether, as 
mechanics, clinicians construct causal client representations reflecting the mechanisms they 
assume to underlie clients’ problems, when they process client information, decide on what 
may the matter with a client and what may be effective interventions, and make 
classifications. Although there is a lot of evidence that underlines the importance of causal 
representations in reasoning and decision making, the central role of causal representations 
is not yet evident in clinicians’ reasoning. Knowledge of clinicians’ reasoning processes will 
be useful for the development of methods to improve clinicians’ performance that may 
address their natural reasoning strategies (Witteman et al., 2007). The following chapters 
present studies aimed to elicit the role of causal representations in clinical judgment and 
decision making, using different methods.  
Chapter 2 describes a think aloud study in which we elicited clinicians’ thoughts 
while they reasoned about what could be the matter with a client and what they would 
propose as follow-up steps. The think aloud method is used to tap into people’s reasoning. It 
is assumed that people can reliably verbalise the information they are attending to in their 
short term memory, if they can do so directly (and no retrieval processes are needed due to 
a too large delay in time) and if what they are attending to can be verbalised (of automated 
processes for example only input and output can be verbalized, not what happens in 
between) (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
We presented participants with the intake video and with information from a battery 
of tests. We analysed the thoughts clinicians verbalised after they had received all this 
information, in two ways. First, we analysed the causal structure of participants’ mental 
representations, similar to how Pennington and Hastie (1986) extracted the causal structure 
of jurors’ mental representations. We also analysed to what extent the follow-up steps that 
participants proposed were related to their mental causal models. Complementary to this 
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structure analysis, we analysed the contents of participants’ verbalisations, to see what 
specific causal factors participants mentioned, and what follow-up steps, similar to how 
Eells and colleagues (1998) analysed the content of clinicians’ case formulations (see also 
Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005 ). Thus, we aimed to extract clinicians’ 
causal mental client representations, and see whether they base follow-up steps on these. 
Chapter 3 describes the analysis of clinicians’ verbalisations made while watching the 
intake video. We categorised the inferences participants made while processing information, 
in analogy to the categorisation of inferences of think aloud protocols from readers in text 
comprehension research (see Trabasso & Magliano, 1996). We aimed to see whether 
clinicians make more causal inferences, compared to descriptive and predictive inferences. 
Additionally, we analysed the specific contents of participants’ causal inferences, to see 
whether clinicians make the same. 
  In Chapter 4 a study is presented in which we further investigated whether 
clinicians base their intervention choices on causal models. We analysed to what extent 
participants’ ratings of the effectiveness of different interventions could be predicted from 
their causal client representations. To extract participants’ causal client representations we 
used a cognitive mapping method. Cognitive mapping is a method which elicits how 
participants think about a problem by asking them to draw causal relations they perceive 
between relevant variables (see e.g. Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004). In contrast to the 
extraction of mental causal representations from think aloud protocols as described in 
chapter 2, which can be seen as an indirect method, cognitive mapping directly asks for 
clinicians’ causal beliefs. 
Chapter 5 describes a series of studies in which we investigated how the causal 
structure of theories about disorders may affect clinicians’ classifications. In particular, we 
aimed to find out if experienced clinicians who reasoned about psychiatric disorders would 
show a causal diversity effect. We looked if experienced clinicians rate evidence that is 
causally diverse stronger than evidence with causally similar origins, according to theories 
for disorders from peer reviewed literature. We also looked if experienced and novice 
clinicians rate evidence that is causally diverse stronger than evidence with causally similar 
origins, according to their own theories.  
The last chapter, Chapter 6, summarises and discusses the findings of the studies 
presented in chapters 2 to 5. It ends with implications for practice and suggestions for 
further research. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
   
Causality in Clinicians’ Mental Representations of Client Information  
A Think Aloud Study  
 
 
 
Abstract  
We investigated whether mental health clinicians mentally represent client information in 
causal models, and whether they base their interventions on these causal models. We showed 20 
clinicians an intake video and test results, and asked them to think aloud about these questions: “What 
do you think is the matter with this client; what would you propose as follow-up steps?” Both causal 
structure analysis and content analysis of participants’ verbalizations indicated that their mental 
representations were predominantly descriptive and lacked causal complexity. Also, most 
verbalizations about further assessment and interventions did not seem to be related to participants’ 
causal models. Finally, we found large variation in the causal factors that participants mentioned and 
in the interventions they proposed. We discuss explanations for our findings and implications, and 
suggest further research. 
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Studies have shown that the reliability and validity of clinical decisions is poor (Dawes, 1994; 
Garb, 1998; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1954), and that experienced 
clinicians often do not outperform inexperienced clinicians (Dawes, 1994; Eells, Lombart, 
Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005; Garb, 1998; Krol, De Bruyn, & Van den Bercken, 1992; 
Lichtenberg, 1997). Many studies on clinical decision making have compared diagnostic 
judgments, such as DSM-classifications or behaviour predictions, with norms, such as 
established e.g. by expert consensus or policy capturing. Results show that clinicians’ 
judgments deviate from these norms, and thus it is concluded that they perform poorly 
(Caspar, 1997; Dawes, 1994; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986). An important limitation of such 
studies is that they do not reveal underlying processes. Studying the clinical decision making 
process can provide useful knowledge for the development of educational methods and 
decision support, which may effectively improve decisions (Caspar, 1997; Caspar, Berger, & 
Hautle, 2004; Galanter & Patel, 2005; Garb, 1998; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986; Witteman, 
Harries, Bekker, & Van Aarle, 2007). Unfortunately, process studies which reflect the 
dynamics and complexity of the clinical situation are rare (Caspar, 1997; Groth-Marnat, 
2003; Nurcombe 2000).  
In complex, dynamic situations the construction of a coherent mental representation 
seems crucial for decision making: the right decision depends on a correct understanding of 
the situation (Endsley, 1997; Pliske & Klein, 2003). It is assumed that if problem information 
concerns human events, mental representations will be structured as causal models or 
stories, containing causal and temporal relations (Beach, 1992; Goldstein & Weber, 1995; 
Hastie & Pennington, 2000; Rettinger & Hastie, 2003). Causal mental representations enable 
us to understand, predict what will happen and, perhaps more importantly, what the effects 
will be of our interventions (Beach, 1992; Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). 
The theory of Explanation-Based Decision Making (Hastie & Pennington, 2000) 
describes how in complex domains decisions result from causal reasoning about 
information. According to this theory, decision makers use previously acquired knowledge 
and experience to construct causal explanations which integrate information, direct 
inferences, and on which, when completed, decisions are based. Pennington and Hastie 
(1986; 1988) found that American jurors who were presented with large amounts of ill-
structured evidence information constructed specific causal models: stories. These stories 
are summary representations in which evidence information is linked causally and 
temporally. Jurors use their general world knowledge to make inferences to complete the 
representations. Jurors’ verdicts follow from their stories: different story representations 
appeared to lead to different verdicts. Furthermore, confidence in a verdict was found to be 
determined by the coherence and the uniqueness of the constructed story.  
Text processing theorists also assume that most comprehension, not only of 
narrative texts, is essentially explanation-based (Graesser, Olde, & Klettke, 2002; Magliano, 
1999). They assume that people process information by constructing causal mental 
representations which go beyond the information actually presented, and that they use 
background knowledge to make inferences which provide local and global coherence to the 
constructed situation models. Think aloud studies showed that explanation-based inferences 
are fundamental and are the most prevalent inferences readers make, together with 
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referential inferences made to determine the referents of pronouns used (Magliano, 1999; 
Trabasso & Magliano, 1996).  
Another model that subscribes to the importance of a causal mental representation 
of information for decision making in complex contexts is the Recognition-Primed Decision 
Model (Pliske & Klein, 2003). This model is based on studies of experienced professionals in 
several domains. According to the RPD-model, decision makers try to causally explain a 
situation which is not immediately understood, by means of feature matching and story 
construction. Decision makers link observed events to causal factors and use mental 
simulation to predict consequences of possible actions.  
In the clinical domain, deciding what is the matter with a client and how (s)he should 
be treated is a complex and dynamic task of assembling and integrating unstructured, 
incomplete information, from several sources. Based on the theories described above, we 
expect clinicians to construct causal models: integrative representations of client 
information in which symptoms, behaviours, and events are causally and temporally 
understood. We further expect that these causal models precede and determine clinicians’ 
decisions. This seems in accordance with characterizations of clinical thinking given by 
psychiatrists: “What’s wrong, how did it get it that way, and what can we do about it?” 
(Nurcombe, Drell, Leonard, & McDermott, 2002b, p. 350), and: “I want to make a story in 
which these symptoms will make sense and fit together in a temporal sense.” (Nurcombe, 
Drell, Leonard, & McDermott, 2002a, p. 94). The identification of causal variables and the 
integration of information in a causal, explanatory model is considered crucial in clinical 
assessment, because these (modifiable) variables affect the effectiveness of treatment (Eells, 
Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998; Haynes, 1992; Haynes & Williams, 2003; Kuyken, Fothergill, Musa, & 
Chadwick, 2005; Nurcombe, 2000). In this study we aimed to identify causal structures in 
clinicians’ mental representations of client information, and to assess the relation of the 
proposed follow-up steps to these causal structures. In addition, we aimed to identify what 
causal factors and follow-up steps clinicians consider, and whether they agree about these.  
 
Method 
To elicit clinicians’ mental representations we used the think aloud method. This 
method can provide insight in thought processes during problem solving (Ericsson, 2006; 
Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994). When thinking aloud 
participants directly verbalize information which is attended to and activated in short term 
memory. It is claimed that thinking aloud does not change the thought process, except that 
it moderately slows it down (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
Participants 
Twenty clinicians with different levels of experience participated. We approached 
clinical child psychologists who had participated in an earlier study and from our network. 
Four participants were novices: master students of the faculty who had finished nine months 
internships in which they also had been engaged in diagnostic tasks. All novices were 
women with a mean age of 25.3 years (SD = 2.6). The other participants, twelve women and 
four men, had a mean experience of 13.3 years (SD = 9.8), and a mean age of 41.3 years (SD = 
12.3).  
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Materials 
We presented participants with a 33 minutes video of an intake interview of two 
diagnosticians with a nine year old boy, Eric, and his parents. Eric and his parents had been 
referred to a Dutch youth care institution because of the boy’s problematic behaviour at 
home and at school. We additionally presented the results of nine tests administered to the 
boy (a developmental history questionnaire, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (III), 
the Child Behaviour Check List, the Teacher Report Form, a Stroop test (measuring inhibition 
capacity), the Bourdon-Vos (measuring concentration span), the Family Relations Test, the 
Theory Of Mind test, and a test measuring children’s perceived competencies). We also 
included an observation report of a free play situation and a summary of the observations of 
the boy’s behaviours during the tests. The test results presented were copies of the original 
forms. The parents had given us written consent to use the video and test materials for our 
study. The case was chosen after consultation with two experienced child psychologists, who 
both judged this case to be representative and with sufficient complexity.  
Procedure and task 
All task instructions were typed out, to insure that all participants received the same 
instructions. Participants were free to read the instructions aloud or silently, and could 
always ask for clarification. In the first instruction we told participants that they would be 
asked to think aloud, that is: “to verbalize all your thoughts while they are coming up. You 
do not have to think about what you want to say and you do not have to explain your 
thoughts. You just have to verbalize immediately what you are thinking. As in ‘think talking’, 
let your thoughts speak. You could imagine yourself sitting alone in a room and talking to 
yourself.” (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Van Someren et al., 1994). After participants had read 
this instruction, the experimenter gave them two exercises in thinking aloud.  
In the second instruction we explained to participants that they would see a video on 
a laptop showing an intake conversation featuring a nine year old boy and his parents, and 
we asked participants to verbalize all thoughts they had while they were watching this video. 
We explained how they could interrupt the video by pushing the space bar whenever they 
wanted in order to verbalize thoughts. We asked participants to think aloud about the 
following questions: “What do you think is the matter with this boy; what would you propose 
as follow-up steps?” We had chosen these specific questions, after discussions of our study 
design with experienced child psychologists, to elicit clinical reasoning as it would occur in 
practice. In practice these questions seem to be the ones most frequently asked by parents. 
Further, we expected that these questions would elicit causal reasoning in participants, in 
two ways. First, although the first question may seem to ask for descriptive information, 
parents with this question ask for an explanation of their child’s problems. Second, as we 
argued in the introduction, treatment planning should be based upon a causal 
understanding of a client’s problems.  
We told participants that all their verbalizations would be tape recorded and that all 
data would be treated anonymously. We emphasized that what they said would not be 
judged as being right or wrong. When the participants had indicated that they understood 
the instruction, the experimenter started the video. If participants did not seem to be 
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verbalizing their thoughts, the experimenter reminded them to think aloud (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993; Van Someren et al., 1994).  
The boy’s test results were given when participants had finished talking at the end of 
the video. Participants were instructed to keep thinking aloud about the questions while 
reading the test results. They could choose to read the results aloud or silently. If necessary, 
the experimenter reminded participants to think aloud. When they had finished reading and 
talking, the experimenter asked participants to summarize their thoughts about the initial 
questions. All participants’ verbalizations were recorded on audiotape.  
After the experiment, the participants received a short form with questions asking 
for their age, gender, education, years of experience, work setting, number of cases seen 
which were similar to the presented case, confidence in their judgments, and whether they 
adhered to a specific theory. 
The experienced participants received a 50 euro gift certificate for their participation; 
students received 10 euro in cash. The experiment took one and a half to two hours per 
participant. The first author administered the task mostly at the participants’ work settings. 
The students and two of the experienced participants visited the first author in her office.  
Analysis of the think aloud protocols 
All verbalizations were typed out verbatim in protocols for each participant. We 
extracted the structure and content of participants’ mental representations from the 
verbalizations they made after they had watched the video and studied all test results, 
including the summaries they gave. First, we analyzed the causal structure of diagnosticians’ 
mental representations, analogous to Pennington and Hastie (1986) who extracted jurors’ 
mental representations of trial information from think aloud protocols obtained after the 
jurors had seen a video of an enacted murder trial. Next, we investigated whether the follow-
up steps the clinicians proposed were related to their mental causal models. Third, we 
analyzed the contents of diagnosticians’ verbalizations using the Case Formulation Content 
Coding Method (CFCCM) from Eells, Kendjelic, Lucas, and Lombart (received in personal 
communication, October 2007, see Eells et al., 1998; Eells et al., 2005). We looked at what 
causal factors clinicians considered, and what follow-up steps.  
 Causal structure analysis 
Case statements. Two coders independently identified case statements in the 
protocols, in analogy to Pennington and Hastie’s explicit story references. The coders did not 
have knowledge of the presented case. We defined case statements as all verbalizations 
concerning Eric and other persons in Eric’s life. Coders did not distinguish between 
information actually given and inferences made by participants. They did not code 
references to events in the intake interview as case statements, in analogy to the exclusion of 
references to events at the trial from Pennington and Hastie’s explicit story references. For 
example, “Mother says” is not a case statement, however what she is saying can be a case 
statement: “(that) he is always busy and often gets angry”. Further, we defined case 
statements not to be: verbalizations concerning the think aloud task or concerning 
participants’ own thinking processes, evaluations of information (e.g., “This is important”), 
open questions (for more information), and incomplete or incomprehensible verbalizations. 
We also excluded verbalizations concerning further assessment and treatment proposed, 
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and their expected effects. These were identified separately (see below: Analysis of proposed 
follow-up steps). 
Case states. The first author segmented all identified case statements into separate 
case states: simple sentences. For example, the case statement “he is always busy and often 
gets angry” was divided into two states: “he is always busy” and “(he) often gets angry”. A 
list of states resulted for each participant. Both coders then checked whether they saw 
repetitions of the same states in the lists, for each participant separately, and marked all 
repetitions.  
Links. Subsequently, both coders identified temporal links and causal links in the lists 
of states of all participants. Coders identified links by connective words such as because, 
therefore, then, or by verbs such as causes and reinforces. We defined a temporal link as a 
link which expresses a sequence of states in time. We also considered words that relate a 
state to a specific moment in time a temporal link (e.g., “at the age of five he moved”), 
although this does not link two states, but only indicates at which point in time a state 
occurred. We defined a causal link as a link between two states, in which one state is a cause 
of the other. Our definitions are similar to the semantic relationships in stories which 
Rumelhart (1975) defined. In our definition of causal links we also included intentional links, 
relating a character’s intention to an action (cf. “Motivate”, Rumelhart, 1975). A frequently 
used link is the and link, expressed by words such as and, also, and as well, which indicates 
a combination of two or more states. This combination may be solely an enumeration of 
more than one state. Although not typical for stories or causal models, coders did identify 
and links, because these may also announce an enumeration of more than one state causing, 
being caused, or being linked temporally. The coders also decided which states the links 
related. To do so, coders were allowed to look in the original protocol text to be able to 
correctly interpret the extracted states and links. 
Graphs. The authors constructed conceptual graphs from the states (repetitions 
excluded) and links identified by the coders, to depict the causal structures extracted from 
the protocol text. Conceptual graphs consist of case states presented in boxes and links 
between these states presented as arrows between the boxes (cf. Pennington and Hastie, 
1986). And links were only taken into account when they were not merely an enumeration of 
information, but meant for example also caused or also after. Consider these three case 
states and their links: “because (causal link) he always acts so impulsively / he frightens 
children / and (and link) he gets involved in fights”. Here the last state is considered to be 
caused by the first state, as is the second state.  
Analysis of follow-up steps  
Follow-up statements. The two coders went through the protocols again, this time to 
identify all verbalizations that suggested additional assessment, treatment plans, 
information expected to be gained from further assessment, and effects expected from 
treatment: the follow-up statements.  
Follow-up states. The first author again segmented all follow-up statements in 
semantic units: simple sentences. For example, the follow-up statement “Refer him to 
another school so he becomes less special” was divided into: “Refer him to another school” 
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and “so he becomes less special”. For each participant this resulted in a list of follow-up 
states. The coders again checked for repetitions and marked these in the lists.  
Links. Subsequently, the coders identified causal, temporal, and and links in all lists 
of follow-up states. Additionally, they identified reason links and referential links. We 
defined reason links as the words referring to the reasons participants gave for their follow-
up states. Typical reason links are words such as so, therefore, and because. A reason 
provided for a specific follow-up state can be a case state, for example when the reason link 
relates a treatment plan to a content state (e.g., “the boy is socially incapable (case state), /  
therefore (reason link) he should engage in a training in social skills (follow-up state)”). A 
reason can also be another follow-up state, if the reason link refers to what effect is 
expected from treatment, or which information is expected to be gained from assessment 
(e.g., “observe the boy in class / in order to (reason link) see how he reacts to his 
classmates”). We defined a referential link as words referring to something stated in another 
follow-up state or case state. Typical referential links are recognized by words such as here, 
this, and where. For example, in the follow-up state “further investigate those physical 
aspects” the words “those physical aspects” refer to the case states: “there were troubles 
with his birth / and (and link) he fell on his head”. Coders also decided, again using protocol 
texts if needed for correct interpretations, which states the links related. 
Graphs. The authors connected the follow-up states identified (repetitions excluded) 
by means of the identified links to each other and to case states. When a reason or a 
referential link connected a follow-up state to a case state in a participant’s conceptual 
graph resulting from the first analysis, we added this follow-up state, and the follow-up 
states connected to this follow-up state, to that participant’s conceptual graph. Here too, we 
only took and links into account when they meant also temporally linked, also causally 
linked, also linked by reason, or also linked referentially. 
Agreement. We calculated interrater agreement for the identification of case 
statements and follow-up statements on the basis of agreement on words in five randomly 
selected protocols. It resulted in Cohen’s kappa of 0.80 for case statements and 0.78 for 
follow-up statements. We calculated agreement on repetitions on the basis of five protocols, 
which resulted in Cohen’s kappa of 0.79 for case states and 0.77 for follow-up states. These 
kappas can be considered substantial (Landis & Koch, 1977) or excellent (Fleiss, 1981). We 
calculated agreement on the links by dividing the number of links agreed on by the total 
number of links identified by both coders1. On the basis of five protocols, agreement was 
91.2 % for the links in case states and 82.8 % for the links in follow-up states. For 87.1 % of 
the links agreed in case states and 89.6 % of the links agreed in follow-up states, coders 
decided similarly about which states were related. After each coding step, the first author 
marked the differences between coders and presented them to the coders. Usually coders 
then came to a shared conclusion about these differences. If not, differences were resolved 
by the first author. 
                                                 
1 We did not calculate kappa-coefficients here, as there is no plausible way to determine expected agreement. 
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Content Analysis 
This analysis we performed following the procedure described in the CFCCM: 
“Manual for case formulation and treatment plan coding”, by Eells, Kendjelic, Lucas, and 
Lombart (received in personal communication, for a description of this coding method, see 
Eells et al., 2005). Eells and colleagues developed this coding method to reliably analyze the 
specific contents and quality of written and ‘think aloud’ case formulations of 
psychotherapists, who may adopt different theoretical frameworks. We translated the 
CFCCM into Dutch. 
Idea units. Three coders segmented all verbalizations into idea units. In the CFCCM, 
Eells et al. define idea units as “the expression of a complete thought”, following the 
segmentation procedure that Stinson, Milbrath, Reidbord, and Bucci (1994) proposed for 
segmentation of psychotherapy transcripts. This segmentation procedure, based on 
intuitions of what “complete ideas” are, has been reliably used by Stinson et al. (1994) and 
Eells et al. (2005). Idea units are of equal size or larger than the semantic units we identified 
in the structural analysis: case states and follow-up states are simple sentences, idea units 
can consist of one or more simple sentences. We based the final segmentation of the 
protocols on coders’ agreement about the beginnings of new units. Each time two or three 
coders agreed on the beginning of a new idea unit, this was taken as such. 
Categories and elements. In the CFCCM Eells et al. distinguish four major coding 
categories. Category A, descriptive information, represents idea units that convey 
information presented in the case description. Considerations of a diagnosis in terms of 
DSM-classifications are coded under category B. Category C, inferred information, is used for 
idea units that contain new information inferred from the presented information. 
Considerations of causal factors are coded in this category, that is: idea units expressing 
ideas about psychological, biological, or social mechanisms and predisposing and 
precipitating factors. We considered strengths and potential therapy-interfering factors as 
causal too. Finally, category D represents idea units considering treatment planning and 
further assessment, whether these are formulations of specific treatment types (e.g. 
individual cognitive therapy) or more general foci of attention. An idea unit can be assigned 
to one to four of the main categories at the same time. For example, the idea unit: “His poor 
fine motor skills fit with Non-verbal Learning Disorder” is assigned to two categories: 
category A (descriptive information) and category B (diagnostic information). Idea units 
which could not be assigned to any category (e.g. participants’ verbalizations about their 
thought processes, or the task, or incomprehensible verbalizations) received the code NC (no 
code), and were not used in any further analyses.  
Each of the four major categories of the CFCCM consists of numbered elements 
which further specify the kind of information expressed. Within a category, an idea unit can 
be assigned to only one specific element. Thus, the three coders assigned each idea unit to 
one element within one or more categories (or coded it as NC). All differences between the 
coders were resolved in discussion. 
Sub-elements. The more specific sub-elements of elements in the CFCCM were not 
always appropriate for a child’s case formulation; it seems that the CFCCM is mainly written 
for case formulations for adult clients.  For example, in the CFCCM separate sub-elements 
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are defined for predisposing experiences in childhood and predisposing experiences in 
adulthood. Also, a frequently used intervention in children’s cases is parent support, and 
this was frequently mentioned by our participants. This is however not represented in the 
CFCCM among the different treatment types. Therefore, instead of using the sub-elements of 
the CFCCM, we had two coders identify the specific contents of the idea units which were 
coded as elements in categories B, C, and D.  
For category B, the coders identified different classifications mentioned for DSM-IV 
axis I (for axis II, participants mentioned no specific classifications). For the causal elements 
coded in category C (inferred information) and the elements coded in category D (treatment 
planning) coders identified which different predisposing experiences, current stressors, 
psychological, biological, and social mechanisms, strengths, potential interfering factors, and 
which different treatment types or foci of attention participants mentioned. For the 
mechanisms (psychological, biological, social), coders identified the different causes within 
the mechanisms, not the effects. First one coder went through all protocols, creating new 
sub-elements for each idea unit expressing a content not identified before. Next, the second 
coder coded the idea units using the first coder’s distinction of sub-elements, adding or 
merging sub-elements as she thought appropriate. Because participants considered many 
different causes and foci of further research and treatment, coders distinguished between 
clinical features of cognition, affect, behaviour, physical condition, and interpersonal 
adjustment, following Carr (2006, Table 11.2). Also, for social factors, coders distinguished 
between parental factors, family factors and school factors, similar to Carr’s distinction of 
contextual factors (2006, Figure 2.1). Coders resolved disagreements in discussion.  
Agreement. We calculated agreement about segmentation into idea units using the 
same formulas as Eells et al. (2005) and Stinson et al. (1994) did, from Scott and Hatfield 
(1985). For five randomly chosen protocols, the three coders arrived at a mean of 71 % 
pairwise agreement (ranging from 57 to 81 %), using the conservative formula (A / (A + D), A 
meaning beginnings of new units agreed on, D beginnings disagreed on), or 83 % (ranging 
from 72 to 91 %) using the less conservative formula (2 A / (x + y), where x and y are the 
total number of beginnings for two coders). To establish content coding agreement, we 
calculated multirater kappas for five randomly chosen protocols, using the formula from 
Siegel and Castellan (1988) (cf. Eells et al., 2005). This resulted, for coding in elements, in a 
mean kappa of .64 (varying from .54 to .76, for different protocols). To compare, agreement 
in Eells et al. (2005) amounted to kappa values of .61, .81, .62 and .69 for coding into 
elements, for the four major categories. As in Eells et al. (2005), our coders seemed to agree 
more on their assignments of idea units to main categories, than on assigning idea units to 
specific elements within categories: the mean multirater kappa for agreement about 
categories was .79 (varying from .74 to .84). To compare, kappa agreement values in Eells et 
al. (2005) were .61, .81, .62 and .69, for coding into categories, for the different categories2. 
For assigning idea units to sub-elements coders arrived at 90 % agreement, calculated for all 
                                                 
2 We did not calculate kappas for the different categories separately, because we based our agreement 
calculations on fewer idea units than Eells et al. (2005) did. Especially in category B there were 
relatively few idea units, which in the five random protocols were exclusively assigned to one element 
(Axis I classification). 
                                                                         Causality in Clinicians’ Mental Representations 
   29
idea units assigned to elements in category B, explanatory elements in category C, and 
elements in category D (99 % for category B, 71 % for category C, and 90 % for category D).  
 
Results 
Causal structure 
Case statements 
Participants verbalized on average 602 words (SD = 218) after they had watched the 
video and studied the test results. Of these words on average 28.2 % (SD = 9.4) were 
contained in case statements. Segmentation of the case statements resulted in a mean of 17.2  
case states (SD = 5.9) (repetitions excluded). Participants verbalized on average 2.7 causal 
links (SD = 2.6), 0.5 temporal links (SD = 1.0), and 3.6 and links (SD = 2.1). On average 6.2 
case states (SD = 4.7), or 32.8 % (SD = 22.3), were linked by means of causal or temporal 
links, or the and links which meant also causally linked or also temporally linked (see 
method).  
Linked case states were visualized in conceptual graphs. Three participants had not 
verbalized any causal or temporal links, so for them no conceptual graphs could be 
constructed. For nine participants conceptual graphs consisted of more than one disjoint 
part. The length of the longest chain, that is: the longest connected path in a conceptual 
graph, consisted on average of 2.4 linked case states (SD = 1.5), for six participants the 
longest chain consisted of more than two case states. To illustrate, Figure 1 and Figure 2 
show the conceptual graphs we constructed for two participants. Case states that were not 
causally or temporally linked are listed beneath the graphs. Figure 1 shows a conceptual 
graph that consists of two disjoint parts. In Figure 2 the longest chain consists of six case 
states, which is the longest of all participants’ chains. 
Follow-up steps 
On average 26.0 % of participants’ verbalizations (SD = 12.7) were contained in 
follow-up statements. Segmentation of the follow-up statements resulted in a mean of 11.2 
follow-up states (SD = 6.1) (repetitions excluded). Participants verbalized on average 0.3 
causal links (SD = 0.7), 0.7 temporal links (SD = 1.2), 4.3 and links (SD = 3.3), 3.0 reason links 
(SD = 1.5), and 1.4 referential links (SD = 1.8).  Here, temporal links between follow-up states 
represent the order of follow-up steps proposed by a participant, or that some information 
or effect was expected after some assessment or some treatment.  
On average 7.8 follow-up states (SD = 4.6), or 70.8 % (SD = 23.6), were linked by 
means of reason links, referential links, causal links, temporal links, or the and links which 
meant also causally linked, also temporally linked, also linked by a reason link, or also 
referentially linked. However, not all linked follow-up states were linked to case states, and 
not all follow-up states linked to case states were linked to case states in a conceptual graph. 
On average 5.6 follow-up states (SD = 4.0), or 55.9 % (SD = 36.0), were linked to case states. 
This percentage includes follow-up states that are indirectly linked to case states: follow-up 
states that are causally, temporally, by reason, or referentially linked to other follow-up 
states which are connected to a case state. On average 3.4 follow-up states (SD = 3.8), or 32.8 
% (SD = 35.3), were linked to case states in a conceptual graph, including follow-up states 
which were linked indirectly.  
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Three participants had no follow-up states linked to case states. Eight participants 
had no follow-up states linked to case states in a conceptual graph. Three of these were the 
participants for whom we had not been able to construct a conceptual graph in the first 
analysis, as they had not verbalized any causal or temporal links between case states.  
Figures 3 and 4 show how follow-up states are linked to case states in the conceptual 
graphs shown in Figures 1 and 2, as well as follow-up states linked to case states which were 
not part of the conceptual graphs for these participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual graph and unlinked case states for one participant.   
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Figure 2. Conceptual graph and unlinked case states for another participant.   
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Figure 3. Follow-up steps added to conceptual graph and unlinked case states for 
participant of Figure 1.   
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Figure 4. Follow-up steps added to conceptual graph and unlinked case states for 
participant of Figure 2. 
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Background variables 
Because results show a large variation in the proportions of case states and follow-up 
states that are linked, we correlated these outcome measures with participants’ experience 
(measured by the number of similar cases participants had seen before, although years of 
experience gave similar results). Experience was not significantly correlated with these 
outcomes, nor with the number of causal links, or the length of the longest causal path 
(Spearman’s rank order correlations were between -.25 and .09; all p’s > .2). When asked for 
their confidence in their judgments of what was the matter with the boy and in their 
proposed follow-up steps, participants scored on average 5.2 and 5.3 respectively, on a scale 
of 1 (very little) to 7 (very much). Although confidence was not significantly correlated with 
the proportions of linked states, it was significantly correlated with experience: the more 
experienced with similar cases, the more confident participants were (Spearman’s rho = 0.67 
and 0.65, respectively; both p’s < .01). Most participants did not adhere to one specific 
theory, so we could not relate our outcome measures to theory preferences.   
Content analysis 
Aver aged over participants, coders assigned 11,3 idea units (SD = 5,6), which is 30,0  
% of all idea units, to category D (treatment planning). Further, on average 8,5 idea units (SD 
= 5,8) were assigned to category A (descriptive information), 3,5 (SD = 3,1) to category B 
(diagnostic information), and 8,5 (SD = 4,7) to category C (inferred information). Within 
category C, on average 4,9 idea units (SD = 2,8) were assigned to explanatory, causal 
elements: psychological, biological, and social mechanisms, predisposing and precipitating 
factors, strengths, and potential therapy-interfering factors. Thus, on average, of all units 
assigned to either categories A, B, or C, 25,0 % was assigned to causal elements (SD = 13,0), 
57,6 % to descriptive elements (SD = 15,0) (category A elements, plus these elements from 
category C: inferred symptoms and evaluations of level of functioning), and 17,3 % to 
category B3 (SD = 14,8).  
Table 1 shows which (sub) elements in the four main categories of the CFCCM  coders 
identified in participants’ verbalizations, and with how many participants. Elements of the 
CFCCM to which coders assigned no idea units are not presented.  
This table shows that all participants considered descriptive information (category 
A); most of the time they mentioned problem and symptom information from the case (n = 
18). For 18 participants at least one idea unit was assigned to category B (classifications); 
these participants all referred to sub-element “ADHD” (Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder). We should note here, that consideration of a classification is sufficient to get a 
code. Thus, if participants mention for example ADHD, while saying that they think this 
classification should not be given, the code for having considered this classification is still 
assigned. For category C, idea units of 11 respectively 13 participants were assigned to 
                                                 
3 We calculated the proportion of idea units assigned to explanatory, causal elements of the total number of idea 
units assigned to categories A, B, and C, to make this comparable to the outcome measures for causal linking of 
case states in the causal structure analyses. We calculated the proportion of idea units assigned to treatment 
planning elements (category D) of the total number of idea units, assigned to any category, to make this 
comparable with the proportion of follow-up statements identified in the protocols, in the causal structure 
analysis. Note that in the content analyses units of analysis (idea units) are larger than in the structure analysis 
(simple sentences); that in the content analyses repetitions are not excluded from analyses; and that in the content 
analyses open questions are included.   
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elements we consider to be descriptive: evaluations of level of functioning, and inferred 
symptoms or problems. For the causal elements, we see that one participant considered 
predisposing factors, and two participants considered precipitating factors. Most 
participants (n = 16) mentioned one or more psychological mechanisms, but as can be 
inferred from the sub-elements, participants mentioned different causes within this element. 
Even within the distinction between cognitive and affective sub-elements participants 
mentioned different specific causes, as is indicated between brackets. Six participants 
mentioned biological mechanisms, 11 participants mentioned social mechanisms. Within 
category D most participants (n = 17) indicated that they wanted to perform further 
assessment. However, they differed in specifically what they wanted to assess. Half of the 
participants proposed parent support (n = 10) as specific treatment type. Participants agreed 
less about other specific treatment types, specific techniques, and foci of attention.   
Causal structure and causal content 
We correlated the number of causal elements identified for a participant in the content 
analysis (the sum of the number of idea units coded as psychological, biological, and social 
mechanisms, predisposing and precipitating factors, strengths, and potential therapy-
interfering events) with causal measures of the causal structure analysis, that is: the number 
of causal links, percentage linked case states, and length of the longest causal path. This 
resulted in Spearman’s rho of 0.71, 0.61, and 0.76 respectively (all p’s < .01).  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
We analyzed the structure and the contents of clinicians’ mental representations of 
client information, to see whether clinicians represented information in causal models. We 
also investigated whether the follow-up steps they proposed were related to these causal 
models. Results of the structure analyses show that on average one third of the case states 
verbalized were causally and temporally connected, mostly causally. For most participants 
the causal structures we reconstructed in conceptual graphs were simple; the longest path of 
connected states often did not exceed two states. Also, conceptual graphs often consisted of 
two or more disjoint parts. Moreover, we found that most follow-up steps that clinicians 
proposed were not related to causally and temporally structured representations. Almost 
half of all follow-up steps were not even linked to any case state. Analysis of the contents of 
participants’ verbalizations, using the CFCCM, gave comparable results: one fourth of the 
idea units (excluding units assigned to the category of treatment planning) were identified as 
having causal content, while most verbalizations contained descriptive information. While 
there was large variation between participants, it seems that most participants did not 
construct complex, coherent causal representations on which they based their follow-up 
steps. Furthermore, we found that participants mentioned different causal elements and 
gave different suggestions for further assessment and treatment.  
If we compare our results to those of Pennington and Hastie (1986), we see that in 
the jurors’ protocols 91 % of all events verbalized was causally and temporally linked, mostly 
causally. Also, jurors’ story representations were related to their verdicts. We had expected 
to find more elaborate causal structures in clinicians’ mental representations of client 
information as well as more connections between follow-up states and case states, since  
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Table 1  
Elements and Sub-elements identified in Content Analysis 
 
Category, Element n Sub-element n
A Descriptive information  20  
a. Symptom and problem identification 18  
b. Development (including mental & physical 
health) 
6  
c. Social relations (family / school / peers) 6  
d. Appearance 3  
e. Need more descriptive information 12  
B Diagnostic information  18  
1. Axis 1 DSM-IV-TR diagnosis 18 a. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 18
 b. Pervasive Development Disorders 8
 c. Oppositional Defiant Disorder  2
 d. Reading Disorder (Dyslexia) 1
 e. Not specified 3
2. Axis 2 DSM-IV-TR diagnosis 1 a. Not specified 1
3. Axis unspecified 2  2
C Inferred information 19  
1. Evaluation level of functioning 11  
2. Inferred symptoms and problems 13  
3. Predisposing factors  2 a. Pre- and perinatal complications 1
 b. Injury 1
 c. Not specified 1
4. Precipitating factors  1 a. Moving house 1
5. Psychological mechanisms 16 a. Cognitive (attention, learning, self-image) 7
 b. Affective (impulse regulation, anger) 9
 c. Behavioural (hyperactivity) 2
 d. Interpersonal  3
 e. Comorbid disorder (NLD) 1
 f. Not specified 3
6. Biological mechanisms 6 a. Genetic predisposition 2
 b. Neurological factors 3
 c. Physical factors (sensory, metabolism) 2
7. Social mechanisms 11 a. Parental factors (parenting style, expectations) 5
 b. Family interactions  4
 c. School factors (teachers, expectations, peers) 3
 d. Social factors not specified 4
8. Strengths 9 a. Strengths/adaptive skills 6
 b. Motivation 1
 c. Psychosocial support 1
 d. Not specified 1
9. Potential interfering factors  2 a. Attitude child 1
 b. Attitude father 1
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Table 1 
Continued 
 
Category, Element n Sub-element n
D Treatment planning 20  
1. Assessment/evaluation 17 a. Development 1
 b. Child: cognitive factors  3
 c. Child: affective factors  1
 d. Child: behaviour/interpersonal factors 3
 e. Child: neurological factors 1
 f. Child: physical factors 3
 g. Diagnosis  6
 h. Parenting style 4
 i. Family interactions 3
 j. School interactions 2
 k. Evaluation 1
 l. Referral 5
 m. Not specified  6
2. Type of treatment 13 a. Parent support 10
 b. Family therapy 3
 c. Remedial teaching 2
 d. Training (social skills, self-efficacy) 1
 e. Cognitive therapy 3
 f. Referral 1
3. Specific techniques 15 a. Child-focused (cognitive, affective) 3
 b. Parenting intervention 6
 c. School intervention 5
 d. Psycho-education 5
4. Treatment expectations 5 a. Improvement child (cognitive, affective) 3
 b. Improvement parenting style  1
 c. Improvement family interactions 1
5. Focus on signs and symptoms 4 a. Cognitive factors 3
 b. Affective factors 1
6. Focus on psychological mechanisms 5 a. Cognitive   2
 b. Affective  1
 c. Interpersonal  1
 d. Not specified 1
7. Focus on social factors 9 a. Parenting style 4
 b. Family interactions 6
 c. School interactions 5
 d. Special education 1
 e. Not specified 2
8. Medication  7
9. Focus on strengths  3
 
Note. Elements from the CFCCM to which coders assigned at least one idea unit are included in this 
table, and the sub-elements identified within these elements. For both elements and sub-elements the 
number of participants for which a (sub) element was coded is indicated. For mechanisms, causes are 
indicated, not effects.  
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identification of causal variables seems important for choosing effective interventions (Eells 
et al., 1998; Haynes, 1992; Haynes & Williams, 2003; Kuyken et al., 2005; Nurcombe, 2000; 
Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006).  
Our results resemble those of Eells et al. (1998), who found that written clinical case 
formulations from intake interviews were largely descriptive, and simple rather than 
complex. In these formulations, symptoms, problems, precipitating or predisposing life 
events were hardly integrated in explanatory mechanisms. Kendjelic and Eells (2007) 
obtained similar results for a group of clinicians who received no training in case 
formulation.  In psychotherapists’ think aloud case formulations Eells et al. (2005) found 
that the largest proportion of idea units was coded as inferred information (category C): 37 
%. However, this percentage includes idea units about inferred symptoms and problems and 
evaluations of level of functioning, elements that we did not consider to be causal. Kuyken et 
al. (2005) assessed the reliability and quality of case formulations that clinicians had 
constructed using a systematic method for cognitive case formulation. Although agreement 
on descriptive aspects was good, agreement was lower for inferential aspects. Further, only 
44 % of the formulations was judged as at least “good enough”, in terms of the parsimony, 
coherence, and meaningfulness needed to base effective interventions on them.  
Why are the causal representations of client information we extracted simple, 
diverse, and poorly related to treatment planning? We discuss four explanations. 
First, the differences in our findings compared to those of Pennington and Hastie 
(1986) may be explained by the different task demands for jurors and clinicians. American 
jurors have to decide about one specific event: the crime, while clinicians have to decide how 
to treat problems which usually span a whole period in life, or a whole life. Jurors appeared 
to construct stories to integrate trial information. Stories, although they may be hierarchic 
(have embedded episodes) (Pennington & Hastie, 1986; Rumelhart, 1975), are told in a linear 
fashion: one event after another unfolding in time. Clients’ problematic behaviours are not a 
single event, and are not the consequence of a single cause. Behaviour is caused by many 
interacting influences: biological, cognitive, and environmental, which are mostly 
probabilistic (Haynes, 1992; Kiesler, 1999; Morton, 2004). As a result of the interactions, 
behaviours can take different forms in subsequent phases in life (Morton, 2004). 
Explanations of behaviours of clients should be multidimensional, taking into account all 
influences, their interactions, and changes in time. This multidimensionality of (explanations 
for) behaviour complicates decisions for interventions (De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006). Gaps 
in a linear story will be more easily discerned and filled in than gaps in more complex, 
multidimensional models (Keil, 2003). Thus, it might be more difficult to construct a 
comprehensive causal representation for a clinician deciding upon a client’s behaviours, 
than it is for jurors deciding about a crime.  
Second, the lack of causal structure in clinicians’ mental representations may be 
explained by the fact that comprehensive scientific knowledge about interacting causes is 
still lacking for mental disorders and psychopathological behaviour (Kiesler, 1999; Cicchetti 
& Sroufe, 2000), as is evidence for why interventions are effective (Bieling & Kuyken, 2003; 
De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006). Insufficient or inconsistent knowledge of causes and effects 
of interventions will impede the construction of complete, coherent causal models to which 
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follow-up steps can be connected. Perhaps clinicians’ knowledge base resembles physics 
students’ knowledge base of physics: loose fragments which are hardly connected in 
unifying causal theories (Di Sessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004; Keil, 2006). This might explain 
why in our study conceptual graphs often consisted of two or more disjoint parts, why 
causal paths were usually short, and why many follow-up steps remained unlinked to case 
states. Also, a lack of consensual knowledge on aetiology and effective treatments can 
explain the large variation in causal contents and treatment planning.  
A third explanation for our results is that clinicians do not only engage in causal 
reasoning to process client information and to decide upon treatment, but also in schematic 
processing, such as classification of problem behaviour in DSM-IV categories. If information 
is ordered in schemas which clinicians activate while processing information, clinicians 
might mention elements of schemas in their protocols, but we will not find much causal and 
temporal linking. Leon and Perez (2001) found that clinicians activate “clinical diagnosis 
inferences” while reading clinical texts. This activation is a process of categorization of 
signs, symptoms, and behaviours. A similar process may partly account for our findings: if 
we consider the lists of unlinked states in Figures 1 and 2, it seems that some of these states 
can be interpreted as symptoms belonging to categories, or elements of schemas that 
participants may have of ADHD or NLD (Nonverbal Learning Disorder).  
Interestingly, participants sometimes suggest categories as cause, as when ‘ADHD’ is 
thought to cause impulsive behaviour (see Figure 1). This seems to be in line with the claim 
of Leon and Perez (2001) that the clinical diagnosis inferences clinicians activate are 
explanations: according to Leon and Perez clinicians infer underlying psychopathological 
disorders from symptoms and behaviours, which are thought to cause the specific 
behaviours. In the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) ADHD is defined as a 
pattern of persistent inattentive, hyperactive, and impulsive behaviours. Thus interpreted, 
saying that ADHD causes impulsiveness is circular. Kim and Ahn (2002) found that despite 
the atheoretical design of the DSM-IV, clinicians’ representations of DSM-IV disorders do 
have causal structure, and that this causal structure influences clinicians’ classifications.  
The content analysis shows that participants mentioned classifications, and it seems 
that participants agree more about classification than about causal elements. Perhaps higher 
agreement about classification follows from the consensual nature of the classification 
systems (e.g. DSM-IV; ICD-10).  
Clinicians might be engaged in both causal reasoning and schematic processing. 
However, if schemas are activated, and clinicians mention elements of these schemas when 
verbalizing their thoughts, one would expect follow-up steps to be related to these elements. 
But we found that almost half of all follow-up steps was not related, either directly or via 
other follow-up steps, to any case state. Also, despite agreement on classification, 
participants did not agree about treatment planning. These findings are in line with those of 
Witteman and Koele (1999), who found that clinicians’ client interpretations could not 
predict their treatment decisions. Perhaps the follow-up steps that clinicians proposed are 
based on routine or institutional standards, rather than (only) on causal or schematic mental 
representations of client information.  
Chapter 2  
 40
Our fourth explanation concerns our methodology. It might be argued that our 
participants did not succeed in arriving at elaborate, coherent causal representations due to 
the case we used, which might have been too difficult, or because we gave insufficient 
information. However, most clinicians were familiar with similar cases, and thought the case 
was representative. We deliberately provided a lot of information, more than clinicians will 
generally have before deciding on treatment.  
Another methodological explanation is, that possibly clinicians were constructing 
causal models or stories, and did base their follow-up steps upon these, but that we have not 
uncovered them because links are not always verbalized explicitly, i.e. with connective words 
or verbs. Similarly, causal elements might be considered though not always verbalized 
explicitly. Our structure coding was very strict, copying from Pennington and Hastie (1986) 
who demanded explicitness before considering a relation to be causal. They judged that in 
“Johnson was a violent man. That makes me think he intended to kill Caldwell” the two 
events are not causally or temporally connected; while in “Johnson was angry so he decided 
to kill him” they are (Pennington and Hastie, 1986, p. 249). However, simply reading the 
protocols yielded no clear indication of implicit causal or temporal structuring of 
information, such as chronological ordering. We further note that our results seem 
comparable to those of Eells et al. (1998) and Kuyken et al. (2005), who analyzed written case 
formulations. Also, the correlations between results of the analyses of causal structure and 
causal content add to the reliability of both methods for analyzing causality in 
diagnosticians’ reasoning. Still, when clinicians become more experienced they might rely 
more on implicit, automatic routines, which are not accessible for verbalization (cf. Einhorn, 
Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Although concurrent 
verbalization of thoughts may accurately reflect underlying cognitive processes (as opposed 
to retrospective verbal reports on mental processes, see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), it is 
impossible to report all thoughts. Validation of results of the think aloud method with other 
methods is recommended (Caspar, 1997; Einhorn et al., 1979; Ericsson, 2006; Magliano, 
1999).  
Limitations of this study are inherent to the labour-intensive think aloud method. We 
used only one case, and our sample is small. Because of the small sample size statistical 
calculations incorporating participants’ characteristics are not powerful. Therefore, we can 
neither support nor exclude explanations for the large variation we found in our structure 
and content analyses. Clinicians’ experience may however be expected to influence causal 
reasoning, in the sense that more expert diagnosticians might have more complex, elaborate, 
and comprehensive causal representations of clients, to which intervention choices are more 
evidently linked (Boshuizen, 2004; Eells & Lombart, 2003; Eells et al., 2005; Kuyken et al., 
2005). Theoretical adherence might also be expected to influence causal reasoning; however 
Kuyken et al. (2005) found that cognitive therapists who received an additional training in a 
standardized cognitive case formulation method still disagreed about explanatory 
inferences. 
                                                                         Causality in Clinicians’ Mental Representations 
   41
Future research 
In future studies, the role of causal reasoning in diagnosticians’ information 
processing and decision making needs to be further investigated. Task demands might be 
varied to learn how these influence clinicians’ reasoning processes. Also sample 
characteristics such as amount of experience might be varied. Other qualitative methods 
might be used, such as explicit probing for causal explanations as in cognitive mapping 
techniques (cf. Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004; Kim & Ahn, 2002; see Chapter 4 of this 
thesis). In addition, more quantitative and experimental methods might be used to refine 
models of clinicians’ cognitive processes and validate models’ predictions (Einhorn et al., 
1979; cf. Gaines, Brown, & Doyle, 1996; Magliano, 1999). Further, research should establish 
what clinicians base their interventions on, because so far this is unclear (cf. Eells et al., 
1998; Kuyken et al., 2005; Witteman & Koele, 1999). Also, it remains to be established 
whether high quality causal client representations or case formulations lead to better 
treatment decisions, in terms of effectiveness (Bieling & Kuyken, 2003; Eells, 2007). Finally, 
the disagreement about causal, explanatory elements that diagnosticians mentioned here, or 
described in case formulations (Eells et al., 1998; Kenjelic & Eells, 2007; Kuyken et al., 2005, 
see also Garb, 1998) needs further attention. Specifically, it seems important to learn what 
the consequences are of this disagreement and how it might be reduced. 
Implications 
Because of the limitations of this study mentioned above, the implications we suggest 
should be treated with caution. Given that clinicians’ tasks are indeed inherently complex, 
and that there is a lack of fundamental causal knowledge, decision support and educational 
methods might be directed at aiding in the construction of causal models, testing causal 
hypotheses, and at making gaps in knowledge visible. It is not self-evident that clinicians are 
aware of gaps. Rozenblit and Keil (2002) found that people overestimate their ability to 
explain complex causal systems. Clinicians in our study were confident about their 
assessments, and more so when they were more experienced. A relation between clinicians’ 
(over)confidence and experience has been reported more often (e.g. Oskamp, 1965; 
Lichtenberg, 1997). Since we hardly found comprehensive causal representations, a poor 
relation of follow-up steps to case states, and large variation in causal contents and 
treatment planning, this confidence is perhaps out of place.  
Morton (2004) has developed a graphic tool which can help represent complex ideas 
in a comprehensible form, called “causal modelling”. Using this tool facilitates both 
understanding and comparison of different theories for disorders (Krol, Morton, & De Bruyn, 
2004) as well as one’s causal understanding of individual clients. Also, use of “Functional 
Analytic Clinical Case Models” (Haynes & Williams, 2003), which depict and quantify complex 
causal relations, can aid in identifying important causal relations and subsequently selecting 
the most effective treatments for individual clients. We advocate the use of such tools. 
Kendjelic and Eells (2007) found that training in case formulation improves their quality, 
and increases the number of explanatory inferences in them. Training in case formulation 
skill might also be enhanced by the use of computers (Caspar et al., 2004).  
Also, it seems important to stimulate students and clinicians to read and use recent 
scientific causal insights. In this light, findings of Woods, Brooks, and Norman (2005) are 
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interesting. They found that, after a time lag, students diagnose more accurately and recall 
more medical information if this information was learned by explaining the causal 
mechanisms than when information was learned by providing probabilities. Students seem 
to remember causal information better, or information is more easily reconstructed when it 
is understood causally. 
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Looking for Causes? 
Causal Reasoning in Mental Health Clinicians’ Information Processing 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Twenty clinicians watched a video of an intake-interview, while thinking aloud about these 
questions: “What do you think is the matter with this client; what would you propose as follow-up 
steps?” Based on the assumption that clinicians’ reasoning process is explanation-based, we expected 
that clinicians would make mostly causal inferences while processing the intake information. We 
found, however, that most inferences were descriptive. Further, we found that, as early as at the intake, 
different clinicians considered different explanations. We suggest that the role of causal reasoning in 
clinicians’ information processing may be limited, because a causal understanding of clients may not 
always be necessary to make treatment decisions, and because diagnosticians may lack complete 
causal knowledge.  
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Clinicians collect information about their clients through interviews, tests, and observations, 
in order to identify their clients’ problems and to decide on effective interventions for these 
problems. This information is integrated in case formulations, which are supposed to give a 
comprehensive description of the client, and causally explain their behaviours and 
symptoms, referring to past events and to interacting physical, social, and psychological 
factors. Further, these case formulations allow predictions or prognoses as to which 
interventions will be most effective (e.g. see handbooks: Carr, 2006; De Bruyn, Ruijssenaars, 
Pamijer, & Van Aarle, 2003; Eells, 2007; Wenar & Kerig, 2006). Causal reasoning thus seems 
essential to clinicians’ information processing and decision making (see also Garb, 2005). 
In complex, dynamic situations decision makers reason causally to arrive at their 
decisions. They integrate ill-structured, incomplete, and implication-rich information in 
causally structured mental representations. From these representations they then derive 
their decisions (Goldstein & Weber, 1995; Hastie & Pennington, 2000; Pliske & Klein, 2003; 
Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). To arrive at coherent representations decision makers make 
inferences, using their background knowledge. Many inferences are made during the 
decision process, before actually reaching a final conclusion, as is shown in research on 
jurors’ decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1988; 1994).  
Similarly, in text comprehension people make a lot of inferences, using their 
knowledge, to construct coherent causal situation representations (Graesser, Olde, & Klettke, 
2002; Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Langston & Trabasso, 1999; Van den Broek & 
Gustafson, 1999). Think aloud studies showed that people make explanatory inferences 
during reading rather than associative inferences which elaborate on descriptions, or 
predictive inferences which predict consequences (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Zwaan & 
Brown, 1996). Similar findings have been obtained with time-based behavioural measures, 
such as sentence reading times and lexical decision times (Graesser et al., 1994; Magliano, 
1999). 
Comprehension is part of decision making, and integration of information in 
coherent causal representations is central to both decision making and text comprehension 
(Rettinger & Hastie, 2003; cf. Whitten & Graesser, 2003). This also applies to clinical 
reasoning (Arocha & Patel, 1995; Leon & Perez, 2001). We may therefore expect that 
clinicians make causal inferences while they process client information to arrive at coherent 
causal representations, using their world knowledge and specific clinical knowledge. We also 
expect them to make these inferences early in the process, in line with Sandifer, Hordern, 
and Green (1970) who found that psychiatrists generated almost half of their diagnostic 
hypotheses after watching the first three minutes of diagnostic interview videos (see also 
Kendell, 1973, Nurcombe & Fitzhenry-Coor, 1982). 
However, this expectation is not supported by research on diagnosticians’ case 
formulations. Eells, Kendjelic, and Lucas (1998) found that the case formulations clinicians 
made from intake interviews were predominantly descriptive. Less than half of the case 
formulations contained inferred causal mechanisms which explained clients’ problems, and 
only a few of these contained mechanisms which were rated adequate or strong. Similarly, 
Kuyken, Fothergill, Musa, and Chadwick (2005) judged that cognitive therapists’ case 
formulations were often not sufficiently coherently structured and did not provide a 
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meaningful enough account of the client’s problems, to allow the derivation of effective 
interventions. Mental client representations as extracted from clinicians’ think aloud 
protocols also appeared to lack causal complexity, with follow-up steps proposed poorly 
related to them (De Kwaadsteniet, Krol, & Witteman, 2008, see Chapter 2 of this thesis) 
However, in the studies of Eells et al. (1998), Kuyken et al. (2005), and De 
Kwaadsteniet et al. (2008) the analyses concerned clinicians’ remarks, either written or 
verbalised, made after all of the information had been presented. Such post hoc reports may 
not be representative of reasoning processes as these occur at the time of actually 
processing the information (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). This was shown, for 
example, by Eva, Brooks, and Norman (2002). They compared medical students’ and 
residents’ think aloud protocols obtained on-line with think aloud protocols obtained after 
all the case information had been presented. In the post hoc protocols fewer propositions 
were verbalised, fewer hypotheses were generated, hypotheses were generated later, and 
fewer causal links were verbalised than in the on-line protocols. Causal explanations that 
clinicians generate while processing information may not be elaborated on afterwards, or 
only briefly mentioned (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), perhaps because these appear obvious, 
or because clinicians feel too uncertain about them.  
In the present study, we analysed clinicians' think aloud protocols that were obtained 
on-line. Clinicians verbalised their thoughts while they were watching a video of an intake 
interview. Assuming that diagnostic reasoning indeed is an explanation-based process 
similar to decision making in other complex domains and in text comprehension, we 
hypothesised that we would find more causal than associative or predictive inferences, and 
that questions and inquiry plans verbalised by the clinicians would mostly ask for causal 
rather than descriptive information. 
In addition we investigated the specific contents of the inferences, questions, and 
inquiry plans, in order to see whether different clinicians offer the same explanations and 
inquiry plans. Reliability of clinicians’ causal inferences is notoriously poor (Dawes, 1994; 
Garb, 1998, 2005). Kuyken et al. (2005) and Persons and Bertagnolli (1999) found that 
cognitive therapists could reliably formulate descriptive aspects, but that the inferential 
aspects of the formulations were less reliable. Also, variability in causal statements that 
clinicians verbalise in post hoc think aloud protocols was large (De Kwaadsteniet et al., 
2008). By analysing the contents of clinicians’ inferences early in the diagnostic process, we 
want to find out whether disagreement already arises early.  
Analysis of clinicians’ on-line information processing should thus inform us about 
clinicians’ causal reasoning processes, while they are constructing their mental 
representations. This information is useful to improve diagnostic reasoning, for example 
through the development of decision aids and training methods (Caspar, Berger, & Hautle, 
2004; Garb, 2005; Witteman, Harries, Bekker, & Van Aarle, 2007).  
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty clinicians with different levels of experience participated. Four participants 
were master students at the end of their final year. These students, all women, had had nine 
Looking for Causes? 
  47
months of clinical experience with children of primary school age during their internships. 
The sixteen experienced participants, twelve women and four men, worked in fourteen 
different institutions, as a clinical (child) psychologist or as a remedial educationalist. Their 
mean experience was 13.3 years (SD = 9.8).  
Materials 
We presented participants with materials of a diagnostic investigation of a nine year 
old boy, for which we had received his parents’ written consent. These materials included a 
video of 33 minutes of the intake interview, the results of nine tests, and a description of the 
behaviour observed during these tests. The boy and his parents had been referred to a Dutch 
youth care institution because of the boy’s increasingly problematic behaviour at home and 
in school.  
In the intake interview, first the parents and the boy talked with two clinicians. After 
ten minutes the boy left with one of the clinicians to go to a play room. The parents 
continued their conversation with the other clinician. The video was shown on a laptop, and 
participants wore headphones. Participants could interrupt the video by pressing the space 
bar. When they interrupted the video the pauses were registered. 
Procedure  
Except for the student participants and two experienced participants who came to 
the experimenter’s office, participants were visited by the experimenter at the institution 
where they worked. After two unrelated exercises to get used to verbalising thoughts aloud, 
the experimenter presented clinicians with the intake video. A written instruction asked the 
participants to watch the intake as if they were present, or as if they were going to be asked 
to take over this client from a colleague. The participants were asked to think aloud, while 
watching the video, focusing on the following questions: “What do you think is the matter 
with this boy; and what would you propose as follow-up steps?” The questions were copied 
on a sheet of paper, which was on the table in front of the participants, as a memory aid.  
Participants could at any time interrupt the video in order to express their thoughts. 
They could also verbalise their thoughts without interrupting the video. If participants didn’t 
speak for several minutes, the experimenter reminded them to think aloud. Otherwise, the 
experimenter remained silent. 
At the end of the video, the experimenter prompted participants to continue to think 
aloud about the questions. When participants stopped speaking, she asked them to study 
the additional test information, all the while thinking aloud. When they again stopped 
speaking, she asked for a summary. Finally, participants filled in a short questionnaire 
asking for personal information (such as age and experience). They were thanked and 
received their rewards: a gift certificate of 50 euro for the clinicians, or 10 euro for the 
students. The experiment took one-and-a-half to two hours per participant.  
Analysis  
The analysis of the data focused on the verbalisations made by the participants while 
they watched the intake video and later, after the video stopped, before they were presented 
with the additional information. In the 33 minutes of the intake a lot of information was 
presented, which should be sufficient to analyse clinicians’ reasoning while they form 
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mental representations. Two coders independently segmented and coded the typed-out 
verbalisations.  
 Segmentation. First, coders segmented all verbalisations into semantic units, using 
the transcription procedure of Berman and Slobin (1994) (cf. Trabasso & Magliano, 1996). 
Each unit should describe one situation (event, action, or state). If, for example, a participant 
said “he is very impulsive and often oppositional”, coders divided this into the units “he is 
very impulsive” and “and often oppositional”. Coders neglected participants’ “narrator 
comments” which concerned their own thinking (e.g. “I think that”, “It appears that”) 
(following Berman & Slobin, 1994), or which concerned persons in the video (e.g. “Mother 
says”, “The clinician asks”).   
 Categories. Next, coders assigned each unit to one of seven categories: information 
from the video, inferences, questions, inquiry plans, treatment plans, knowledge, and a rest 
category. Information from the video was defined as repetitions of what the parents, the 
boy, or the clinicians said in the video, or consisting of observations of behaviours in the 
video. Repetitions of what had been said did not need to be given in the same words, as long 
as the gist remained the same. Repetitions of information or observations which were stated 
in general terms were also considered to be information from the video, as long as these 
general formulations did not add anything new.  
Coders identified units as inferences when the verbalisations of the participants 
added new information concerning persons in the video, which at least at that point had not 
yet been presented. To establish whether information had been presented before or not, 
coders used a literally typed-out report of the intake video.  
We defined questions as verbalisations asking for more information. Usually 
questions can be recognised by words such as who, what, how, etcetera (e.g. “What hobbies 
does he have?”). Verbalisations conveying inquiry plans were coded separately (e.g. “I would 
check his hearing”), as were verbalisations conveying treatment plans and their expected 
effects (e.g. “Medication might help”, and “to help him concentrate”). Verbalisations in which 
participants explicated their theoretical or experiential knowledge were categorised 
separately (e.g. “I often see young children being spoiled”). Finally, in the rest category were 
coded verbalisations not about the persons in the video, but for example about the task (e.g. 
“Which key should I press”), or about participants’ own thinking processes (e.g. “Let me 
think back”) and incomprehensible verbalisations.  
Coders coded all units identified in participants’ verbalisations, excluding only 
experimenter’s verbalisations and typist’s comments (e.g. “laughs”). Here too, coders 
neglected narrator comments.   
Subcategories. For inferences, questions and inquiry plans, coders distinguished four 
subcategories: descriptive, explanatory, classifying, or predicting. Inferences were coded as 
descriptive when they provided additional information or details about symptoms, 
problems, or persons, so the who, what, how, etcetera of events or situations (e.g. “(I think) 
there will be many conflicts between mother and son”). They were coded as explanatory 
when they provided causes or reasons for events or situations (e.g. “It might just be 
provocation”). These inferences can be imagined to answer why questions. Inferences were 
coded as classifying when they mentioned specific clinical categories for symptoms or 
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behaviours (e.g. from DSM-IV, as in “(It seems to me) ADHD”). Finally, inferences were coded 
as predicting when they conveyed what a participant thought would happen later in the 
video, or later in the boy’s life (e.g. “He might drop out of school”). The level of certainty 
expressed (e.g. by words such as perhaps, probably, probably not) was irrelevant for 
assigning an inference to one of these subcategories. 
   Analogously, questions and inquiry plans were coded as descriptive when they 
asked for more descriptive information (e.g. “How is his motor-functioning?”), as 
explanatory when they asked for possible causes or reasons (e.g. “Why does he become so 
angry?”), as classifying when they asked for possible classifications (e.g. “Test the ADHD-
hypothesis”), or as predicting when they asked how situations would evolve in time. For 
inquiry plans, we added the subcategory open for units in which inquiry plans expressed 
only the plan to gain additional information, without further specifying what kind of 
information (e.g. “I would do additional research”).   
 Content coding. Coders analysed the specific contents of those inferences, questions, 
and inquiry plans that had been subcategorised as either explanatory or classifying. For this, 
we used the Case Formulation Content Coding Method (CFCCM) of Eells, Kendjelic, Lucas, 
and Lombart (received in personal communication, October 2007). This coding method has 
been developed to code the contents of written case formulations and of case formulations 
as verbalised in thinking aloud (for a description, see Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & 
Lucas, 2005).  
We mapped the inferences, questions and inquiry plan that had been subcategorised 
as classifying onto the category ‘diagnostic information’ of the CFCCM, which codes 
verbalisations that consider a diagnosis in DSM-terms. We mapped the inferences, questions 
and inquiry plans that had been subcategorised as explanatory onto the category ‘inferred 
information’ of the CFCCM, specifically to those elements which concern explanatory 
inferences: predisposing and precipitating factors or events, psychological mechanisms, 
biological mechanisms, social mechanisms, and protective factors.  
Based on participants’ verbalisations we created a subdivision in the elements of the 
CFCCM, because sub-elements in the CFCCM do not always seem appropriate for children’s 
cases (cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis). For this subdivision we used Carr’s (2006) identification 
of factors influencing problem development (see Figure 2.1 in Carr, 2006) and his distinction 
of cognitive, affective, behavioural, physical, and interpersonal clinical features (see Table 
11.2 in Carr, 2006). For explanatory units, coders distinguished what specific predisposing 
and precipitating factors participants mentioned, what specific causes participants 
mentioned in the psychological, biological, and social mechanisms, and what protective 
factors they mentioned. Inferences, questions, and inquiry plans might not mention any 
specific explanation (e.g. just asking “why”, or mentioning “child factors”). Coders gave these 
units the code not specified. In the classifications, coders distinguished the different axis I 
DSM-IV-TR-classifications (APA, 2000) that participants mentioned.  
Reliability. We calculated reliability on the basis of five randomly chosen protocols. 
Coders agreed about segmentation into units for 90.6 % of the words in the protocols. For 
assigning units to one of the seven categories, Cohen’s kappa for agreement was .74. For the 
subcategories Cohen’s kappa was .69. We calculated content coding reliability for 
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explanatory and classifying units in all protocols, since there were not so many of them. 
Cohen’s kappa for agreement about content codes was .77. These kappa show substantial 
coding agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). For disagreements, coders provided alternative 
codes. Usually, with these alternatives agreement was reached. Remaining disagreements 
were resolved in discussion. 
 
Results 
Categories and subcategories 
Coders segmented the protocols into on average of 198.7 units (SD = 140.1). One-
third was identified as information from the video, and almost a quarter as inferences. Of 
the inferences, almost two-third was categorised as descriptive. Of the questions an even 
higher percentage was descriptive, and the same was true of the inquiry plans (see Table 1 
for the percentages). 
 
Table 1 
Mean Percentages (and Standard Deviations) of Protocol Units Coded into the Different 
Categories and into Sub-Categories 
 
Category Mean % (SD)  Sub-category Mean % (SD)
Information from the video 34.6 (19.7)    
Inferences 22.3 (12.2)  descriptive 65.9 (18.6)
  explanatory 17.6 (13.5)
  classifying 14.5 (14.8)
  predicting 2.0 (3.0)
Questions 10.5 (8.3)  descriptive 75.8 (21.9)
  explanatory 21.8 (21.8)
  classifying 1.7 (4.8)
  predicting 0.7 (2.5)
Inquiry plans 6.3 (4.2)  descriptive 70.9 (25.3)
  explanatory 6.4 (9.3)
  classifying 3.1 (6.6)
  open 19.6 (18.5)
Treatment plans 2.3 (6.0)    
Knowledge 1.4 (1.9)    
Rest 23.6 (10.6)    
 
 
Paired sample t-tests showed that the proportion of descriptive inferences was 
significantly higher than the proportion of either explanatory, classifying, or predicting 
inferences (t(19) = 7.4; t(19) = 7.6; t(19) = 14.8, all p’s <.01). Similarly, paired sample t-tests 
showed that the proportion of descriptive questions and inquiry plans was larger than the 
proportions of explanatory, classifying, predicting, or open questions and inquiry plans (t-
values ranged between 5.6 and 15.0, all p’s <.001).    
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Content coding 
Table 2 shows to which elements of the CFCCM and to which sub-elements coders 
assigned the inferences, questions, and inquiry plans that had been coded as explanatory 
and classifying.  
As can be seen, participants mentioned only a few predisposing and precipitating 
factors. Moving house was mentioned most often, by six participants. Seventeen participants 
mentioned psychological mechanisms, with cognitive, affective, and interpersonal causes. 
Within these causes, participants mentioned different specific factors, as is indicated in the 
table. Four participants mentioned a biological mechanism, with different causes. Seventeen 
participants mentioned social mechanisms. Here too, participants mentioned different 
causes, and within these causes again different specific factors. One participant mentioned a 
protective factor. Nine participants mentioned explanations which could not be assigned to 
any of the content elements (e.g. “It is something in the boy”; “It is a combination of child 
and family factors”).  
Participants often repeated causal factors in their explanatory inferences, questions, 
and inquiry plans. On average, participants mentioned 5.3 different causal factors (ranging 
from none to 19). 
Seventeen participants mentioned a classification and all these participants mentioned 
ADHD. Eight participants mentioned at least one alternative axis I classification. Two 
participants mentioned that the problems might be classified according to DSM-criteria, 
without further specification. Participants also often repeated the same classification in their 
inferences, questions, and inquiry plans. On average, participants mentioned 1.7 different 
classifications (ranging from none to six).  
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 We expected the diagnostic decision making process to be explanation-based, similar 
to decision making in other complex, dynamic domains (Hastie & Pennington, 2000), and 
similar to text comprehension (Graesser et al., 2002). Thus, we had expected that while 
processing the video information clinicians would make many causal inferences, and seek 
mostly causal explanations. These expectations were not borne out. We found that clinicians’ 
thoughts while they watched the intake video were mostly repetitions of information from 
the video. Participants did generate quite some inferences, but these were mostly additions 
of descriptive information. It may not be surprising that participants generated fewer 
questions, inquiry plans, or treatment plans, since they were expecting to receive more 
information after the intake video. However, most of the information they asked for was 
again descriptive, not explanatory. 
These findings are contradictory to findings in text comprehension research, where 
most of the inferences that readers make seem to be causal rather than descriptive 
(Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Zwaan & Brown, 1996). These findings do, however, corroborate 
earlier results that showed no evidence for elaborate causal reasoning by clinicians who were 
thinking aloud after the presentation of information (De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2008). Also, 
written case formulations often appear to contain insufficient causal mechanisms to form a 
basis for treatment plans (Eells et al., 1998; Kuyken et al., 2005). 
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Table 2  
Number of Participants who Considered Specific Causal Factors and Classifications as 
Identified in the Content Analysis 
 
Element n Sub-element n Further specification n  
Explanations      
1. Predisposing factors 2 a. Pre- and perinatal complications 1  
  b. Age 1  
2. Precipitating factors  10 a. Moving house 6  
  b. Events in school 2  
  c. Events at home 3  
  d. Not specified 4  
General intelligence 5 
Integration / Learning problems 6 
Self-image 4 
Conscience 2 
3. Psychological 
mechanisms 
17 a. Cognitive factors 13
Other 3 
Impulse control / Regulation 10
Anxiety 4 
Mood 3 
 
 b. Affective factors 13
Other 5 
Provocative behaviour 5  
Interactions  4 
Attitude 2 
 
 c. Interpersonal factors 9 
Other 2 
  d. Not specified 1  
4. Biological 
mechanisms 
4 
a. Neurological factors 
3  
  b. Physical factors 2  
  c. Genetic predisposition  1  
  d. Not specified 2  
5. Social mechanisms 17 a. Parental factors  12 Parenting style 12 
    Other 3 
  b. Family interactions  1  
  c. School factors 4 Teaching 3 
    Peers 2 
  d. Unstructured situations 4  
  e. Social factors not specified 5  
6. Strengths 1 a. Psychosocial support parents 1  
7. No specific 
explanation 
9 
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Table 2 
Continued 
 
Classifications     
1. Axis 1 DSM-IV-TR 
diagnosis 
17 a. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity 
    Disorder 
17  
  b. Pervasive Development Disorder 5  
 
 c. Oppositional Defiant Disorder / 
    Conduct Disorder  
6  
 
 d. Learning Disorder / Reading  
    Disorder (Dyslexia)   
3  
  e. Depression 1  
  f. Attachment Disorder 1  
  g. Not specified 5  
2. Axis unspecified 2    
 
Note. The table presents the elements from the CFCCM, the sub-elements we distinguished as well as 
further specifications within these sub-elements that participants mentioned in their classifying and 
explanatory inferences, questions and inquiry plans. Coders identified causes in the mechanisms, not 
effects.  
 
First, we will discuss methodological aspects that might have influenced our findings. 
Then we will discuss why our participants, and clinicians more in general, might not usually 
be engaged in elaborate causal reasoning while processing client information.   
When collecting our think aloud protocols we adhered closely to the procedure 
described by Ericsson and Simon (1993). They claim that, although participants will not 
verbalise all their thoughts while processing information, thinking aloud should yield a 
reliable subset of their thoughts (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Ericsson, 2006; 
Ericsson & Simon, 1993). We gave our participants the opportunity to interrupt the video at 
any moment to speak and to speak without interruption, so they could verbalise their 
thoughts as they came up. We did so specifically to prevent participants from needing to 
retrieve their thinking process from memory, since this might lead to biased responses (cf. 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
We do not expect that differences in coding are responsible for the low number of 
causal inferences we identified. We analysed the inferences clinicians made in analogy to 
think aloud studies in text comprehension (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Zwaan & Brown, 
1996) and juror decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1994). Specifically, our distinction 
between descriptive, explanatory, and predicting inferences matches the distinction between 
associations, explanations, and predictions of Trabasso and Magliano (1996).  
The think aloud instruction we used may not have explicitly prompted clinicians to 
reason causally. However, we believed that a more specific instruction might induce other 
thinking processes than clinicians normally have. We assumed that causal reasoning would 
occur spontaneously, as this seems required to think of effective interventions (Beach, 1992; 
Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). In contrast, in other on-line think aloud studies in 
text comprehension the instructions explicitly asked participants to understand each 
individual sentence, and to inform the experimenter about their understanding (Trabasso & 
Magliano, 1996; Zwaan & Brown, 1996). The stories that those participants read had been 
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constructed as coherent causal networks, in which the story structure explains the presence 
of each sentence. In on-line think aloud studies on diagnostic reasoning participants have 
been instructed to verbalise their (preliminary) diagnostic conclusions at set points (see Eva 
et al., 2002; Sandifer et al., 1970). We think that as a consequence of such directing 
instructions, participants might consider more explanations and classifications than they 
would do without such directions, as in our study (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
The issue thus is whether clinicians normally engage in elaborate causal reasoning in 
order to decide what is the matter with a client and what follow-up steps need to be 
undertaken. Here, we focus on two important considerations: the need to engage in elaborate 
causal reasoning, and the availability and accessibility of causal knowledge needed to do so. 
In text comprehension, readers only generate many causal inferences if they have an explicit 
goal to understand the text, and if relevant information is available and easily accessible to 
working memory (Frank, Koppen, Noordman, & Vonk, 2003; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; 
Trabasso & Magliano, 1996). For jurors, an exact reconstruction of past events is necessary 
to be able to decide upon a verdict. Jurors need to know the precipitating factors, and the 
motives of a suspect, before deciding on their guilt. Clinicians might not consider the 
predisposing, the precipitating, and maintaining factors in detail before deciding upon a 
treatment. Groenier, Pieters, Hulshof, Wilhelm, and Witteman (2008) found that clinicians 
judged causal analysis of clients’ problems least necessary, compared to describing clients’ 
problems and choosing treatments. Clinicians might indicate treatments without having a 
clear understanding of the mechanisms causing clients’ problems, but they might for 
example base treatments on a classification.  
Although classifications are no explanations (APA, 2000; Morton, 2004), it looks as if 
they sometimes are being used as such. For example, Leon and Perez (2001) call 
categorisations that clinicians activate, such as kleptomania, explanatory inferences, 
“because it is seen as the manifestation of a deep psychological disorder that causes the 
behavior” (Leon & Perez, 2001, p. 189) (see also Chapter 2). Classifications may provide 
coherence to a mental representation (Arocha & Patel, 1995; Leon & Perez, 2001; Van den 
Broek & Gustafson, 1999).  
Apart from not having the explicit goal to causally understand their clients, clinicians 
may lack relevant knowledge. In the clinical domain, causal explanations of clients’ problems 
are complex: psychological and or behavioural problems develop in a continuous interaction 
between many biological, psychological, behavioural, and environmental factors (Kiesler, 
1999; Morton, 2004; Nurcombe, 2000). Detailed knowledge about what all these factors are 
and how they interact is in development (Bieling & Kuyken, 2003; Clarkin & Levy, 2004; 
Kiesler, 1999). Uncertainty about specific causes for clients’ problems might prevent 
clinicians from drawing causal inferences. Leon and Perez (2001) showed that with more 
experience, and thus more clinical knowledge, clinicians make categorising inferences 
sooner. From this, we reason that if relevant causal knowledge is made available, and easily 
accessible (e.g. by training or experience), clinicians might make more causal inferences. 
Finally, we found that different clinicians considered different causal factors. This 
might also be a consequence of incomplete common causal knowledge (Bieling & Kuyken, 
2003). Further, clinicians often do not get feedback about the explanations they propose, 
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about the actual effectiveness of the interventions they propose, and about what specifically 
makes interventions effective (Garb, 2005; Lichtenberg, 1997). This might increase the 
idiosyncrasy of clinicians’ causal theories. Differences in education, in institutions and in 
clients may further increase the idiosyncrasy of clinicians’ causal beliefs. This can be an 
explanation of our current finding that different clinicians’ causal judgements begin to 
deviate as early in the process as during the intake interview. And if clinicians disagree 
about causes already early in the process, poor reliability of clinicians’ final causal 
conclusions is to be expected (cf Chapter 2; Garb, 1998, 2005;  Kuyken et al., 2005; Persons & 
Bertagnolli, 1999). 
Implications and future research  
Our sample was small, we used one case, and our experimental situation is different 
from a real diagnostic situation. Therefore our findings should be interpreted with caution, 
and need replication with more participants and more cases. It would be interesting to test 
whether clinicians make implicit causal inferences, using implicit measures such as priming 
tasks (cf. Magliano, 1999; Leon & Perez, 2001). Further, from our suggestion that causal 
knowledge is insufficiently available and shared to arrive at reliable causal client 
representations, the testable prediction follows that providing clinicians with relevant causal 
knowledge will lead to more elaborate causal reasoning and to more reliable causal 
representations.  
If arriving at coherent causal explanations for clients’ problems is seen as a 
prerequisite for the planning of effective interventions, as handbooks prescribe, it would be 
worthwhile to use causal modelling methods to aid and train clinicians to construct these 
(e.g. Haynes & Williams, 2003; Morton, 2004). Subsequently, attention should be paid to the 
testing of these models and the evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions based on 
them (Haynes, Spain, & Oliveira, 1993; Staines, 2007).  
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Chapter 4   
 
Causal Client Models in Selecting Effective Interventions: A Cognitive Mapping Study 
 
 
 
Abstract 
An important reason to choose an intervention is the expectation that it will be effective. We 
investigated whether clinicians base their predictions of the effectiveness of interventions on models 
representing the mechanisms causing and maintaining a client’s problems. Forty clinical child 
psychologists drew causal models and rank ordered interventions according to their expected 
effectiveness, for two cases. We predicted participants’ judgments of effectiveness (i) from their 
individual causal models, and (ii) from average rankings, mirroring common beliefs. We found that for 
a majority of participants judgments of effectiveness were better predicted by their causal models, 
than by the average rankings. Additionally, we found little agreement about the models, and low to 
moderate agreement about the effectiveness expected from different interventions. Taken together, 
these results indicate that clinicians indeed base their predictions of the effectiveness of interventions 
on causal models, but that these models are idiosyncratic.  
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How do clinicians decide upon interventions for their clients? Hundreds of different 
interventions exist that clinicians might choose to use, and this number keeps growing 
(Wenar & Kerig, 2006; Lambert, Bergin, & Garfield, 2004). Probably the most important 
reason to choose a specific intervention is the expectation that it will be effective. Other 
factors may also influence clinicians’ intervention choices, such as availability, flexibility, fit 
within budget and time, and client’s consent (Nelson & Steele, 2008; Nezu & Nezu, 1993).  
The effectiveness of an intervention depends on how it changes the system of 
interacting psychological, biological, and environmental factors that cause and maintain a 
client’s problems (Carr, 2006; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; Haynes & Williams, 2003; 
Kendall, Holmbeck, & Verduin, 2004; Wenar & Kerig, 2006). For example, the effectiveness of 
different interventions such as social skills training, parent support, or family therapy to 
reduce a child’s aggressive behaviour will depend on whether this aggressive behaviour is 
caused by a lack of social skills, whether poor parenting reinforces the aggressive behaviour, 
or whether a child acts aggressively in reaction to parents’ marital problems (Wenar & Kerig, 
2006).  
Given that an intervention is effective to the extent that it changes the mechanisms 
underlying a client’s problems such that problems diminish, we expect that clinicians base 
their predictions of the effectiveness of interventions on client-specific causal models which 
specify these mechanisms. Such models allow predictions of the consequences of different 
interventions (Beach, 1992; Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). This is also what is 
recommended in the literature: clinicians should construct case formulations which “aim[s] 
to describe a person’s presenting problems and use theory to make explanatory inferences 
about causes and maintaining factors that can inform interventions” (Kuyken, Fothergill, 
Musa, & Chadwick, 2005, p.1188) (see also e.g. Carr, 2006; Eells, 2007; Groth-Marnat, 2003; 
Wenar & Kerig, 2006).  
Causal Assumptions Affect Clinicians’ Reasoning  
A number of studies has investigated the impact of beliefs about causal structure on 
clinicians’ reasoning. For example, Kim and Ahn (2002) showed that clinicians’ theories of 
how symptoms are causally related in a disorder influence their diagnoses and memory for 
case information. Clinicians judge symptoms that are causally more central in their theories 
(i.e., symptoms that affect many other symptoms) as stronger evidence for a diagnosis, and 
they recall these symptoms better than symptoms that they rate as causally peripheral (i.e., 
symptoms that do not influence other symptoms). Recently, Cobos, Florez and López (2008) 
replicated these findings and additionally found that knowledge that a causally central 
symptom is absent slows down clinicians’ information processing more than knowledge that 
a causally peripheral symptom is absent. Proctor and Ahn (2007) showed that assumptions 
about the causal structure underlying a patient’s symptoms affected the inferences that 
clinicians draw. Clinicians are more willing to make inferences about unobserved symptoms 
from symptoms that affect other symptoms than from symptoms that do not affect other 
symptoms.  
Causal Models in Intervention Selection 
Research in other domains provides converging evidence that people use models 
representing causal mechanisms to decide upon effective interventions (Hagmayer & Sloman, 
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2005, in press; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). Individual causal models of coronary heart 
disease appear strongly correlated with how non-medical and medical students rate the 
effectiveness of different preventive interventions (Green & McManus, 1995). Similarly, a 
strong relation is found between the perceived causal structure of scenarios presenting 
environmental risks, such as chemical pollution or a new epidemic, and people’s action 
tendencies (Böhm & Pfister, 2000).  
In the clinical domain, Furnham (1995) showed that lay people’s beliefs about which 
interventions are effective to treat phobia are related to their beliefs about what causes 
phobia. This indicates that lay people might infer the effectiveness of different interventions 
from their causal theories. In a similar vein, Yopchick and Kim (2007) investigated how the 
structure of causal models influenced students’ judgments of the effectiveness of 
interventions for artificial mental disorders. It turned out that interventions which affected 
symptoms that are initiating causes, with no further causes, were judged to be more 
effective than interventions which affected symptoms that do have causes.  
We know of no evidence to show that clinicians’ causal models influence their 
intervention choices. Witteman and Kunst (1997) and Witteman and Koele (1999) found no 
evidence for a connection between interpretation of client data and proposed interventions. 
Clinicians who chose the same intervention considered different client aspects, and 
clinicians who considered the same client aspects chose different interventions. However, 
given the poor reliability of clinicians’ causal inferences (Garb, 2005; Kuyken et al., 2005; 
Persons & Bertagnolli, 1999; see also Chapter 3 in this thesis), it seems likely that their 
causal client models are idiosyncratic. It may thus be the case that although on the group 
level no relation was found, on an individual level clinicians use their individual causal 
models when they select interventions. 
Case formulations should specify mechanisms underlying clients’ problems, from 
which effective interventions can then be derived. Nevertheless, research findings indicate 
that mechanisms are often not well elaborated (Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998; Kuyken et al., 
2005). In addition, from the analysis of clinicians’ think aloud protocols it appeared that 
clinicians’ causal client models are rather simple, and that proposed interventions are often 
unrelated to these models (see Chapter 2 in this thesis). In contrast to these findings, 
Kendjelic and Eells (2007) showed that after only two hours of training clinicians’ case 
formulations became more elaborate, comprehensive, complex, precise, and contained more 
references to underlying mechanisms. Thus, clinicians may not usually explicate causal 
explanations of clients’ problems even when they do endorse implicit causal models.  
Aim of this Study 
The studies reported above indicate that causal assumptions do affect clinicians’ 
reasoning, while there is currently no evidence that clinicians choose interventions based on 
causal models of their clients’ problems. This may be because (i) clinicians don’t explicate 
their causal models if they are not prompted to do so, and (ii) research has focused on 
average causal models rather than on the causal assumptions of individual clinicians. In the 
present study we aimed to see whether clinicians base their expectations of the effectiveness 
of different interventions on individual models explaining the mechanisms underlying a 
client’s problems. 
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We elicited clinicians’ individual causal client models with a cognitive mapping 
technique (Axelrod, 1976; Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004; Huff & Jenkins, 2002; see also 
Kim & Ahn, 2002, for a similar method used with clinicians). We also asked clinicians to rate 
the effectiveness of various interventions. We analyzed whether clinicians’ individual causal 
client maps could predict which interventions they rated as most effective. As an alternative, 
we analyzed whether common beliefs about the interventions’ effectiveness could predict 
individual effectiveness ratings. Additionally, we analyzed clinicians’ agreement about the 
contents of the causal models. We hypothesized that clinicians’ effectiveness ratings would 
be better predicted by their idiosyncratic causal models than by the average ranking 
expressing shared beliefs.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty Dutch therapists participated who had worked for at least two years with 
children of primary school age. Their mean experience was 14.4 years (SE = 1.7), their mean 
age 41.2 years (SE = 1.9), and they had on average seen 28 children in the last three months 
(SE = 6.4). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Later analyses showed 
that randomization was successful: there were no significant differences between groups in 
experience (t(38) = -1.1), age (t(38) = -1.2), or number of children seen in the last three 
months (t(37) = 0.9; all p’s > .2).  In the first group there were three men, in the second group 
four. This is representative for psychotherapists working with children in the Netherlands. 
Ten participants in the first group and twelve in the second worked in youth care 
institutions; nine participants in the first group and five in the second in an educational 
setting. The remaining participants worked in private practice or in a medical setting. In 
both groups, most participants said they did not adhere to a specific theory, the rest 
mentioned different theories (e.g., system theory, learning theory).  
Materials and procedure  
Materials. Two case descriptions were constructed based on descriptions of 
depressed children from De Wit (2000). Each description was one and a half pages long (810 
words). One case description was about a boy named Thijs, ten years old, presenting with 
depressive symptoms from which he suffered since his parents divorced a year earlier and 
he lost contact with his father. The other case description was about a boy named Brian, 
eleven years old, who also presents with depressive complaints which he had developed 
about a year earlier, when he repeated sixth grade and lost contact with his best friend. We 
increased complexity in Brian’s case by adding information indicating comorbidity of 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and a reading 
problem (Carroll, Maughan, Goodman, & Meltzer, 2005; Drabick, Gadow, & Sprafkin, 2006; 
Ostrander & Herman, 2006). We provided similar lengths of text in both cases to describe the 
situation at home and in school, as well as relationships with peers. In addition, results of 
six tests were presented with both cases, WISC-III (intelligence test), TRF (behaviour 
questionnaire filled in by teacher), CBCL (behaviour questionnaire filled in by parents), a 
depression questionnaire for children, and a questionnaire for children’s own perceived 
competencies. Brian’s case also contained scores on a questionnaire for ADHD, and Thijs’ 
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case contained scores on an additional depression questionnaire. Case descriptions were 
revised by two experienced clinicians to ensure that they were realistic and provided 
sufficient information to decide on an intervention (see Appendix A for complete case 
descriptions).  
Causal Mapping Task. For the causal mapping task participants received written 
instructions and an example, which showed six variables connected by several unidirectional 
and one bidirectional causal links. The task was split into four steps. In the first step 
participants were asked to write down on index cards the problems they identified, and the 
causal factors that initiated, increased, maintained, decreased, or prevented these problems. 
Participants could use as many cards as they thought appropriate, though not more than ten 
(a pretest confirmed ten to be an adequate number). In the second step participants were 
asked to rate the importance of the problems. They were instructed that ratings should 
reflect the degree of harm or distress experienced by the child or others (e.g. parents, 
teacher), or of the risks inherent to a problem (cf. Haynes & Williams, 2003). The single most 
important problem should be rated as ‘1’, the one or two second most important problems 
as ‘2’, and the remaining problems as ‘3’.  In the third step participants were asked to 
arrange the problems and causal factors on an A3-sized paper and to indicate causal 
relations by arrows. Participants were allowed to draw bidirectional relations and loops. 
Participants were also asked to indicate for each relation whether it was initiating / 
increasing, or preventing / decreasing, with a plus or minus. Also, they had to rate the 
strength of the relations as weak (‘1’), moderate (‘2’), or strong (‘3’). Finally, in step four 
participants were asked to indicate for each problem or causal factor how modifiable they 
thought it was. We explained that the modifiability of a factor could depend on many things, 
for example resistance to change, or availability of effective treatments (cf. Haynes & 
Williams, 2003). Easily modifiable factors were to be rated as ‘2’, moderately modifiable as 
‘1’ and non-modifiable as ‘0’.  
Interventions Rating Task. In the interventions rating task participants were 
presented with a list of 10 possible interventions taken from the literature (Carr, 2006; De 
Wit, 2000): (a) remedial teaching, (b) family therapy, (c) individual cognitive therapy, (d) 
medication, (e) individual therapy for mother, (f) training impulse control, (g) parent support, 
(h) individual play therapy, (i) teacher support, and (j) social skills training. Participants were 
asked to choose and rank the five most effective interventions, that is, the five interventions 
leading to the highest reduction of the problems identified. They were instructed to assume 
that each intervention would be the only intervention undertaken, and that other factors 
such as cost, time, and effort were irrelevant. When finished, they indicated, on a scale of 1 
to 7, how confident they were that the intervention they had rated as most effective would 
indeed be the most effective. 
Linking Interventions to Variables in the Causal Models. After having constructed the 
causal map, and having rated the interventions for effectiveness, participants were asked to 
indicate which factors or problems in their maps were immediately affected by the five 
interventions they had chosen. For this, they added the interventions to their maps, and 
drew causal relations between the interventions and the variables affected. Again 
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participants rated these causal relations as strong, moderate, or weak, by assigning a ‘3’, ‘2’, 
or ‘1’ to each arrow.  Figure 1 shows an example of a completed causal map. 
 
 
 
 
Note. Variables are depicted as rectangles, interventions as ovals. Straight arrows indicate 
causal relations among variables, dashed arrows causal effects of interventions. Pluses or 
minuses and numbers indicating strength are not indicated, for clarity. All causal relations  
in this model were positive. P indicates rated problem importance (1 most important – 3 least 
important), M indicates rated modifiability (2 easily modifiable – 0 not modifiable).  
 
Figure 1. Example of a causal map generated by a participant for Thijs. 
 
 
Questionnaires. For both cases participants received a short questionnaire, in which 
they were asked to indicate how many similar cases they had seen before, how difficult and 
how complex they thought the present case was in relation to other cases they met, whether 
the description contained sufficient information to rate the effectiveness of interventions, 
and whether their maps were representative for how they thought about the case.  
Procedure. At the start, both groups were told that we were interested in how they 
thought about client information and decided upon interventions. All instructions were 
typed out, and participants were encouraged to ask for explanations at any time. The order 
of the tasks was different for the two groups. In the mapping-first group, participants 
constructed a causal map for a case first. Then they ranked interventions for their 
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effectiveness. While making their rankings they could refer back to their causal map, which 
was still in sight, although they were not asked or prompted to do so. Next they indicated 
how the five most effective interventions affected variables in their map. Finally, they filled 
in the questionnaire. Then, the same procedure was repeated for the second case 
description. In the ranking-first group, the order of tasks was reversed. Participants did the 
intervention ranking task for the first and the second case before they proceeded to the 
causal mapping task. Hence, they had to rank interventions for effectiveness without being 
prompted about causal models. 
In both groups the order of cases was counterbalanced. At the end, participants in 
both groups answered questions about their age, gender, experience, the institution and 
function they worked in, their theoretical adherence, and they could give comments. 
Participants were thanked and received a gift certificate of 25 euro. The task took on average 
one and a half hours. Two research assistants administered the task at the participants’ 
work places, except with two participants who came to the office of the author.  
 
Analyses and Results 
Analyses and results will be reported together for better understanding. First 
participants’ assessment of their own models, their rankings, and of the given information 
will be reported. Then we will report whether clinicians’ individual causal client models can 
predict their rankings of interventions for their effectiveness, and whether an average 
ranking can. Finally we will report clinicians’ agreement about causal models and 
interventions. 
Participants generated 40 causal models for Thijs and 39 models for Brian. One 
participant failed to generate a causal model for Brian due to personal time constraints. 
Participants indicated that their maps were representative for how they thought about the 
case. Means on a scale from ‘1 does not reflect my thinking’ to ‘7 perfectly reflects how I 
think about the case’ were 4.6 (SE = .2) for Thijs and 5.1 (SE = .2) for Brian, both of which 
deviated significantly from 4, the midpoint of the scale (Thijs t(39)=3.2, p <.01, Brian 
t(38)=5.6, p <.01). Further, participants judged the amount of information as sufficient to 
rate the effectiveness of the interventions. On a scale of 1 (insufficient) to 7 (too much) they 
gave mean ratings of 3.6 (SE = .2) for Thijs, and 3.7 (SE = .2) for Brian. Both scores did not 
deviate significantly from 4, which we interpreted as ‘sufficient’ (t(39) = -1.6, p >.1 ; t(38) = -
1.2, p >.2). Participants also indicated they were confident that the intervention they rated 
highest would indeed be the most effective intervention for the boy in the case description: 
on a scale of 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (highly confident) they gave mean ratings of 5.4 
(SE = .2) for Thijs, and 5.2 (SE = .2) for Brian.  
Prediction of Individual Rankings from Causal Models and from Average Rankings  
To analyze whether participants’ rankings of the chosen interventions for their 
effectiveness can be predicted from their individual causal models we first had to define 
strategies to derive predictions from the individual causal maps. A strategy describes which 
information from a causal map is used and how this information is integrated to derive the 
effects of interventions. The first strategy we call the maximum impact strategy. It is based 
on the functional analysis approach proposed by Haynes and Williams (2003). Its basic idea 
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is that first the impact of each variable upon all other variables (including the client’s 
problems) is calculated taking into account the strengths of the causal relations among the 
variables, the importance of the problems and the modifiability of the variables. Second, the 
effect of each intervention is calculated by summing up the impacts of the variables directly 
affected by the intervention (see Appendix B for details).  
The second strategy we call the maximum symptom reduction strategy. It was 
inspired by causal model theories of decision making (Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009; Sloman & 
Hagmayer, 2006). This strategy only takes into account the strength of the different causal 
relations, but not the importance of the problems or the modifiability of the variables. First 
the reduction of the variables that are directly targeted by the intervention is calculated. 
Then the resulting reduction of the variables that are affected by these variables is 
computed, and so on. As the causal influence of an intervention fades quickly, only four 
iterations had to be used to capture an intervention’s effect. Finally, the reductions resulting 
from each intervention are summed (see again Appendix B for details). 
The two causal strategies were compared to a third strategy, which does not consider 
causal models. This non-causal strategy may be called the common knowledge strategy. Its 
basic idea is that participants simply refer to their expert knowledge about the effectiveness 
of different interventions. All our participants had seen similar clients before (a median of 
20 for Thijs and 40 for Brian) and had ample experience in treating children (14 years on 
average). Thus they probably share a knowledge base, which they may have employed to 
guide their judgments. As an indicator for their shared knowledge about the effectiveness of 
the different interventions we looked at how often participants chose interventions as one of 
the five most effective, see Table 1. If participants use this common knowledge rather than 
their own causal models, rankings derived from these frequencies should be the best 
predictor for their individual rankings. Note that the relative frequency of participants 
choosing an intervention as effective and the mean ranks assigned to these interventions are 
very highly correlated, r = .96. 
As a first analysis we compared participants’ individual rankings to the predictions 
derived from the three strategies described above. For the two causal strategies (maximum 
impact strategy and maximum symptom reduction strategy) predictions for the five 
interventions that were considered most effective – and which were thus included in the 
map – were derived from participants’ idiosyncratic causal models. The resulting predictions 
(impact values in case of the maximum impact strategy and reduction values in case of the 
maximum reduction strategy) were transformed into ranks. For the non-causal strategy the 
ranks implied by the frequencies depicted in Table 1 were used. For each participant an 
individual rank order was computed for the five interventions that this participant actually 
chose as being one of the five most effective. Finally the ranks derived from the predictions 
of each strategy were correlated with the rankings actually made by each participant, using 
Spearman’s Rho. While computing the predictions, it turned out that one participant created 
a causal model for both Thijs and Brian which implied that all interventions would be 
equally effective. Therefore these two causal models were excluded from the analyses 
reported hereafter.  
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After computing the rank correlations between predictions and actual rankings for 
each case and each participant, we averaged these correlations for each strategy for each 
case (Thijs vs. Brian) and each group (causal mapping task before ranking vs. causal 
mapping task after ranking). As some predicted rank orders perfectly matched the actual 
rank order assigned by participants, we were not able to transform correlations into Fisher 
z-values before averaging. In consequence, the reported means underestimate the actual 
mean correlations. Table 2 shows the resulting twelve mean correlations. All are above .3, 
some as high as .62.  
 
Table 1  
Relative Frequencies and Mean Ranks (SE) of Interventions 
 
 Thijs Brian 
Interventions 
Relative 
frequency 
Mean ranks 
(SE) 
Relative 
frequency 
Mean ranks 
(SE) 
Remedial teaching .13 5.68 (.15) .54 4.51 (.26) 
Family therapy .70 3.15 (.32) .51 4.67 (.30) 
Individual cognitive 
therapy 
.83 3.55 (.26) .46 4.87 (.26) 
Medication .05 5.90 (.06) .69 3.36 (.33) 
Individual therapy 
mother 
.63 4.48 (.23) .51 4.85 (.26) 
Training impulse 
control 
.00 5.98 (.03) .49 4.64 (.27) 
Parent support .95 2.55 (.22) .90 2.23 (.25) 
Individual play therapy .85 3.28 (.29) .28 5.41 (.18) 
Teacher support .43 5.20 (.19) .44 4.87 (.22) 
Social skills training .38 5.15 (.20) .15 5.74 (.12) 
 
Note. Ranks ranged from 1 (best) to 5 (least effective). Interventions not included within the five most 
effective interventions received rank 6. 
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In order to test whether these mean correlations were significantly different from 
chance, we created a theoretically derived test distribution. First we created all possible 
combinations of two rank orders with ranks 1-5, allowing for double ranks. Next we 
correlated these rank orders using Spearman’s Rhos. Then we randomly drew 3000 sets of 
20 correlations, and averaged each set. Five percent of the resulting mean correlations were 
larger than .19 and 1 % was larger than .27. Thus, all mean correlations depicted in Table 2 
are significantly above chance, which means that with all three strategies we are able to 
predict participants’ effectiveness rankings to some extent.  
 
Table 2  
Mean Correlations between Participants’ Effectiveness Rankings and the Effectiveness 
Rankings Derived from Different Strategies Conditional on Case and Task Order Group 
 
 Causal mapping before ranking task Causal mapping after ranking task 
 Thijs Brian Thijs Brian 
Strategy Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
Maximum impact .59 (.11) .45 (.08) .44 (.09) .49 (.06) 
Maximum symptom 
reduction .62 (.10) .33 (.10) .49 (.08) .62 (.06) 
Common knowledge .46 (.08) .51 (.08) .48 (.09) .48 (.09) 
 
One may expect to find a higher correlation for predictions derived from the causal 
model for participants who ranked the interventions directly after constructing their causal 
model. Using independent-sample t-tests to compare the mean correlations for each strategy 
between conditions, only one difference reached significance. The maximum symptom 
reduction strategy predicted participants’ effectiveness ranking better when participants did 
the rating tasks first than when they did the causal mapping task first (t(36) = -2.5; p<.05, 
equality of variances not assumed). No other test reached significance (all ts <1, p> .4). Thus 
the only difference we found contradicted the above speculation, and despite descriptive 
differences there seems to be no overall effect of task order. 
So which strategy predicted participants’ rankings of effectiveness best? No clear 
pattern emerged on the group level, as can be seen from the findings reported in Table 2. 
Correlations were not systematically higher for causal strategies than for the non-causal 
strategy or vice versa. The same is true when the two causal strategies are compared with 
each other, although the maximum symptom reduction strategy seems to be slightly more 
predictive. In addition, mean correlations were all substantial, but not very high (overall 
average of .49). However, it is quite plausible that individual participants used different 
strategies to assess effectiveness. Some may have used causal strategies, others common 
knowledge, and others may have used completely different strategies. Therefore we went 
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back to each individual participant and each case and compared the correlations for the 
three strategies. We classified participants into four categories using the following scheme: If 
the correlation of one of the causal strategies was at least rho ≥ .5 and was at least .2 higher 
than for the common knowledge strategy, the participant was classified as using a causal 
strategy. If the correlation of the common knowledge strategy was at least rho ≥ .5 and .2 
higher than either of the two causal strategies, the participant was classified as using a non-
causal, common knowledge strategy. If the correlations for the causal strategies and the 
common knowledge strategy were both rho ≥ .5 and did not differ by at least .2 participants 
were classified as tied between causal and non-causal. Finally if neither strategy reached rho 
≥ .5 participants were classified as using another strategy. We decided to use rho ≥ .5 as the 
threshold for classification because the overall mean correlation between any of the 
strategies’ predictions and the actual rankings was .49. So for all participants who were 
classified by the scheme described above as using a specific strategy the predictions had a 
higher than average correlation with the actual rankings.  
Results of this classification are presented in Table 3. For Thijs 44% of the 
participating clinicians seem to have used a causal strategy, while only 10% seem to have 
followed common knowledge. In the case of Brian 47% of clinicians seem to have used a 
causal strategy over 24% who seem to apply common knowledge. For both cases there was a 
substantial number of participants for whom causal and non-causal strategies made equally 
good predictions. Surprisingly, only a rather small number of participants had to be 
classified as ‘other’ (a total of 6 participants for each case).  
 
Table 3 
Percentage of Participants Using either a Causal or a Non-Causal Strategy 
 
 Thijs Brian 
Causal strategy (maximum impact or 
maximum symptom reduction strategy) 
44 47 
Non-causal strategy 
(common knowledge strategy) 
10 24 
Tie between causal and non-causal 31 24 
No prediction 15 15 
 
As a final analysis we investigated how well the strategies that participants seemed to 
have used predicted their rankings of effectiveness. To do so we calculated the mean 
correlations between predicted rankings and actual rankings. These findings are given in 
Table 4. Mean correlations are reported separately for the maximum impact and the 
maximum reduction of symptoms strategies for all participants using a causal strategy. As 
Table 4 shows mean correlations were much higher than the ones reported in Table 2. 
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Especially the maximum symptom reduction strategy, which simulates the reduction of 
problems resulting from an intervention in the causal model, does a good job for both cases. 
It is able to account for more than 50% of the variance in rankings of participants pursuing a 
causal strategy.  
 
Table 4 
Mean Rank Correlations between Predictions Derived from Individual Causal Maps or 
Common Knowledge and Effectiveness Rankings of Interventions 
 
 Thijs Brian 
Causal strategy 1:  
Maximum impact strategy 
.82 .64 
Causal strategy 2: Maximum 
symptom reduction strategy 
.76 .74 
Non-causal strategy:  
Common knowledge strategy 
.63 .76 
 
Content of Causal Models and Agreement 
Table 5 depicts the number of variables (i.e., problems and causal factors) and causal 
relations in participants’ causal models, regardless of their specific content. As Table 5 
shows, participants tended to construct more complex causal models for Brian than for 
Thijs. Paired samples t-tests showed that participants used more variables (t(38) = 2.4; 
p <.05), drew more positive relations (t(38) = 2.4; p <.05), and drew more bidirectional 
relations (t(38) = 3.7; p <.01) for Brian than for Thijs.  
 
Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics of Causal Models Generated by Participants: Means and (SE) 
 
 Thijs Brian 
 N Positive 
relations 
Negative
relations 
Bi-
directional 
relations 
N Positive
relations
Negative 
relations 
Bi-
directional 
relations 
Variables 7.98 
(.27) 
13.7 
(.83) 
.23 
(.10) 
2.38 
(.38) 
8.64 
(.21) 
15.5 
(1.06) 
.46 
(.19) 
3.80 
(.53) 
Interventions 5 12.2 
(.75) 
  5 12.5 
(.91) 
  
 
Chapter 4 
 70
These findings conform to the fact that Brian but not Thijs shows several signs of 
comorbidities. Interestingly, the difference between the models is not reflected by 
participants’ subjective assessments. Mean difficulty ratings for Thijs were 3.6 (SE = 0.2) on a 
scale from ‘1 = not at all’ to ‘7 very’, for Brian they were 3.3 (SE= 0.2). Mean complexity 
ratings for Thijs were 3.6 (SE = 0.2), and for Brian 3.6 (SE = 0.2). Paired t-tests showed no 
differences for the cases (t(37) = 1.1, p >.2; t(37) = 0.2, p >.8).  
In order to compare the content of participants’ individual causal models, variables 
had to be coded into the same categories. Categories were defined by three coders (the 
author and two research assistants) on the basis of ten randomly selected maps. This initial 
analysis resulted in 13 content categories for Thijs and 20 for Brian. Next, the coders 
independently coded the variables of the remaining maps into these categories, adding a 
category each time they thought that the content of a card was not adequately reflected by 
any of the categories created before. In the end, for Thijs 15 content categories and for Brian 
23 content categories were defined. For Thijs, all three coders agreed for 90.8 % of the cards; 
for 8.9 % two of the three coders agreed. For Brian all three coders agreed about 83.2 % of 
the cards; for 15.4 % two of the three coders agreed.  
Table 6 shows the categories and their relative frequencies for both cases. In 
addition, the mean importance of the variables as indicated by participants is shown, with 
higher values indicating more important problems. Values were computed by assigning 8 
points to the most important problem, 4 points to the two second most important problems, 
2 points to the least important problems and 1 to variables not representing a problem. This 
was done separately for each model drawn by each participant. In order to assess agreement 
among participants, kappa values were calculated over categories that were mentioned by at 
least five participants. Kappa was .20 for Thijs and .29 for Brian, which indicates a poor 
agreement given conventional standards (Fleiss, 1981). Nevertheless, both kappa values were 
statistically significant (p < .01) 
 
Table 6 
Relative Frequencies of Categories and Importance Ratings 
 
Thijs Brian 
Categories Relative  
frequency 
Mean  
importance 
Categories Relative  
frequency 
Mean  
importance 
Divorce .93 3.16 
Emotional 
stress mother 
.95 2.27 
Depressive 
complaints 
.93 5.14 
ADHD 
characteristics 
.92 4.50 
Stress mother .90 2.67 
Parenting 
problems 
.87 2.71 
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Table 6 
Continued 
 
Demanding 
sister 
.75 1.67 
Behavioural 
problems at 
home 
.82 4.34 
Absence father .68 2.52 
Low school 
performance 
.69 2.70 
Parentification .65 3.00 
Relation  
to father 
.59 1.61 
Few social 
contacts 
.60 2.79 
Depressive 
complaints 
.51 3.10 
Low school 
performance 
.58 2.73 Low self-esteem .49 3.68 
Low self-esteem  .43 3.47 
Behavioural 
problems 
school 
.41 3.75 
Physical 
complaints 
.40 2.31 
Few social 
contacts 
.33 1.77 
Protective 
factors 
.18 1.00 
Repeating 
grade 
.26 2.10 
   
Protective 
factors 
.21 1.17 
   Friend moved .18 1.29 
   
Negative social 
interactions 
.18 3.14 
   
Genetic 
predisposition 
.15 1.17 
 
Note. Relative frequencies are only given for categories identified in maps of at least 5 participants. 
The importance of problems was recoded so that higher values indicate more important problems. A 
value of 1 indicates that the category is no problem at all. 
 
Causal relations were retained in coding. Whenever coding resulted in more than one 
causal relation between two categorical variables, we copied the strongest relation. For 
example, ‘sad mood’ and ‘being withdrawn’ could be mentioned on different cards, and both 
be caused by ‘poor school performance’. In coding, ‘sad mood’ and ‘being withdrawn’ 
become one category: ‘depressive complaints’. Here, we copied the strongest causal relation 
from ‘lower school performance’ to one of the two original variables as the relation between 
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‘poor school performance’ and ‘depressive complaints’. Table 7a shows the frequencies of 
causal links, conditional on the number of participants with both categories in their models, 
for Thijs; Table 7b shows these results for Brian. For example, 34 participants included both 
‘divorce’ and ‘depressive complaints’ in their model for Thijs and 24 of these participants 
assumed that divorce was a factor contributing to the depressive complaints. Agreement 
among participants was calculated by computing kappa using pairs of categories mentioned 
by at least 5 participants. Agreement was again poor both for Thijs (κ = .29) and for Brian (κ 
= .26), although kappa values were again statistically significant (p’s < .01).  
Agreement about the effectiveness of the ten possible interventions for both Thijs 
and Brian was depicted in Table 1, which shows the relative frequencies of participants 
choosing each of the interventions as one of the five most effective. Based on these relative 
frequencies again kappa values were calculated, yielding a moderate agreement for Thijs (κ = 
.43), but a really poor agreement for Brian (κ = .12). Both kappas were again significant 
(p’s<.01). A series of t-tests for independent samples yielded no significant differences 
between the groups. Participants chose the same interventions as most effective regardless 
of whether they first constructed a causal model, or did so after they had made their 
rankings.  
We also calculated participants’ agreement about the effects of the ten interventions. 
To do so, we again first determined the numbers of participants with each possible 
combination of interventions and categories. If at least five participants had a certain 
combination we determined the frequency of a causal link. The relative frequencies are 
shown in Tables 8a and 8b. Based on these relative frequencies again kappas were 
computed, yielding a moderate agreement for Thijs (κ = .44) and Brian (κ = .41). Thus 
participants at least seem to agree which categories are affected by the interventions. 
 
General Discussion 
An important reason to choose a specific intervention is that it is expected to be 
effective. Because the effectiveness of an intervention depends on how it changes the 
mechanism underlying a client’s problems, we expect clinicians to base their predictions of 
how effective interventions will be on causal client models representing these mechanisms. 
We elicited clinicians’ causal models for two cases, and asked clinicians to rate the 
effectiveness of interventions. We hypothesized that clinicians’ effectiveness ratings would 
be better predicted by their idiosyncratic causal models than by the average effectiveness 
ranking.  
We defined two strategies to derive effectiveness predictions for interventions from 
individual causal maps, the maximum impact strategy and the maximum symptom 
reduction strategy. In addition, we derived average rankings from the relative frequencies of 
participants choosing an intervention as one of the five most effective. We took this average 
ranking to represent participants’ common beliefs about the effectiveness of different 
interventions in similar cases. Averaged over participants, both causal strategies and the 
average ranking predicted effectiveness ratings better than chance. However, looking at 
individual participants it appeared that for a majority of participants the causal strategies 
predicted their effectiveness ratings better than the average ranking did. For most other  
 Table 7a  
Frequencies of Causal Relations Conditional on the Number of Participants Having Both Categories in their Causal Maps for Thijs 
 
  Divorce 
Stress  
mother 
Demanding 
sister 
Absence 
father 
Parenti-
fication 
Few social 
contacts 
Depressive 
complaints 
Physical 
complaints 
Low self-
esteem 
Low school 
perform. 
Protective 
factors 
Divorce  20/33 11/29 17/24 12/23   6/22 24/34 4/15 6/17   3/21 1/8 
Stress mother 3/33  15/29   1/24 21/23   8/21 22/33 2/15 6/18   3/21 1/7 
Demanding sister 1/29 16/29    1/22 12/20   1/17 11/29 2/13 4/16   1/17 0/7 
Absence father 1/24   5/24   5/22    5/18   3/16 17/26 1/14 7/11   3/15 0/7 
Parentification 1/23   7/23   5/20   0/18    4/16 12/24 6/12 8/14   1/15 0/5 
Few social contacts 0/22   2/21   1/17   1/16   0/16  11/22 3/12 6/9   3/16 1/5 
Depressive complaints 2/34   7/33   3/29   3/26   0/24 17/22  7/17 8/15 19/23 0/7 
Physical complaints 0/15   0/15   0/13   0/14   0/12   1/12   4/17  1/7   2/13  
Low self-esteem 0/17   1/18   1/16   0/11   4/14   4/9 11/15 3/7    4/8 0/5 
Low school performance 0/21   1/21   0/17   0/15   0/15   0/16   8/23 5/13 4/8   
Protective factors 1/8   1/7   0/7   0/7   1/5   1/5   3/7  2/5   
 
Note. Empty cells indicate combinations which fewer than five participants had in their model. Categories in the left column are indicated as causes, categories 
in the top row as effects. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7b 
Frequencies of Causal Relations Conditional on the Number of Participants Having Both Categories in their Causal Maps for Brian 
 
  
Stress 
mother 
Relation 
to father
Parenting 
problems 
Few social 
contacts 
Depres-
sive 
com-
plaints 
Low 
self-
esteem 
Low 
school 
perfor-
mance 
Protec-
tive 
factors
ADHD 
charac-
teristics 
Behav. 
prob. 
home 
Behav.
prob. 
school 
Friend 
moved 
Repea-
ting 
grade 
Nega-
tive 
social 
inter. 
Gene-
tic 
predis.  
Stress mother  6/23 21/32 0/13 9/19 6/18   1/25 0/7   5/34 14/32   0/15 0/7 1/9 0/7 0/5 
Relation to father  12/23  14/19 2/11 5/10 4/12   0/15 0/6   3/23   7/19   0/8 0/7 1/6   
Parenting problems 21/32 5/19  0/11 6/17 4/17   1/24 0/6 12/31 20/27   3/15 0/7 0/9 0/6  
Few social contacts   1/13 0/11   0/11  1/5 4/7   0/9    1/13   3/11   1/2  0/5 0/3  
Depressive complaints   1/19 1/10   2/17 2/5  2/6   2/14    1/18   6/16   3/6  1/5 2/4  
Low self-esteem   2/18 1/12   0/17 2/7 2/6    4/13    3/17   8/15   5/8  1/5 2/4  
Low school performance   2/25 1/15   0/24 1/9 9/14 9/13     3/25   3/23   4/10  5/6 0/6 0/5 
Protective factors   0/7 1/6   2/6        1/6   1/5      
ADHD characteristics   8/34 2/23 11/31 4/13 7/18 6/17 13/25 0/6  17/29 13/14 0/7 3/9 5/7 0/6 
Behav. prob. home 10/32 1/19   8/27 4/11 6/16 8/15   0/23 0/5   3/29    3/14 0/5 0/7 4/6 0/5 
Behav. prob. school   0/15 0/8   0/15  3/6 3/8   1/10    3/14   2/14      
Friend moved   0/7 0/7   0/7        1/7   3/5      
Repeating grade   1/9 1/6   0/9 2/5 2/5 4/5   2/6    2/9   2/7      
Negative social interactions   0/7    0/6      0/6    2/7   1/6      
Genetic predisposition    1/5        2/5    3/6   1/5      
 
Note. Empty cells indicate combinations which fewer than five participants had in their model. Categories in the left column are indicated as causes, categories 
in the top row as effects. 
 
  
Table 8a  
Frequencies of Direct Effects Conditional on the Number of Participants Having Both a Category in their Causal Map and Chosen an Intervention 
as one of the Five Most Effective for Thijs 
 
 Divorce 
Stress 
mother 
Demanding 
sister 
Relation 
father 
Parenti-
fication 
Few social 
contacts 
Depressive 
complaints 
Physical 
complaints 
Low  
self- 
esteem 
Low school 
performance 
Remedial teaching  0/5     0/5     1/5    
Family therapy  7/26 18/24 21/21 10/17 12/18   4/18   6/25 1/12   5/13   1/16 
Individual cognitive therapy  6/30   0/29   2/24   3/22 10/23 10/22 25/30 6/15 15/15   7/20 
Medication            
Individual therapy mother  8/23 22/23   3/19   3/18   4/17   1/14   1/23 0/12   2/8   0/14 
Training impulse control            
Parent support  5/35 29/34 18/28 10/25 16/25   7/23   1/35 1/15   5/16   0/21 
Individual play therapy  8/32   0/32   2/25   3/22   4/22   4/19 28/31 6/12 15/15   5/18 
Teacher support  0/15   0/16   0/13   0/12   0/11   4/11 10/17 1/5   7/8 11/12 
Social skills training  0/14   0/13   0/13   0/11   1/9   9/12   9/14 0/6   6/9   0/6 
 
Note. Empty cells indicate combinations which fewer than five participants had in their model. In the left column interventions are listed, which affect 
categories as mentioned in the top row.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8b  
Frequencies of Direct Effects Conditional on the Number of Participants Having Both a Category in their Causal Map and Chosen an Intervention 
as one of the Five Most Effective for Brian 
 
  
Stress 
mother 
Relation 
to father
Parenting 
problems 
Few 
social 
contacts
Depressive 
com-plaints
Low self-
esteem 
Low 
school 
perf. 
Protec-
tive 
factors 
ADHD 
char. 
Behav. 
prob. 
home 
Behav.
prob. 
school 
Friend 
moved 
Repea-
ting 
grade 
Genetic 
predis. 
father 
Remedial teaching     0/19   0/13   1/17 1/6 5/14 2/10 17/17    1/20   3/18 2/8  3/6  
Family therapy  14/19   9/12 17/19 1/8 7/12 1/7   0/12 0/5   3/18   8/14 1/6  1/5  
Individual cognitive therapy    0/18   0/8   0/17 2/7 8/11 8/9   0/12    4/16 10/16 4/8  2/6  
Medication    2/27   0/18   1/23 4/11 3/12 2/13   4/19  27/27 12/25 4/11  0/6 2/5 
Individual therapy mother  20/20   0/10   3/19 0/5 1/12 0/11   0/17    0/17   2/17 0/9  0/5  
Training impulse control    0/20   0/14   0/16 5/8 2/9 4/9   1/16 0/5 16/20 11/19 5/9    
Parent support  20/34 15/21 29/31 1/11 3/17 7/18   1/25 0/6   5/34 12/30 1/16 0/6 0/8 1/7 
Individual play therapy    0/9    0/10  4/6 4/6   0/5    2/10   1/6     
Teacher support    1/17   0/11   0/17 6/8 4/6 9/12   8/12    7/16   8/14 8/8 0/5 3/7  
Social skills training    1/5    1/5   1/5   0/5    2/6      
 
Note. Empty cells indicate combinations which fewer than five participants had in their model. In the left column interventions are listed, which affect 
categories as mentioned in the top row. 
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participants the causal strategies and average ranking predicted effectiveness ratings equally 
well. Only for a minority of participants did the average ranking predict ratings best. Thus, 
clinicians’ effectiveness ratings were indeed consistent with their individual causal models, 
and more so than with common beliefs about the effectiveness of the interventions.  
Analyses of the agreement about the contents of the causal models showed that 
clinicians’ models were idiosyncratic. Participants focused on different variables and 
assumed different causal relations. This idiosyncrasy is not unexpected. Clinicians have been 
found to disagree about case formulations, and especially about causal inferences (Garb, 
2005; Kuyken et al., 2005; Persons & Bertagnolli, 1999; see Chapter 2). Agreement about the 
effectiveness of interventions was moderate to poor. Interestingly, participants agreed 
moderately about what variables are affected by the interventions for both cases. Thus, it 
seems that although participants think differently about mechanisms underlying the boys’ 
problems, they share beliefs about the effects of the interventions. 
Taking these findings together we conclude that, despite the idiosyncrasy of the 
causal models, participants’ effectiveness judgments are more in line with their individual 
models than with shared beliefs about the effectiveness of these interventions. Thus, our 
hypothesis is supported. Our findings are also consistent with previous studies showing that 
causal assumptions affect clinicians’ diagnosis (Kim & Ahn, 2002) and inferences about 
unobserved symptoms (Proctor & Ahn, 2007). Further, similar findings had been obtained for 
students’ ratings of the effectiveness of actions to prevent coronary heart disease (Green & 
McManus, 1995) or reduce environmental risks (Böhm & Pfister, 2000). Also related are 
findings in the area of legal decision making. Jurors were shown to have different mental 
causal models of what happened in a crime, and these different models led to different 
verdicts for the same suspect (Huntley & Costanzo, 2003; Pennington & Hastie, 1988).  
Strategies for Predicting the Effectiveness of Interventions 
We could predict most participants’ effectiveness ratings quite well with the causal 
strategies we defined, and for some participants even perfectly so. Hence, our findings 
indicate that most clinicians considered their own causal model when judging the 
effectiveness of different interventions. What we do not know is which precise strategy each 
clinician used.  Looking at the complexity of the causal models drawn, it seems that 
clinicians may not derive the effectiveness of interventions from their models by taking into 
account all variables directly and indirectly affected, the strength of all causal relations, 
causal feedback loops, the modifiability of variables, and problem importance. Instead, they 
may use simpler heuristics (cf. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). For example, as the effect of 
an intervention rapidly fades the further away a problem is from the point of intervention, 
participants may refrain from inferring distant, but weak effects of an intervention. Note 
that such simpler heuristic strategies are still causal, because they still infer effectiveness of 
interventions from participants’ own causal client models.  
Further, it is possible that clinicians base their expectations for how effective 
different interventions will be not on a specific causal model constructed for an individual 
client, but on a more general causal model of behaviour. Robins, Mendelsohn, Connell, and 
Kwan (2004) found that people disagree about causes of specific behaviours of others and 
themselves. However, people tend to arrive at similar explanations for other people’s and 
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their own behaviours. Thus, Robins et al. suggest that people may have a personal, implicit 
theory about what generally causes behaviour in themselves and others, and that different 
individuals may have different theories. Similarly, therapists in our study might have 
implicit theories about what generally causes (problematic) behaviour, emotions, and 
cognitions, and use these theories to infer the effectiveness of interventions (cf. Hong, Chiu, 
Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). ). Alternatively, they may have disorder-specific causal models (cf. 
Kim & Ahn, 2002). However, inspection of the contents of the causal models shows that 
participants used different variables for Thijs and Brian (see Table 6). Also, for variable 
categories which are present in models for Thijs and Brian participants show different 
beliefs about causal relations (see Tables 7a and 7b). For example, for both boys depressive 
complaints were identified as a category. However, relatively more participants believed that 
depressive complaints lead to fewer social contacts, low self esteem, and low school 
performance for Thijs than for Brian. Thus, the causal models that participants constructed 
for both boys seem to be client-specific rather than general. 
As a non-causal strategy to infer the effectiveness of interventions we defined the 
common knowledge strategy, to reflect experiences of what interventions had been effective 
for similar clients before, generalized over clinicians. We reasoned that this would be 
appropriate since our participants were quite experienced and had seen many similar cases 
in their work. The fact that agreement about the effectiveness of interventions was not too 
high, especially not for Brian, indicates that participants might have used idiosyncratic 
rather than common experiences. These idiosyncratic experiences might result from 
different clients they have met, but also from subjective interpretations of causes for client 
problems and of the effectiveness of interventions (Haynes, Spain, & Oliveira, 1993; cf. 
Robins et al., 2004). Further, clinicians might refer to prototypical or stereotypical clients, 
and have different prototypes and stereotypes (Garb, 1996). Different judgments may also 
originate in differences in knowledge obtained from scientific literature, colleagues, or other 
sources.  
To conclude, clinicians may use a variety of causal and non-causal strategies to derive 
judgments of effectiveness. Our results indicate that many clinicians derive their judgments 
from their idiosyncratic causal models.  
Limitations 
A limitation of this study is the two cases, which both presented problems of young 
boys. Also, all clinical psychologists participating in the study worked with children. 
Therefore, we cannot be sure to what extent these results can be generalized to other cases, 
and to clinicians working with adolescents or adults. 
In our study we explicitly asked participants to draw a causal model of a client’s 
problems. One may suspect that this procedure drew participants’ attention to the 
importance of causal considerations for inferring the effectiveness of different 
interventions. Note however, that only half of the participants constructed a causal map 
before ranking interventions for effectiveness. The other participants first ranked 
interventions. We found no differences between these two groups in (i) the complexity of the 
generated models, (ii) the mean ranks assigned to the ten interventions, and (iii) correlations 
between rankings participants gave and rankings based on any of the causal and non-causal 
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strategies (except one in the opposite direction to what would be predicted, see Analyses 
and Results section). Thus it seems that we in fact tracked participants’ causal assumptions.   
Finally, we only asked participants to predict the effectiveness of different 
interventions and not to choose an intervention. However, as we mentioned in the beginning, 
in practice intervention choices will not only be determined by predicted effectiveness. 
Factors such as available time and budget, interventions available in an institution, and 
client-specific (e.g. motivation) or clinician-specific factors (e.g. experience) might also 
influence intervention choices (Beutler, Malik, Alimohamed, Harwood, Talebi, Noble, & Wong, 
2004; Clarkin & Levy, 2004; Nelson & Steele, 2008). For a complete understanding of 
intervention choices, these other factors have to be taken into account as well.  
Implications for Clinical Practice 
We focused on the question whether psychotherapists base their intervention choices 
on causal client models. Another question is whether they should do so in practice. In the 
introduction we referred to handbooks which advocate basing intervention choices on case 
formulations which explain how clients’ problems are caused and maintained (Carr, 2006; 
Eells, 2007; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Wenar & Kerig, 2006). However, it seems difficult for 
clinicians to make reliable causal inferences about the mechanisms underlying clients’ 
problems. In addition, it is often unknown why precisely interventions are effective (De Los 
Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; Haynes & Williams, 2003). Clinicians might do better to choose 
empirically validated interventions based on classifications of clients’ problems. But 
empirically validated interventions may not always be available, and classifications may not 
always be straightforward, as in cases with comorbidity of disorders (Nelson-Gray, 2003). 
Although evidence for better treatment outcomes following case formulations explicating 
causal mechanisms is scarce and not uniformly positive, some studies indicate that for 
complex cases and severe problems better outcomes have been associated with the 
identification of causal mechanisms (Beutler et al., 2004; Bieling & Kuyken, 2003; Eells, 2007; 
Nelson-Gray, 2003).  
Our study indicates that clinicians’ idiosyncratic causal models lead to different 
ratings of effectiveness for interventions. As a consequence they may lead to different 
intervention choices for the same client. We believe that clinicians should be cautious when 
making inferences about underlying causal mechanisms (see also Garb, 2005), and that they 
should put assumed mechanisms to stringent tests (e.g. Haynes, Spain, & Oliveira, 1993; 
Staines, 2007).  
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Appendix A 
 
Case description Thijs (translated from Dutch) 
Thijs is eleven years old. Mother is an analyst, father is a sales representative. The 
parents are divorced. Thijs has a six year old sister. Thijs has been brought in by mother, on 
the advice of Thijs’ teacher. The teacher was worried about Thijs and asked the pedagogical 
assistant in school, after having consulted mother, to have Thijs fill in the KDVK (Short 
Depression Questionnaire for Children). Thijs appeared to reach a score in the clinical range. 
Thijs works hard at school, but his achievements have detoriated since last year. The teacher 
thinks Thijs is a good and docile pupil, but he misses all initiative. He never raises his hand, 
and he will never ask anything. With creative subjects it takes long before he makes 
anything. With drawing for example he thinks a long time and keeps rubbing out, when 
working with clay he keeps moulding. With gym and playing outside he is withdrawn. It 
seems that he does not want to join others, but prefers to watch. He has one friend from 
another class. The teacher of the previous year says that Thijs used to be more actively 
involved in class and used to play a lot with other children. Mother was very surprised to 
hear that Thijs might be depressed. She does not have many problems with Thijs. He is 
always quiet, sweet, and obedient. He does however often complain about stomach ache. 
Thijs’ sister on the contrary is very difficult to handle and hot-tempered. She demands all 
attention, because she refuses to eat or sleep. Mother says she finds it strange to be here for 
Thijs, she could use more help for his sister. Thijs always wants to help his mother with 
cooking and doing the dishes. Mother says she often finds that inconvenient. Thijs often 
helps his mother by looking after his sister, when she goes shopping for example. Thijs 
watches television a lot and often plays with his Gameboy. He does not want to train and has 
not joined any club. He did play soccer, but he stopped after the divorce, because father no 
longer took him to the training and competitions. Father left his family two years ago, he 
was having an affair. He didn’t comply with the arrangement concerning parental visits. 
Often he did not come to pick up the children when this was agreed on. Thijs didn’t like 
being at father’s place, he always wanted to go back to his mother. This year Thijs has seen 
his father only at his grandmother’s birthday. Mother has had great problems with the 
divorce. She felt rejected and abandoned. She still feels very lonely. She finds it hard to take 
care of the children all by herself. She has to do everything alone, while she works four days 
a week as well. During the interview Thijs does not speak much. If he is asked something, he 
looks at his shoes and often says: “I don’t know”. Thijs is cooperative during the tests, he 
seems to enjoy them. He says he would like to play with friends more often, but that this is 
often not possible because his mother cannot bring or fetch him. He finds it unpleasant that 
his sister is so difficult; he is sorry for his mum. He explains that his mother has to work 
hard, since she has to do everything alone. He says he used to miss his father a lot, but not 
anymore. What he misses most is that there are no fun activities anymore. With father they 
often used to go to the zoo, or swimming. He says he likes school, but often does not know 
what he has to do. Pregnancy and birth were normal. Thijs’ development was fine. He has 
always been a sweet and easy child. When he was young, he suffered from frequent ear 
infections. After surgery at the age of three the infections disappeared. He has always been 
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careful with his sister. At school he achieved average results until this year. On the TRF 
(behaviour questionnaire filled in by the teacher) scores fall in the clinical range for 
withdrawn and anxious/depressive behaviour. On the CBCL (behaviour questionnaire filled 
in by mother) scores fall in the clinical subrange for somatic complaints. From the WISC-III 
(intelligence test) Thijs appears to have an IQ of 104, with a harmonic profile. The CBSK 
(Scale for children’s perceived competences) shows low scores in the domains school 
performance, social acceptation, sports achievements, and self esteem. From the DVK 
(Depression questionnaire for children) it appears that Thijs thinks negatively of himself and 
his environment. Mother feels guilty that she didn’t notice that Thijs felt so bad. She hopes 
that he will feel better soon and is prepared to do anything that is necessary. Father has 
been informed about the assessment, but he did not want to be involved. 
 
Case description Brian (translated from Dutch)  
Brian is ten years old. Mother is a housewife, father is a self-employed handyman. 
Brian is their only child. Brian has been brought in by his mother, because she can no longer 
influence Brian’s behaviour, and on the advice of the teacher. Mother says it seems as if 
there’s nothing but fights at home. She cannot ask or tell Brian anything. He gets angry at 
everything. He starts to shout, goes outside or to his room stamping his feet and slamming 
the doors. Brian has always been an active child and has always needed a lot of attention. He 
was always playing wild games, testing the limits and getting into mischief. He cannot sit 
still and always dominates the conversation. But now it seems there is nothing but fights. 
Mother says she’s depressed and can no longer put up with these continuing fights. Father 
works a lot, also most Saturdays. Father recognises a lot in his son, he used to be very active 
too. He says he still cannot sit still. His father was very strict with him. He thinks Brian needs 
a firm approach too, which he does not get from his mother. When Brian doesn’t listen to 
him, father sends him upstairs, and he isn’t allowed to come back for the rest of the evening. 
Brian obeys his father more than his mother. Mother starts to cry when father criticises her 
approach to Brian. According to the teacher Brian has always been highly visible at school 
and has always been easily distracted. At the same time Brian was always a pleasant pupil, 
with a sense of humour and helpful to other children. He’s repeating the sixth grade, 
because he is two years behind with reading, as appears from AVI and 1-minute tests 
(reading competence measures). The teacher thinks Brian has changed a lot since this last 
year. He has become very uninterested; he often sighs aloud and gives a lot of negative 
comments on everything he is asked to do. He doesn’t comply with rules and agreements. 
When there’s a conflict he walks out of the classroom. Usually his work is not finished, 
sloppy, and full of mistakes. In the schoolyard he’s constantly engaged in fights. He swears, 
pushes, and kicks. If the teacher wants to talk, he says he doesn’t care. Frequently he 
appears to be lying. Brian says he always does everything wrong. Things always go wrong 
and everyone always gets angry. He understands that everyone gets angry because he keeps 
doing stupid things. When he tries his best, he just doesn’t manage. He just doesn’t like 
school anymore. His best friend has moved in the summer holidays. Other children, who he 
calls babies, always start to fight and he always gets the blame. At home there isn’t much to 
do. Usually he watches television or plays computer games. He also often goes outside. He 
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bikes around in the neighbourhood, but there isn’t much to do there either. He does not 
often play with the children from his former class anymore. Pregnancy and birth were 
normal. Brian used to sleep little and to cry a lot when he was a baby. In his development he 
was quick with everything; he could walk with ten months of age. He has visited the 
emergency department more than once, because he was stunting on his bike, jumped off the 
roof of a shed, and was hit when he suddenly crossed the street. Apart from this, he has 
always been in good health. Brian has always had a lot of friends and his family was fond of 
him. He always used to make everybody laugh with his jokes. Three years ago, mother 
received help from the RIAGG (= mental health care institution) for half a year. After having 
had a miscarriage she became depressed. She stopped treatment there because she felt 
better. She says that she has again been suffering from depressive complaints for a while 
now, and wants to seek help again. Both the CBCL (behaviour questionnaire filled in by 
parents) and TRF (behaviour questionnaire filled in by the teacher) scores fall in the clinical 
ranges for aggressive behaviour and attention problems, and in the clinical subrange for 
anxious/depressive behaviour. On the AVL (ADHD-questionnaire) there are high scores in the 
domains hyperactivity, impulsivity, and attention problems. From the WISC-III (intelligence 
test) it appears that Brian has an average intelligence (IQ=97), he has low scores on the parts 
‘Substitution’ and ‘Digit Series’. The CBSK (Scale for children’s perceived competences) shows 
low scores in the domains school performance, social acceptation, behaviour, and self 
esteem. From the DVK (Depression questionnaire for children) it appears that Brian thinks 
negatively of himself, his environment, and the future. Mother and father are shocked by the 
test results. They hope Brian learns to behave better at home and at school. They also hope 
he will feel better soon. Brian says he doesn’t know, when he is asked what he wants. 
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Appendix B 
 
General Coding. Causal strength ratings were re-coded following the proposal by 
Haynes and Williams (2003). Weak relations were set to .2, moderate relations to .5 and 
strong relations to .8. The most important problem was assigned a value of 8, the second 
most important problems a value of 4, the least important problems a value of 2, and 
variables not representing problems a value of 1. Modifiability ratings were re-coded as 1 for 
easily modifiable factors, .5 for moderately modifiable factors, and .1 for factors not being 
modifiable. All calculations described hereafter were performed for each causal model 
generated by participants. Formulae were programmed into an Excel file.    
Calculation of predictions for Maximum Impact Heuristic. The basic idea of this 
heuristic is that people think of the impact each variable has on the client’s situation. 
Interventions are chosen that influence the variables with the highest impacts. As the basic 
idea was adopted from Haynes and Williams (2003), the calculation also followed their 
proposed method.  
First, the causal influence of each variable upon every other variable was computed 
by multiplying the strength of the causal relations connecting each cause to its effects, that 
is the causal strength relating variable V
i
 to variable V
j
 via m intermediate variables V
k
 was 
computed as  . As causal relations were assigned values <1, the 
causal influence of variable V
i
 diminished the further apart cause and effect were. If a 
variable V
l
 was affected by two or more other variables V
k
, the causal influence of these 
variables on their joint effect was calculated using the so-called noisy-or scheme,  
 (Jensen, 1996). This rule ensures that causal influences do not sum 
up to values larger than 1, even if several variables strongly affect the same variable.  
Next the impact of each variable V
i
 upon all other variables V
j≠i was computed by 
multiplying the importance of each variable (imp
j
) with its modifiability (mod
j
), and the 
strength of the causal relation relating variable V
i
 to all its effects c
ij
,  
 . Note that the importance and 
modifiability of variable V
i
 is part of its impact. This captures the notion that the impact of a 
variable is its overall relevance for the current situation of the client.  
Finally the causal impact of an intervention t was computed by summing up the 
causal impacts of the variables directly targeted by the intervention multiplied by the 
intervention’s causal influence upon these variables, 
. Based on the variable impacttreatment 
treatments T
1
 to T
5
 were rank ordered.  
Calculation of predictions for Maximum Symptom Reduction Heuristic. The basic idea 
underlying this heuristic is that interventions reduce the presence of variables, which are 
either problems or causes of these problems. Two assumptions were made (i) each variable 
in the model was present and therefore received a starting value of v
i
 = 1, (ii) strong 
interventions reduce the presence of a variable that is directly affected by 80%, medium 
interventions by 50% and weak interventions by 20%. Assumption 2 was implemented by 
calculating the value of a variable V
i
 conditional on an intervention T with the causal 
strength c
ti
 as v
i|t
 = v
i
 * (1 – c
ti
) = 1 – c
ti
. This formula also implicitly assumes that an 
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intervention screens off the causal influences of other variables upon the variable being 
targeted by the intervention. This assumption is commonly made to model interventions in 
causal systems (see Pearl, 2000).  
The causal influence of each intervention was calculated in a stepwise procedure. 
First the effect on the immediately affected variables was calculated using the formula 
above. Second the influence of interventions upon the variables that are direct effects of the 
variables directly affected were calculated, then the influence of the intervention upon the 
effects of these effects, and so on. The causal influence of an intervention T on variable V
j
 
via variable V
i
 was computed as . As V
j
 initially had a value 
of 1, the reduction is calculated by reduction
j
 = 1 – v
j|t
. If variable j had several causes V
i
, the 
reduced value of V
j
 was calculated by reduction
j
.  This 
formula computes the reduction of symptoms assuming that all other variables affecting V
j
 
are still present and exert their influence. Note that variables not targeted by the 
intervention keep their initial value of v
i
 = 1 and therefore their complete influence. The 
formula also captures the intuition that if there are many alternative causes of a problem 
not targeted by an intervention, the intervention has only little influence on the problem. 
Finally the reductions of all variables V
i
 directly or indirectly affected by an 
intervention T were summed, . Based on this sum treatments T
1
 to T
5
 were 
rank ordered. The intervention with the highest reduction received rank 1. 
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Experience and the Causal Diversity Effect in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Laypeople have been found to show a “causal diversity effect” in their reasoning about medical 
diseases: they perceive symptoms which emerge from a root cause via divergent causal paths as 
providing stronger evidence for the presence of a medical disease than symptoms which emerge from 
the root cause along a similar path (Kim & Keil, 2003). We investigated whether the causal structure of 
knowledge similarly influences experienced clinicians’ diagnostic reasoning. In Study 1, we presented 
experienced clinical psychologists with recent theories for different disorders about how symptoms 
stem from a root cause. We asked them to choose which of two clients was most likely to have a 
disorder: a client with causally diverse or causally similar symptoms. The clinicians showed a causal 
diversity effect when they reasoned with the theories, but only when they could first use their own 
knowledge in a similar task. In Study 2, we elicited experienced clinical psychologists’ causal 
assumptions about how symptoms stem from a root cause for different disorders. The clinicians didn’t 
think clients with symptoms that were causally diverse according to their own assumptions were more 
likely to have a disorder than clients with causally similar symptoms. In Study 3 we elicited novices’ 
causal assumptions. We found that novices did show a causal diversity effect. Causal diversity seems 
useful to infer the likelihood of a disorder for novices, while experienced clinical psychologists may 
use their knowledge of conditional probabilities obtained by experience to do so.  
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Clinicians often have to classify clients’ symptoms and problems into a disorder category 
specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2000). Kim and 
Ahn (2002) investigated such classifications. With a theory-drawing task they elicited 
clinicians’ assumptions of how symptoms are causally related in different disorders. They 
found that experienced clinical psychologists and novices weight symptoms which receive 
equal weights in the DSM-IV differently, depending on the causal status of the symptoms in 
their theories. Thus, in a hypothetical client rating task clinicians were more likely to classify 
clients as having a hypothesized disorder when they had symptoms which were more 
causally central in their theories, in the sense that these symptoms caused more other 
symptoms. For example, in clinicians’ theories for Anorexia Nervosa the symptom “refuses 
to maintain weight’ causes several other symptoms of Anorexia Nervosa, while “absence of 
the period for more than 3 months” does not cause any other symptoms. The first more 
causally central symptom appeared more important for classifying a hypothetical client as 
having Anorexia Nervosa than the latter.  
The studies we present here investigate whether the causal structure of knowledge 
may also influence clinicians’ classifications in another way. Specifically, we aimed to test 
whether experienced clinical psychologists show a causal diversity effect in their diagnostic 
reasoning. Undergraduate psychology students have been found to show this effect when 
reasoning about medical diseases. They judge that patients are more likely to have a disease 
when they have symptoms that are causally diverse, that is: symptoms stemming from a 
root cause via divergent causal paths, than when they have symptoms that stem from the 
root cause via the same causal path (Kim & Keil, 2003).  
Kim and Keil (2003) had presented undergraduate psychology students with 
information about the causal origins of four symptoms, for different medical diseases. The 
symptoms originated from a single common root cause, following a causal hierarchical 
structure, see Figure 1 for an example.  
This figure illustrates how a root cause branches out in two causal paths, each again 
leading to two symptoms, of the disease “rheumatic fever.” The undergraduates judged 
which of two patients was most likely to have a specific disease: a patient presenting with 
two symptoms originating from the same causal path (“causally proximal” symptoms), or a 
patient presenting with two symptoms originating from different paths (“causally diverse” 
symptoms). In the example of rheumatic fever, a patient presenting with joint inflammation 
and rapid heartbeat presents with proximal symptoms, and a patient with joint 
inflammation and skin rash around the neck presents with diverse symptoms. Most 
undergraduates judged patients with causally diverse symptoms as most likely to have the 
hypothesized disease. Also, undergraduates preferred to seek out causally diverse 
symptoms rather than causally proximal symptoms, in order to test whether a patient has a 
hypothesized disease. They did so even though they thought patients are more likely to have 
causally proximal symptoms than causally diverse symptoms (Kim, Yopchick, & De 
Kwaadsteniet, 2008).    
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Figure 1. Causal diagram of rheumatic fever stimuli used by Kim & Keil (2003). 
 
This causal diversity effect seems analogous to the “premise diversity effect” which 
occurs in novices’ category-based induction. In category-based induction tasks people are 
asked to infer properties of categories, using information about properties that other 
categories have. Undergraduates rate arguments consisting of premises leading to a 
conclusion as stronger if the categories in the premises to which the to-be inferred property 
is ascribed are more diverse. For example, Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, and Shafir (1990) 
found that most undergraduates rate an argument with premises ”Hippopotamuses have a 
higher sodium concentration in their blood than humans” and ”Hamsters have a higher 
sodium concentration in their blood than humans”, and conclusion ”All mammals have a 
higher sodium concentration in their blood than humans” as stronger than an argument 
having the same conclusion but premises ”Hippopotamuses have a higher sodium 
concentration in their blood than humans” and ”Rhinoceroses have a higher sodium 
concentration in their blood than humans”.  Hippopotamuses and hamsters are perceived as 
more dissimilar or diverse than hippopotamuses and rhinoceroses, and therefore when they 
share a property that is stronger evidence for the conclusion that all mammals share that 
property (Osherson et al., 1990). Not only do undergraduates rate more diverse evidence 
stronger in category-based inferences, they prefer to seek out diverse information to test a 
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category-based inference too (López, 1995; see also Kincannon & Spellman, 2003; Spellman, 
López, & Smith, 1999).  
More diverse evidence seems intuitively more convincing in category-based induction 
and causal diagnostic reasoning, and this has also been argued to be normative (see e.g. Heit, 
Hahn, & Feeney, 2005; Popper, 1963; Whewell, 1840/1999). Meehl (1954) argued that 
clinicians should try to find diverse evidence to corroborate their hypotheses: “Having once 
conceived a particular hypothesis concerning a patient, we must, if we are scientific (...), 
subject this hypothesis to the usual canons of inference. That is, we must see whether the 
hypothesis will entail (…) a greater range of or diversity of the known facts (…), and so on” 
(1954, p. 66). 
People prefer explanations that are as simple as possible, and that account for as 
many data as possible (Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Thagard, 1992). For causally diverse 
evidence the most simple, parsimonious explanation that unifies the observations is that the 
hypothesized root cause is present. For causally proximal evidence, the most economic 
explanation seems that the immediately preceding cause is present (see Figure 1: the cause 
on the last level but one, preceding two proximal symptoms) (Kim et al., 2008). In a similar 
vein, people may sooner discount alternative causes if diverse evidence is present, leaving 
the hypothesized root cause more likely, while it is easier to imagine alternative causes than 
the hypothesized root cause if proximal evidence is present (Kim & Keil, 2003).  
Following Horwich (1982) and Kincannon and Spellman (2003), who gave Bayesian 
justifications for why diverse premises form stronger evidence in category-based induction, 
the reason why causally diverse symptoms form stronger evidence in diagnostic reasoning 
can also be formalized in a Bayesian way: The chance that your hypothesis is correct, given 
specific evidence - the chance that a specific root cause is present, given proximal/diverse 
evidence – is equal to the probability that the evidence occurs given the hypothesized cause 
(P (e│c
1
)) multiplied by the probability of the hypothesized cause, independent of any 
evidence (P(c
1
)), controlling for the prior probability that the evidence occurs, that is: the 
summed probabilities that the evidence occurs with all possible causes (hypothesized root 
cause and alternative causes). See (1): 
 
                  P (e│c
1
) P(c
1
)    
(1) P (c
1
│e) ═   ∑c
1-n
 P(e│c) P(c) 
 
In the causal hierarchies used by Kim and Keil (2003) and Kim et al. (2008) the possible 
causes for proximal evidence may include the possible causes for the presence of diverse 
evidence, and more. Thus, the denominator in the equation gets larger for proximal evidence 
compared to diverse evidence, leading to a lower probability that with proximal evidence the 
hypothesized root cause is present. With fewer alternative causes, as with diverse evidence, 
the denominator gets smaller, leading to a higher probability of the hypothesized root cause.  
Kim and Keil (2003) speculated that if experts have developed more pronounced 
causal theories “gaining expertise would also give rise to increasingly powerful diversity 
effects” (2003, p.165). If this is true, experienced clinical psychologists will show a stronger 
causal diversity effect in diagnostic reasoning than novices.  
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However, it is also possible that causal diversity effects will not occur in an expert 
sample. With categorical induction domain experts and undergraduate students do not 
display diversity effects equally, which shows that the availability of relevant background 
knowledge can make a big difference (Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003). While American 
undergraduates preferred more diverse bird categories to make general inductions about 
birds, US bird experts did not show this preference, but often seem to consider ecological 
relations that exist between birds of different categories (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & 
Coley, 2002). Itza’ Maja, who can be seen as expert biologists, also showed no diversity 
preference for category-based inferences about birds, nor about mammals, or palms, 
contrary to American undergraduate students. They often considered ecological relations 
too (Bailenson et al., 2002; López, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997). Similarly, tree experts 
showed no diversity effect when making category-based inductions of diseases affecting 
trees (Proffitt, Coley & Medin, 2000). A diversity-based strategy in categorical induction 
might thus be a default strategy that novices often use, and other strategies may be adopted 
when relevant background knowledge is available. Similarly, experts may not always show a 
preference for causally diverse evidence, but their relevant knowledge might trigger other 
reasoning strategies. We can imagine that expert clinicians might use their knowledge of the 
typicality or diagnosticity of symptoms (Klayman and Brown, 1993), or cue validity of 
symptoms (Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998), to make diagnostic decisions rather than knowledge 
of causal structure.  
We tested whether experienced clinical psychologists show a causal diversity effect in 
their diagnostic reasoning. In our first study, with a design similar to the first study by Kim 
and Keil (2003), we presented experienced clinical psychologists with causal hierarchies for 
psychiatric disorders that explained how according to recent literature associated symptoms 
originate from a root cause. Then we asked them to choose which of two clients would most 
likely have a hypothesized disorder according to these theories: a client presenting with two 
causally proximal symptoms or a client presenting with two causally diverse symptoms.  
In Study 2, we investigated whether a causal diversity effect would occur when 
clinical psychologists reasoned using their own causal theories of disorders. In daily 
practice, clinical psychologists will reason using their own theories (Kim & Ahn, 2002). We 
tried to extract clinicians’ causal assumptions about how symptoms emerge in different 
disorders, and tested whether clinicians showed a preference for information that is causally 
diverse according to these assumptions. Study 3 was similar to Study 2, except that now 
novices in clinical psychology participated.  
 
Study 1 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 19 clinical psychologists from the US and the 
Netherlands, recruited by phone and e-mail. We randomly assigned participants to condition 
1 (n = 10, 5 American and 5 Dutch psychologists), or condition 2 (n = 9, 4 American and 5 
Dutch).  The American and Dutch samples did not differ significantly in experience, age, or 
gender. Mean experience of the whole sample was 19.6 years (SE = 2.4), 11 were female, 
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mean age was 47.5 (SE = 3.0). American participants were paid 40 dollars and Dutch 
participants received a 10 euro gift certificate for their participation.  
Materials and procedure. We derived summary causal diagrams for five DSM-IV-TR 
(APA, 2000) psychiatric disorders from recently published theories. Each diagram had an 
underlying structure similar to the causal diagrams used by Kim & Keil (2003): a root cause 
branched out in two divergent causal paths, each containing two intermediate steps, leading 
to two pairs of symptoms. Although we did not intend to present complete scientific 
theories, as these usually consist of more than two causal pathways and contain more than 
four symptoms, we intended to correctly represent parts of the theories. In Figure 2 a 
sample diagram is presented, for autism, which we based on Belmonte, Allen, et al. (2004) 
and Belmonte, Cook, et al. (2004). Other psychiatric disorders for which we constructed 
causal diagrams were: anorexia nervosa (diagram based on Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 
2003, and Fairburn, Shafran, & Cooper, 1999), ADHD (based on Sonuga-Barke, 2002), panic 
disorder (based on Ninan & Dunlop 2005), and Borderline personality disorder (based on 
Mauchnik, Schmahl, & Bohus, 2005). In Appendix A the components of all diagrams are 
presented.  
We discussed the plausibility of all diagrams with experienced clinical psychologists.  
From the diagrams we created sets of four separate chains, each showing how one symptom 
results from the root cause, via one of the branches with two intermediate steps. We used 
these sets of four chains per disorder instead of the summary diagrams to eliminate spatial 
distance cues (cf. Kim & Keil, 2003).   
We sent two questionnaires to each participant, with one week in between. In one 
questionnaire, containing the causal task, participants were shown the sets of four chains 
for the disorders. Each chain was labelled with the name of the disorder and a reference to 
the publications used for the construction. The four chains for one disorder were presented 
in pseudo-randomized order on separate sheets, such that the same causal chain was never 
seen twice consecutively. After having read the four chains for the first disorder, 
participants were asked to write a summary paragraph of the information.  
Next, they were asked to suppose that there were two clients: one client presenting 
with two symptoms that were shown to result from the same causal path, proximal 
symptoms, and the other client presenting with two symptoms that were shown to result 
from different causal paths, diverse symptoms. The two clients had one symptom in 
common. For example, for the disorder autism participants were presented with the 
statements: “Client N.W. has impairment in social interactions and problems with 
communication” and “Client C.F. has a need for structure and rules and problems with 
communication”. As can be seen from Figure 2, symptoms of Client N.W. are proximal, and 
symptoms of Client C. F. are diverse. In order to ensure that participants would not simply 
discount the presented theories when they did not agree with their content, we asked them 
to determine which of two clients would be most likely, according to the theory they had 
read, to have the disorder. Continuing our example, we asked: “Which client will be more 
likely, according to Belmonte et al. (2004a, 2004b), to have autism? Please choose one. ”. To 
avoid that some choices were far more plausible for reasons other than diversity (e.g. 
prevalence or salience in practice, mirroring of DSM-IV-TR criteria), we discussed the sets of 
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symptoms used in the questions with experienced clinical psychologists. We further asked 
participants to explain their choice, and to indicate whether they had ever heard of, read 
about, or studied the specific theory before.  
 
 
Figure 2. Causal diagram of autism stimuli used in Study 1. 
 
The same procedure was followed for the other four disorders, except that for these 
disorders we did not ask to provide a written summary, but we asked participants to 
mentally summarize the information from the chains. We counterbalanced the sequence of 
disorders between participants and we counterbalanced which client, with proximal or 
diverse symptoms, was presented first. At the end participants filled in their age, gender, 
and experience, and we gave them complete references for the theories we had presented.  
The other questionnaire contained a control task. We reasoned that experienced 
clinical psychologists would have developed strong opinions about psychiatric disorders (as 
in Kim & Ahn, 2002), with which we could compare their choices made after causal 
information was presented. In the control task, participants were presented with the same 
client statements, for the same disorders, and in the same sequence as in the causal task, 
but now we asked them to judge which of two clients would be most likely, in their own 
opinion, to have a disorder.  For example, after presenting the same two client statements 
about “Client N.W.” and “Client C.F.”, we asked: “Which client do you think is more likely to 
have autism? Please choose one”.  
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Participants in condition 1 completed the control task first. Participants in condition 
2 completed the causal task first.  For Dutch participants, all materials were translated in 
Dutch. 
Results. A choice for the client presenting with diverse symptoms was coded as “1” 
and a choice for the client with proximal symptoms as “0”. We collapsed the binary data 
across the five disorders for analysis. Results are shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Results Study 1 
 
We conducted all analyses at the α = .05 level. A 2 within subjects (Task: control, causal) X 2 
between subjects (Condition: control first, causal first) ANOVA revealed an interaction 
(F(1,17) = 23.5; p < .001; η2=.58), and a main effect of task (F(1,17) = 15.4; p < .01; η2=.48). 
Paired sample t-tests showed that participants who completed the control task first, chose 
the client presenting with diverse symptoms significantly more often in the causal task (M = 
88%; SE = 5.7), than in the control task (M = 46%; SE = 4.8) (t(9) = -5.2; p < .01; Cohen’s d = 
2.0). The results were in the same direction for all five disorders, indicating that this 
difference was not caused by any single item. Participants who completed the causal task 
first did not more often prefer the client with diverse symptoms in the causal task (M = 51%; 
SE = 9.4) than in the control task (M = 56%; SE = 8.3) (t(8) = 1.0; p > .3).  
Further, independent sample t-tests revealed no difference between frequency of 
diverse choices in tasks completed first, that is: between frequency of diverse choices in the 
control task for participants in the control-first condition and frequency of diverse choices 
in the causal task for participants in the causal-first condition (t(12) = -0.3; p > .7 (equal 
variances not assumed)). Also, frequency of diverse choices in the control task did not differ 
between conditions (t(13) = -.7; p > .4 (equal variances not assumed)). Frequency of diverse 
choices in the causal task did differ between conditions, with more diverse choices in the 
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control-first condition (t(17) = 2.4; p < .05; Cohen’s d = .97). We found no differences 
between American and Dutch participants. 
Justifications. Each justification that participants gave in the causal task was assigned 
to one of five coding categories by two coders, who were blind for the choices made and the 
conditions. We defined two categories for explanations in which participants referred to 
causal structure: Category A was for explanations according to which proximal symptoms 
provide the strongest evidence for the presence of the disorder, and category B was for 
explanations according to which diverse symptoms provide the strongest evidence for the 
presence of the disorder. Further, we defined category C for explanations referring to 
typicality or importance of symptoms. Category D was for explanations referring to 
distinction of the disorder from alternative disorders. Finally, category E was for 
explanations that did not fit any of the other categories. Cohen’s kappa for interrater 
reliability was .73; differences were discussed until coders agreed.  
For participants who did the control task first, 80% of the justifications in the causal 
task referred to causal structure. Of these all but two justifications referred to diverse 
symptoms as strongest evidence and explained a diverse choice. For participants who did 
the causal task first, 60% of the justifications referred to causal structure. Of these, 59% 
referred to diverse symptoms as strongest evidence and explained a diverse choice; the 
others referred to proximal choices, all but one to explain a proximal choice. In both 
conditions the remaining justifications most often referred to category C: typicality or 
importance of symptoms, to explain both diverse and proximal choices. Also, justifications 
assigned to categories D and E explained both diverse and proximal choices. So, most 
participants who chose the client with causally diverse symptoms appeared to do so because 
they considered causally diverse evidence to be stronger evidence for the presence of a 
disorder.  
Discussion. We found a causal diversity effect with experienced clinical psychologists, 
similar to the causal diversity effect found with undergraduate psychology students 
reasoning about medical conditions (Kim & Keil, 2003). Participants who completed the 
control task first thought that in the causal task according to the presented theories a client 
with diverse symptoms was more likely to have the hypothesized psychiatric disorder than a 
client with proximal symptoms. In the control task no such effect was found. Although 
people may not always be conscious of their real reasons to choose a specific answer 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), participants’ justifications indicated that choices were indeed 
based on causal structure. Surprisingly, we found no diversity effect for participants who 
completed the causal task first. Also, we found no difference in frequency of diverse choices 
between tasks performed first.  
Possibly, participants who completed the causal task first might have reasoned less 
according to the theories we presented, although they were instructed to do so, and made 
more use of their own insights, than participants who started with the control task and thus 
could express their own opinions first. To explore this explanation, we sent questionnaires 
to five more Dutch clinical psychologists (mean experience = 26.8 years, mean age = 50.2 
years, two were female), with first the causal task and the control task one week later. We 
stressed in the causal task that participants could express their own opinions in the second 
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(control) task, by each time adding after the question which client was more likely to have a 
disorder according to the theory presented, this sentence between brackets: “In the second 
questionnaire we will ask for your personal opinion”. These five participants chose the 
diverse client in 71 % of the cases in the causal task, and in 44 % of the cases in the control 
task. Of the justifications that these participants gave for their diverse choices in the causal 
task 89% referred to causal structure. Although the percentage of causal choices is smaller 
than it was for participants who did the control task first, the results are in the same 
direction, supporting our explanation.  
Our instruction to reason according to presented theories constrains our findings, 
because in a sense the experienced clinical psychologists were novices. For all disorders, 
most participants answered that they had never heard about, read about, or studied the 
specific theory before. Results of participants who did the causal task first indicate that 
background knowledge may influence their diagnostic reasoning strategies. Therefore we 
investigated, in Study 2, whether experienced clinical psychologists would show a preference 
for evidence that was causally diverse in their own causal assumptions about a disorder. 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 17 clinical psychologists recruited by phone and e-
mail. Of these, 4 were American and 13 Dutch. Their mean experience was 22.4 years 
(SE=3.0), 7 were female, and their mean age was 48.6 (SE=2.6). American clinical 
psychologists were paid 30 dollars and Dutch clinical psychologists received a 10 euro gift 
certificate for their participation.  
Materials and procedure. Participants received two tasks by mail, with a time lag of at 
least one week. In the first task we asked them to show how they thought four symptoms 
originated from a root cause via two divergent causal paths, for five psychiatric DSM-IV-TR 
disorders (APA, 2000). For each disorder, we asked them first to choose four symptoms from 
a list of 6 to 9 symptoms of that disorder according to DSM-IV-TR criteria (APA, 2000), and 
place these four symptoms in the bottom four boxes of an empty diagram. The diagrams 
had the same hierarchical structure as those used in Studies 1, see Figure 2. Next, we 
instructed participants to fill in the other boxes in the diagram explaining how, in their 
opinion, these four symptoms originate from a root cause, following the two paths in the 
diagram. They should take care that symptoms could not be easily switched between paths, 
meaning that symptoms explained with one pathway should not be equally plausibly be 
explained with the other pathway. As an example we showed a hierarchical diagram of Kim 
and Keil (2003) for radiation sickness. After having completed diagrams for the five 
disorders, we asked participants to rate for each disorder, on 7 point scales, how difficult it 
was to fill in the diagrams and how well they thought the diagrams represented how they 
thought the four symptoms emerged.  
We picked the five disorders from the DSM-IV-TR (2000) based on the presence of 
lists with equally-weighted criteria: Major Depressive Episode, General Anxiety Disorder, 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder and 
Schizotypical Personality Disorder. To adhere to the criteria of Major Depressive Episode at 
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least one of the symptoms ‘depressed mood’ or ‘loss of interest/pleasure’ should be present. 
We excluded these two symptoms from our list. For GAD we used the symptoms enumerated 
under criterion C: symptoms that are associated with excessive anxiety and worry. We 
excluded the symptoms excessive anxiety and worry that are separately mentioned in 
criterion A in the DMS-IV-TR. By letting participants choose between symptoms that in the 
DSM-IV-TR receive equal weights, we avoided that participants placed symptoms in separate 
paths in their diagrams based on a differential weighting in the DSM-IV-TR. Symptom lists 
from which participants could choose for each disorder are presented in Appendix B. For 
Dutch participants all materials were translated, using a DSM-IV-TR translation (Koster van 
Groos, 2003). 
Based on their completed diagrams, we constructed a set of questions constituting 
the second task for each participant. For each disorder, we presented two clients: one client 
with two causally proximal symptoms and one client with two causally diverse symptoms. 
We asked participants to choose which of the two clients they thought was most likely to 
have the disorder, and to explain their choice in one sentence. We constructed the question 
sets with pre-defined symptom pairs, based on the position of symptoms in the causal 
hierarchies, using table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Pre-defined Symptom Sets used in Study 2 and Study 3 
 
  Disorder     
  BPD Depression GAD OCD SPD 
Diverse S2-S4 S1-S3 S3-S1 S4-S1 S3-S2 
Proximal S2-S1 S1-S2 S3-S4 S4-S3 S3-S4 
  
For example, for Borderline Personality Disorder, we presented each participant with client 
statements: “Client E.V. shows S2 and S4” and “Client H.L. shows S2 and S1”, and asked 
“Which client do you think is more likely to have Borderline Personality Disorder?”. For S1 – S4 
we filled in the symptoms that the participant had placed in the bottom boxes, with S1 being 
the symptom placed in the box most left and S4 the symptom in the box most right.  
At the end, we asked participants for their experience, gender, and age. We sent the 
second task one week after we had received answers to the first task. We counterbalanced 
the order of client statements and options presented first, and randomized the sequence of 
disorders. The order in which the disorders were presented was the same in both tasks.  
Results. A choice for the client presenting with diverse symptoms was coded as “1” 
and a choice for the client with proximal symptoms as “0”. We collapsed the binary data 
across the five disorders for analysis. We conducted all analyses at the α = .05 level. 
Participants chose the client with the diverse symptoms (with diversity based on the 
participants’ diagrams) in 44% of the cases (SE = 5.6). The percentage of diverse choices did 
not significantly deviate from 50% (t(80) = -1.0; p>.3).  
Because in the second task (the client choices) we did not remind participants of their 
diagrams, we did not expect participants to refer to causal structure in their justifications. 
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We analysed participants’ justifications to see whether their choices were guesses. This may 
be expected if participants wanted to choose based on DSM-IV-TR-criteria, because symptom 
pairs of the hypothetical clients have equal weight in the DSM-IV-TR. Only two times did a 
participant explain the choice to be a pure guess. The lion’s share of justifications referred 
to how discriminating symptoms were for a specific disorder.   
It appeared difficult to fill in the diagrams: averaged over participants and disorders 
difficulty ratings were 4.5 (SE = 0.2) on a scale of 1 (not at all difficult) to 7 (very difficult), 
which deviated significantly from the midpoint 4 (t(83) = 2.7; p < .01). Participants will not 
always have been able to fit their causal beliefs into the fixed structures. Therefore we 
reanalyzed the data, now looking only at those choices for disorders for which participants 
had indicated that their diagrams were representative for how they thought. We assumed 
diagrams to be representative if participants had given them representativeness ratings of at 
least 4, the midpoint of the scale (with 1 meaning not at all representative and 7 highly 
representative). Two participants had not given any ratings higher than 3, the remaining 15 
participants had rated 52 diagrams as representative. Results for representative diagrams 
were similar: in 40% of the cases the diverse client was chosen (SE = 6.9), which does not 
significantly deviate from chance level (t(51 ) = -1.4; p > .1).  
Discussion. Participants didn’t think that clients with symptoms that were causally 
diverse according to their own assumptions were more likely to have a disorder than clients 
with symptoms that were causally proximal. In Kim and Keil’s study (2003) and in Study 1 
the chains explaining how symptoms originate from a root cause were available to 
participants when they answered the diagnostic questions. Here there was a time lag of more 
than one week between the diagram drawing task and the questionnaire, and participants 
were in no specific ways reminded of their diagrams in the questionnaire. If their causal 
explanations as given in the diagrams were ad hoc constructions, they might have been 
forgotten after some time. Kim and Ahn (2002) however found implicit theories about how 
symptoms are causally related in DSM-IV-disorders to influence diagnostic decisions of 
experienced clinicians and novices two weeks after drawing these theories. So why did the 
causal diversity of symptoms in participants’ theories not influence their choices here?  
If clinicians relied on their knowledge of the DSM when making choices, a similar 
number of diverse choices could be expected, because the symptoms that clients presented 
with all have equal weight in the DSM-IV-TR. Participants didn’t explain their choices as pure 
guesses however, but they thought symptoms were differently discriminating. This is in line 
with other studies showing that clinicians weight DSM-criteria differently, while in the DSM 
they are equally weighted (Evans, Herbert, Nelson-Gray, & Gaudiano, 2002; Kim & Ahn, 2002).  
In the introduction we suggested that a preference for causally diverse evidence 
might be related to not having expertise in a domain. Results in Study 1 indicate that 
experienced clinical psychologists do perceive differential value of causally diverse versus 
proximal information, as they more often chose the client with diverse symptoms than the 
client with proximal symptoms in the causal task. However, the theories presented were 
mostly new to participants. Background knowledge appeared to interfere with a causal 
diversity preference, since we only found this preference when participants could express 
their personal opinions first, or knew they could later. In this second study, in which we 
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expected participants to refer to their own background knowledge, we found no causal 
diversity effect.  
Domain novices may have a preference for causally diverse evidence because this 
allows them to make inferences about the probability of a root cause, when they have no 
further information or knowledge about conditional probabilities (cf. Horwich, 1982; Kim et 
al., 2008; Kincannon & Spellman, 2003). Experts may have other strategies available to infer 
the probability of a root cause given specific evidence (cf. Medin et al., 2003; Murphy, 2002). 
Specifically, experienced clinical psychologists may infer the probability of a disorder from 
knowledge obtained by experience about how likely it is that a client has a disorder given the 
presence of specific symptoms.  
To see whether novices in clinical psychology would show a causal diversity effect, 
we replicated Study 2 with a group of beginning clinical psychologists. While participants in 
Study 2 had at least 10 years of experience, the novices sample in Study 3 had at most 3 
years of experience. These novices will have domain knowledge obtained from education, so 
they should be familiar with the disorders and their symptoms. Kim and Ahn (2002) found 
that novices, and even lay people, have causal theories for disorders, which have elements in 
common with experts’ theories. However, novices haven’t seen many clients in practice, so 
we don’t expect them to have obtained much experiential knowledge about how likely it is 
that a client has a disorder given that specific symptoms are present. Thus, we expected that 
these novices would judge clients with symptoms that are causally diverse according to their 
assumptions as more likely to have a disorder than clients with causally proximal 
symptoms.  
 
  Study 3 
Method 
Participants. Participants (N=14) were students in clinical psychology who were 
finishing their masters and had followed internships for several months, and clinical 
psychologists who had less than three years of experience. Together they had a mean 
experience of 1.0 years (SE=0.3), 10 were female, mean age was 24.7 (SE=0.5). Participants 
were recruited at the department of the author, and by phone and e-mail. All participants 
were Dutch. Students received 5 euros for their participation; clinical psychologists received 
10 euro gift certificates.  
Materials and procedure. The materials and the procedure were the same as in Study 
2, except that students did the second task at the author’s office, after which they received 
their rewards. Others did both tasks by mail. 
Results. Participants chose the client with the diverse symptoms, with diversity based 
on the participants’ own diagrams, in 61% of the cases (SE = 6.1). Results were similar for all 
five disorders. Participants’ diverse choices did not significantly deviate from 50% (t(63) = 
1.8; p = .08). 
Next, we looked only at the choices for those disorders for which participants had 
given representativeness ratings of at least 4. For 4 participants ratings were not higher than 
3. The remaining novices rated 31 of their diagrams as representative. For these disorders, in 
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69% of the cases the diverse client was chosen (SE = 8.7), which does significantly deviate 
from 50% (t(28) = 2.2; p < .05).  
Like the experienced clinical psychologists, the novices rarely explained their choices 
as being guesses. Justifications again referred mostly to how discriminating symptoms were 
for the hypothesized disorders.  
Experts versus novices. Comparing experienced clinical psychologists with novices 
with a t-test for independent samples showed a significant effect of expertise when all 
diagrams are taken into account, regardless of representativeness: t(143) = -2.0; p < .05; 
Cohen’s d = .33). Thus, the novices more often than experienced clinical psychologists 
judged clients with diverse symptoms, according to their own diagrams, to be most likely to 
have a disorder. Looking only at representative diagrams, with ratings of at least 4, we found 
an even stronger effect of expertise (t(79) = -2.5; p < .05; Cohen’s d = .57).  
Discussion. For representative diagrams, novices more often thought that clients who 
had symptoms that were causally diverse were more likely to have a disorder, than clients 
with causally proximal symptoms. Furthermore, they chose clients with causally diverse 
symptoms more often than experienced clinical psychologists did. Thus, novices showed a 
causal diversity effect. Relying on causal diversity might be a useful strategy for novices, 
because they do not have knowledge about conditional probabilities available as experts do, 
as we suggested above. Alternatively, they may have some statistical knowledge about 
conditional probabilities, but cannot easily apply this knowledge. In the domain of medical 
diagnostic reasoning it is assumed that experts not only have more experiential, associative 
knowledge, but also apply this knowledge more easily than advanced students, who will 
more often refer to their theoretical knowledge (see e.g. Norman, Eva, Brooks, & Hamstra, 
2006; Van de Wiel, Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 2000). 
  
 
General discussion 
We aimed to find out whether experienced clinical psychologists would show a causal 
diversity effect in diagnostic reasoning tasks, like psychology undergraduates did when 
reasoning about medical conditions (Kim & Keil, 2003). In Study 1 we asked experienced 
clinical psychologists to decide, using recent theories about psychiatric conditions, which of 
two hypothetical clients was more likely to have a specific psychiatric condition. We found 
that participants more often chose the client with symptoms that were causally diverse than 
the client with symptoms with similar causal origins. However, they only did so when they 
could express their own opinions first, or when they knew they could later. Apparently 
participants’ background knowledge interfered with the task.  
In a sense the clinical psychologists in Study 1 were novices, since most had not 
heard about the theories presented before. Therefore, in Study 2 we elicited clinical 
psychologists’ own causal assumptions about how symptoms originate from a root cause in 
a disorder, and tested whether they would show a preference for symptoms that were 
causally diverse rather than similar, according to their assumptions. They did not. In Study 3 
novices in the same task did show a preference for symptoms that were causally diverse 
according to their own assumptions.  
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We asked clinical psychologists to fit their causal assumptions into the diagram 
structures, what might have been an unrealistic demand. However, with novices we did find 
a causal diversity effect for those diagrams that participants rated to be representative, 
while not with experienced clinical psychologists. Taken together, the results of the three 
studies indicate that relevant background knowledge may interfere with causal diversity. 
Specifically, we suggest that using information about causal diversity is a default strategy 
(cf. Kim et al., 2008), like relying on premise-diversity seems to be a default strategy in 
category-based reasoning (Medin et al., 2003; Murphy, 2002). This strategy may be useful 
when relevant knowledge about conditional probabilities of causes given evidence (see 
formula (1)) is lacking, or when it is not easily applied (see e.g. Van de Wiel et al., 2000). 
Experienced clinical psychologists will have experience-based knowledge about how likely 
clients are to have a disorder, given the presence of specific symptoms. They may use this 
knowledge about the diagnosticity of symptoms (Klayman & Brown, 1993) or cue validity 
(Sloman et al., 1998) to make inferences about the likelihood that a specific client has a 
specific disorder given a set of symptoms. The distinction between diversity and proximity 
in a causal structure is then no longer informative in this respect.  
Justifications that both novices and experienced clinical psychologists gave referred 
mostly to the distinction of the hypothesized disorder from other disorders. We argued that 
novices will rely on causal structure, while experts will rely on their experiential knowledge 
of conditional probabilities. We had not expected participants to refer to causal structure in 
their justifications in Studies 2 and 3, because participants didn’t have their diagrams 
available when answering the diagnostic questions. Reliance on causal diversity need not be 
a strategy that people are aware of. Perhaps, if we had enabled participants in Studies 2 and 
3 to look at their diagrams when making their choices, as participants in Study 1 and in the 
studies by Kim and Keil (2003) and Kim et al. (2008) could look back at the causal 
information, participants would have given more diversity-based responses. We did not 
however, because not presenting the diagrams would be more similar to daily practice, in 
which clinicians will not have visualizations of their causal beliefs available when making 
decisions. It is therefore remarkable that we still found a causal diversity effect for novices 
in Study 3.  
It is possible that novices based their choices not on causal structure diversity, but 
rather on feature diversity, choosing the clients with more dissimilar symptoms. We can also 
imagine that novices (and experts alike) constructed the causal diagrams using feature 
similarity: they may have proceeded by first choosing two dissimilar pairs of similar 
symptoms, and next thinking of different causes for these two pairs. Feature diversity and 
causal diversity need not necessarily be different concepts, however. Feature diversity might 
be a consequence of causal diversity, in the sense that divergent causal paths may lead to 
more different features while similar causal paths may lead to more similar features (cf. 
Murphy & Medin, 1985).  
Our results are in line with those of Lo, Sides, Rozelle, and Osherson (2002) who 
concluded that people use probability information rather than information about diversity in 
category-based induction tasks. Lo et al. found that children and students adhere to the 
‘Premise Probability Principle’, which states that arguments with less probable premises are 
Experience and the Causal Diversity Effect in Clinical Psychology 
   101
stronger, rather than to a diversity principle according to which arguments with more 
diverse premises are stronger. Our experienced participants may have reasoned using their 
knowledge about conditional probabilities rather than knowledge of the probability that 
symptoms occur, but this is not contradictory to the Premise Probability Principle. 
Symptoms that are more diagnostic for a disorder will occur less often in other disorders 
(see definition Klayman & Brown, 1993), and thus will be less probable since they have fewer 
alternative causes.  
In this light, differences in beliefs about mental disorders between experienced 
clinicians and novices are interesting. Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh, and Sanislow (2006) found that 
novices seem to believe that mental disorders have a defining feature which causes 
symptoms associated with them, and that disorders will disappear if this defining feature is 
removed. Further, novices seem to believe that experts will have knowledge about what these 
defining features are. Experienced clinicians do not seem to believe these things. Thus, 
novices may assume there is one root cause for all symptoms associated with a disorder, 
while experienced clinicians may assume that disorders have different combined causes 
(Ahn et al., 2006). Also, experienced clinicians may see more different causes for symptoms 
than novices. Experienced clinicians’ theories for different disorders may thus be 
overlapping, while novices’ theories for different disorders may be more disjoint (see also 
Murphy & Wright, 1984). Such differences in knowledge representation may imply that 
experienced clinicians think of alternative causes for diverse symptoms sooner than novices, 
and that experienced clinicians prefer to look at symptoms which occur less often in other 
disorders when deciding whether a client has a specific disorder, while these symptoms may 
have similar causal origins. 
We suggested that relying on causal diversity is a useful strategy for novices, and 
may no longer be used when more knowledge about conditional probabilities is available. 
This receives support in a new series of studies, in which we manipulate novices’ knowledge. 
In the first of these studies, we presented novices with both causal structure information 
and information about conditional probabilities. We found that when novices are presented 
with both these kinds of information, they use statistical information rather than 
information about causal diversity to make diagnostic decisions (Kim & de Kwaadsteniet, in 
preparation). We finally note that knowledge about conditional probabilities and causal 
structure need not be separate, but will be integrated (cf. Rehder, 2007; Tenenbaum, 
Griffiths, & Niyogi, 2007).   
To conclude, our results add to those showing that experts in a domain may use 
other reasoning strategies than novices in a domain (cf. Bailenson et al., 2002; López et al., 
1997; Medin et al., 2003; Proffitt et al., 2000). A causal diversity effect might thus be specific 
to novices’ diagnostic reasoning. Further research should establish whether experienced 
clinicians’ strategies are indeed based on their experiential knowledge of conditional 
probabilities as we suggested, or on other strategies.  
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Appendix A 
Components of the Psychiatric Disorder Stimuli Used in Study 1  
 
      Disorder   
Components Anorexia Nervosa ADHD Panic Disorder Borderline Personality Disorder 
Root Cause Too severe dietary restrictions 
due to an extreme need for self-
control 
Inhibitory dysfunction due to 
alterations in prefrontal control 
circuits  
Specific trigger activates 
malfunctioning amygdala 
Interaction of genetic 
predisposition and 
environmental stressors 
Intermediate 
Causes 1 
Breaking of (too) strict dietary 
rules;  
Perceived failure 
 
Cognitive dysregulation; 
Poor planning and working 
memory functioning 
Amygdala sends overly strong 
signal to lateral hypothalamus;  
Overactive sympathetic nervous 
symptom 
Low serotonin activity;  
Lack of inhibitory influence 
over limbic system 
Terminal 
Effects 1 
Negative self-evaluation;  
Abuse of laxatives 
Failure to complete tasks; 
Careless in daily activities 
Chills;  
Sweating 
Outbursts of anger;  
Impulsivity 
Intermediate 
Causes 2 
Severely low caloric intake; 
State of starvation 
Behavioural dysregulation; 
Impulsiveness 
Amygdala misdirects signal to 
the locus cereleus; 
Enhanced excitability 
Increased amygdala activation; 
Neurochemically-based 
difficulty regulating emotions 
Terminal 
Effects 2 
Preoccupied with food and 
eating;  
Social withdrawal 
Risky behaviour; 
Interrupts others frequently 
Pounding heart; 
Chest pain 
Fluctuating emotions; 
Stress-related transient 
paranoia 
Patient Symptoms:     
Presenting Abuse of laxatives Careless in daily activities Sweating Stress-related transient 
paranoia 
Diverse Social withdrawal Interrupts others frequently Chest pain Outbursts of anger 
Proximal Negative self-evaluation Failure to complete tasks Chills Fluctuating emotions 
Note. A 5th psychological disorder used in both studies, Autism, is depicted in Figure 2. These stimuli were presented to participants in diagram format, as 
described in Study 1.  
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Appendix B 
Lists of Symptoms in the DSM-IV-TR (2000), used for the Psychiatric Disorder Stimuli in 
Study 2 and Study 3 
 
Disorder      Symptoms to choose from 
Borderline Personality Disorder • Frantic efforts to avoid abandonment 
• Pattern of unstable and intense relationships 
• Identity disturbance 
• Impulsivity 
• Recurrent suicidal behaviour 
• Affective instability 
• Chronic feelings of emptiness 
• Difficulty controlling anger 
• Transient, stress-related paranoia 
Major Depressive Episode • Significant, unintentional change in weight 
• Daily insomnia or hypersomnia 
• Psychomotor agitation or retardation 
• Daily fatigue or loss of energy 
• Feelings of worthlessness 
• Diminished ability to think or indecisiveness 
• Recurrent thoughts of death/suicide 
General Anxiety Disorder • Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge 
• Easily fatigued 
• Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank 
• Irritability 
• Muscle tension 
• Difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep 
Obsessive-Compulsive 
Personality Disorder 
• Preoccupied with details to the extent that major point of 
activity is lost 
• Perfectionism that interferes with task completion 
• Excessively devoted to work and productivity 
• Scrupulous and inflexible about moral or ethical matters 
• Unable to discard worn-out or worthless objects 
• Reluctant to delegate tasks to others 
• Miserly spending style toward self and others 
• Rigidity and stubbornness 
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Schizotypical Personality 
Disorder 
• Ideas of reference 
• Odd beliefs or magical thinking  
• Unusual perceptual experiences 
• Odd thinking and speech 
• Suspiciousness or paranoid ideation 
• Inappropriate or constricted affect 
• Behaviour or appearance that is odd, eccentric, or peculiar 
• Lack of close friends or confidants 
• Excessive social anxiety   
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We introduced the studies described in chapters 2 to 5 as all searching for evidence for 
Meehl’s idea of ‘clinicians-reasoning-as-mechanics’, or: for clinicians reasoning causally 
(Meehl, 1954). Causal reasoning is an essential capacity of people, making it possible to 
predict future events, but more importantly, to predict consequences of interventions 
(Beach, 1992; Gopnik & Schultz, 2007; Pearl, 2000; Sloman, 2005; Woodward, 2003). For 
clinicians, the ability to predict consequences of interventions is important, to effectively 
diminish complaints and problems of their clients. We proposed, in line with Meehl, that 
clinicians would reason causally when processing client information, and integrate client 
information to understand mechanisms underlying their clients’ problems and to derive 
effective treatments. This is also how clinicians should proceed, according to handbooks. 
Clinicians should integrate client information in case formulations that explain how clients’ 
problems are caused and maintained by interacting biological, psychological, and social 
factors, so interventions can be based on them (see e.g. Carr, 2006; De Bruyn, Ruijssenaars, 
Pameijer, & Van Aarle, 2003; Eells, 2007; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Kuyken, Fothergill, Musa, & 
Chadwick, 2005; Wenar & Kerig, 2006).  
In several domains it has been shown that judgments and intervention decisions, of 
both novices and professionals, are based on causal mental models. But in the clinical 
domain there is hardly any evidence for causal mental models underlying judgments and 
decisions (see the introductory chapter). Here we will first briefly present the results of our 
studies as described in chapters 2 to 5. Then we will discuss these findings. We will end with 
implications of our findings and suggestions for further research.   
  
Findings 
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we aimed to find evidence for clinicians’ causal reasoning 
using the think aloud method (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). We presented 
clinicians with an intake video and test results of a boy with problematic behaviour at home 
and in school, and asked them to think aloud about these questions: “What do you think is 
the matter with this client; what would you propose as follow-up steps?” 
Causality in clinicians’ mental representations of client information  
Chapter 2 reports our analysis of both the structure and the contents of clinicians’ 
mental representations, as we extracted these from the verbalisations clinicians made after 
they had seen the intake video and had studied all test results. We extracted the structure of 
clinicians’ mental representations in analogy with how Pennington and Hastie (1986) had 
analysed jurors’ verbalisations to extract their mental representations. We distinguished 
statements about the client and follow-up steps that participants proposed. We identified 
causal and temporal links between client statements, and causal, temporal, and reason links 
between client statements and follow-up steps. We found that few client statements were 
causally linked, and that the causal representations as we reconstructed them often 
consisted of simple disjoint parts. Further, only one third of the follow-up steps that 
participants had proposed seemed to be related to these causal representations. 
Surprisingly, almost half of all follow-up steps seemed unrelated to any of their thoughts 
about the client. 
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To analyse the content of the clinicians’ verbalisations we used the Case Formulation 
Content Coding Method of Eells, Kendjelic, Lucas, and Lombart (received from Tracy Eells by 
e-mail, October 2007, see Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005). We looked 
whether the content of participants’ verbalisations was descriptive, classifying, explanatory, 
or mentioned additional research or intervention plans. For verbalisations with explanatory 
content we established what specific causal factors and what specific plans for further 
research and interventions participants mentioned. Consistent with the results of the 
structure analysis, this content analysis showed that clinicians’ verbalisations were mostly 
descriptive rather than causal. In addition, clinicians appeared to disagree about the causal 
factors and about the follow-up steps.  
Thus, contrary to our expectations, and contrary to findings with jurors, we did not 
find that clinicians constructed complex, coherent causal mental representations. Also, most 
of the follow-up steps proposed did not appear to be based on the causal representations we 
extracted. Our results are consistent however with findings that case formulations are 
mostly descriptive and lack specified mechanisms explaining a client’s problems (Eells, 
Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998; Kuyken et al., 2005).  
Looking for causes? Causal reasoning in clinicians’ information processing 
In Chapter 3 we analysed clinicians’ early verbalisations: the verbalisations they made 
while watching the intake video, before receiving test results. If indeed clinical reasoning is a 
comprehension process similar to text comprehension, in which information is integrated in 
coherent causal representations, we would expect clinicians similarly to readers to make 
mostly causal inferences while processing client information (cf. Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; 
Zwaan & Brown, 1996). Further, we would expect them to ask mostly for causal information 
in the questions and inquiry plans that they verbalise.  
We identified which of the early verbalisations were repetitions of information from 
the video, and what verbalisations were inferences: additions to information from the video. 
Additionally, we identified questions and inquiry plans. For each inference, question, and 
inquiry plan we established whether it was causal, classifying, descriptive, or predicting. 
Further, we specified the specific contents of the causal and classifying verbalisations.  
In line with findings reported in the previous chapter, we found that a minority 
instead of a majority of inferences, questions, and inquiry plans referred to or asked for 
causal factors. Content analysis further showed that different clinicians mentioned different 
causal factors. They agreed more about a classification. Thus, beliefs about possible causes 
of a client’s problems already diverge from the beginning of the diagnostic process, that is: 
at the intake.  
Causal client models in selecting effective interventions 
Chapter 4 describes a study in which we used a cognitive mapping technique to elicit 
clinicians’ causal mental representations, to see whether these may be the basis for 
clinicians’ interventions choices. Cognitive mapping techniques aim to extract how people 
think about problems and how this may influence their decisions, by having people draw 
causal relations between variables that they believe to be relevant for their decision (Axelrod, 
1976; Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004). Thus, in contrast to the think aloud method we 
used before, in this study we explicitly asked clinicians for their causal client models.  
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Clinicians drew models of how they thought problems and causal factors influencing 
these problems were causally related for a client’s case, and they rank ordered interventions 
for their expected effectiveness. We analysed whether we could predict which interventions 
participants would think of as most effective from the causal models that they had drawn. 
We also compared participants’ rankings with an average ranking, which we based on how 
often all participants together had chosen an intervention to be one of the most effective. We 
took this average ranking as mirroring common beliefs about the effectiveness of the 
different interventions. For most participants, we could predict their effectiveness rankings 
from their causal models quite well, and better than from the average ranking.  
We had counterbalanced the order of tasks: half of the participants constructed a 
causal map before they rank ordered interventions, the other half of the participants rank 
ordered interventions first. Results were similar for all participants, indicating that our 
findings are not the result of the specific demand to construct a causal map before ranking 
interventions for their expected effectiveness. 
We also analysed agreement about the causal models and about the effectiveness of 
interventions. We found that clinicians used different variables in their models, and assumed 
different causal relations between variables. Further, agreement about the effectiveness of 
interventions was moderate to poor. Agreement about what variables are affected by 
different interventions was highest, though still only moderate. 
Taking these findings together we concluded that clinicians may often base their 
expectations of how effective interventions will be on their individual, idiosyncratic causal 
models, rather than on common beliefs about the effectiveness of interventions. 
Causal diversity effects in clinicians’ reasoning about disorders  
In the studies described in Chapter 5 we didn’t look at mental causal representations 
that clinicians may have for individual clients, but we looked at how causal models for 
disorders may affect clinicians’ reasoning. Kim and Keil (2003) had found that the structure 
of causal representations, indicating how for a medical disease symptoms originate from a 
root cause via different causal paths, affected students’ reasoning about this disease. 
Psychology undergraduates rated symptoms originating from a root cause via different 
causal paths as stronger evidence that a patient has a disease, than symptoms originating 
from the same causal path. We investigated whether experienced clinicians would similarly 
show a “causal diversity effect”, when reasoning about psychiatric disorders. 
First, we presented experienced clinical psychologists with information about how 
according to recent scientific theories symptoms originate from a root cause via different 
causal paths, for a set of psychiatric disorders. When reasoning with these theories, 
clinicians rated clients who had causally diverse symptoms as more likely to have a 
hypothesized disorder than clients with causally proximal symptoms. However, they only 
did so when they could first do a similar hypothetical client task, using their own knowledge.  
Next, we elicited experienced clinicians’ own assumptions about how symptoms 
originate from a root cause for different psychiatric disorders. Clinicians indicated in 
diagrams how they thought symptoms of a disorder originate from a root cause via two 
different causal paths. Then we asked them to choose which of two clients was more likely 
to have a hypothesized disorder: one with causally diverse symptoms or one with causally 
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proximal symptoms. The clinicians didn’t judge that clients with causally diverse symptoms 
were more likely to have the disorder than clients with causally proximal symptoms. When 
we similarly elicited novices’ assumptions for how symptoms originate from a root cause for 
the same set of disorders, and asked them to do a similar client rating task, we found that 
novices did show a causal diversity effect. Thus, relying on causal diversity seems specific to 
novices’ diagnostic reasoning.  
 
Discussion  
Causality in think aloud protocols 
Results from the analyses of clinicians’ think aloud protocols reported in the first 
two chapters indicate that clinicians do not engage in elaborate causal reasoning when they 
think about what is the matter with a client and what are appropriate follow-up steps. 
Although clinicians did mention several causal factors, their inferences were descriptive 
rather than causal, they searched for descriptive rather than causal information, and their 
mental representations as we extracted them were descriptive rather than coherent causal 
models. Most follow-up steps that clinicians proposed were not related to their causal 
representations, or even to any descriptive information they mentioned about the client. We 
discussed several explanations for these findings.  
One explanation was that it may be more difficult for clinicians than for jurors to 
construct an appropriate causal representation. While jurors usually need to reconstruct why 
one event occurred, the crime, clinicians usually need to explain many problems in a client’s 
life. Further, the structure of a causal representation of events leading to a crime might be 
simple: events unfold in a chronological order. Gaps in a linear story structure are easily 
perceived (Keil, 2003). Clients’ problems usually result from several interacting biological, 
psychological, and environmental factors. Multidimensional mechanisms may be harder to 
identify. It is interesting in this context that Pennington and Hastie (1988) found that the 
ease with which a specific causal model could be constructed influenced jurors’ verdicts. 
Jurors more often chose a verdict that fit with information that was presented in a 
chronologically and causally consistent order, than a verdict that fit with information that 
was presented in a scrambled order. Thus, the ease with which a coherent causal model can 
be constructed may indeed affect causal reasoning.  
The difficulty inherent in clinicians’ tasks may be further increased by the fact that 
scientific knowledge of what the specific causal factors are and how they interact in causing 
and maintaining psychological problems is incomplete (Kiesler, 1999; Cicchetti & Sroufe, 
2000). Also, knowledge is lacking about how precisely interventions exert their effects in 
multidimensional mechanisms causing and maintaining clients’ problems (Bieling & Kuyken, 
2003; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006). To make causal inferences in order to arrive at coherent 
causal mental models, relevant knowledge should be available and accessible (Frank, 
Koppen, Noordman, & Vonk, 2003; Leon & Perez, 2001; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Pennington 
& Hastie, 2000; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996).   
Apart from relevant knowledge to construct causal mental models, a specific goal 
that promotes understanding should be present too (Frank et al., 2003; McKoon & Ratcliff, 
1992). In general, when the goal is to choose effective interventions, people should construct 
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causal models (Beach, 1992; Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). Specifically, clinicians 
are supposed to construct causal client models to decide on effective interventions (Carr, 
2006; De Bruyn et al., 2003; Eells, 2007; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Haynes & Williams, 2003; 
Kuyken et al., 2005; Wenar & Kerig, 2006). However, in practice clinicians may not adhere to 
this prescription, but decide about interventions without having a clear causal 
understanding (see also Keil, 2006). They may for example classify a client’s problems on the 
basis of criteria as defined in the DSM-IV and choose a treatment based on this classification 
(see e.g. Clarke, DeBar, & Lewinsohn, 2003; Kendall, Aschenbrand, & Hudson, 2003). Findings 
of Groenier, Pieters, Hulshof, Wilhelm, and Witteman (2008) indicate that in practice 
clinicians do not see it as their goal to causally understand their clients. Groenier et al. found 
that clinicians didn’t think that a causal analysis of a client’s problems was important, but 
they thought that a description of problems and intervention choice was more important.  
Further, clinicians may think that classifications offer explanations. Clinicians 
mentioned classifications in terms of the DSM in their think aloud protocols, and sometimes 
suggested that these were causing specific behaviours or problems. According to Leon and 
Perez (2001) clinicians activate “clinical diagnosis inferences” when processing client 
information. Although these clinical diagnosis inferences look like classifications (e.g. 
kleptomania), Leon and Perez argue that clinicians assume an underlying psychopathology 
causing symptoms and behaviours. In contrast, the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) aims to describe disorders as clusters of co-occurring symptoms and 
behaviours in order to promote consensus in classification, while explicitly refraining from 
describing the aetiology. Mentioning classifications of symptoms as explaining the 
occurrence of these symptoms may be tautological, but clinicians may not realize this (cf. 
Keil, 2006).  
Finally, an explanation for why we found so few causal links in clinicians’ think aloud 
protocols may be that clinicians activate schemas or scripts when reasoning about clients 
(Hamm, 2003; cf. Pliske & Klein, 2003), and mention only elements of these in their 
protocols. Still, this would not explain our finding that many follow-up steps were also not 
related to any descriptive statements about the client.  
Different methods 
For methodological issues relating to sample size, case materials presented, and 
instructions we gave to participants, we refer to the discussions in Chapter 2 and 3. Here we 
focus on fundamental concerns about the think aloud method, and compare the think aloud 
method with the cognitive mapping method. We thus aim to clarify the discrepancy between 
our findings in the think aloud study and the cognitive mapping study. From our analyses in 
Chapter 4 of the causal maps that clinicians had generated, it appeared that these were more 
elaborate, coherent, and complex than the causal models that we had extracted from the 
think aloud protocols. Furthermore, with clinicians’ causal maps we could predict their 
ratings of the effectiveness of interventions quite well, which indicates that clinicians may 
base their interventions on causal mental client models. Thus, the think aloud procedure we 
adopted may not have adequately tracked clinicians’ reasoning. Alternatively, the causal 
maps drawn by clinicians may not have been representative for the mental representations 
that they normally construct when reasoning about a client.  
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The main assumption underlying the think aloud method is that people can reliably 
verbalise thoughts that pass through working memory while they are reasoning about 
information (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Ericsson and Simon (1993) specified in 
detail the procedures that should be followed in a think aloud study in order to ensure that 
the protocols obtained are true reflections of spontaneous thought processes, and not, for 
example, memories of whatever thoughts may have occurred, or justifications for decisions. 
We adhered to this procedure closely, by making our task realistic, offering sufficient 
information, prompting with questions that seem to be most frequently asked in practice, 
and enabling clinicians to verbalise their thoughts at any moment. We thus meant to ensure 
that we would capture clinicians’ thinking processes as these may occur spontaneously in 
practice when clinicians are thinking about a client.  
Still, although thinking aloud may result in a reliable and rich data set of conscious 
thoughts that occur while people are engaged in a specific task, it will only deliver a subset 
of all thoughts (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Simon, 
1993; Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997; Zwaan & Brown, 1996). We cannot rule out that causal 
assumptions are not verbalised when they are so evident that they are not attended to 
consciously, or conversely, when they are not clear enough to be verbalised. In our coding 
procedure causal links had to be verbalised explicitly, in analogy with Pennington and 
Hastie’s coding procedure, which demanded explicit verbalisation of causal links. Implicit 
causal links would thus not be coded. Still, the content analysis gave very much the same 
results as the structure analysis. Also, from simply reading clinicians’ think aloud protocols 
it was not obvious that clinicians made many implicit causal links. 
With the cognitive mapping method we explicitly asked clinicians to indicate which 
variables they thought were important and how they thought these were causally related. 
Contrary to what may happen with the think aloud method, causal mapping may elicit causal 
inferences like the ones that occur when clinicians are reasoning in actual practice, plus 
causal inferences that they would not normally consider. It was clear that clinicians were not 
simply copying their mental causal models on paper in the cognitive mapping task. The 
construction of the causal maps took quite some time and effort. Clinicians thought about 
which variables to include and which causal relations to draw. They frequently changed their 
minds, often resulting in messy maps with many corrections. It seems rather unlikely that 
clinicians have mental representations as complex as the ones they drew, and that they take 
into account all directly and indirectly affected variables when they derive the effects of 
interventions from them.  
Hodgkinson, Maule, and Bown (2004) compared two techniques to elicit the causal 
relations managers assumed to hold between variables in a strategic investment decision 
task. In one task managers constructed causal maps by drawing causal relations they 
believed to hold between a fixed set of variables, and rated the strengths of these relations. 
In the other task managers indicated for each pair of variables whether they thought there 
was a causal relation between them and, if so, how strong it was. Hodgkinson et al. found 
that with the pairwise comparison technique the managers indicated more and stronger 
relations than with the causal mapping technique. They suggested that with pairwise 
comparisons, people might add causal relations they would not normally consider, while 
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with causal mapping they might omit causal relations they did consider, but did not recall 
when drawing the map. We suggest that a similar explanation may apply to our findings. 
Clinicians may believe that there are many causal relations between variables, but they may 
not consider all these relations when reasoning about a client. However, with an explicit 
instruction to think of causal relations, clinicians may consider more causal relations than 
they would otherwise do. Furthermore, drawing causal maps will facilitate reasoning about 
how different factors interact in causing a client’s problems, since causal maps can serve as 
a visual memory aid (cf. Morton, 2004; Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004). When thinking aloud on 
the other hand, clinicians may not verbalise causal relations that they do consider.  
Findings reconciled? 
To reconcile our findings obtained in the think aloud study and in the cognitive 
mapping study we propose that clinicians do reason causally, but that in actual practice they 
will not do so as elaborately as in the cognitive mapping study. The causal maps that 
clinicians draw will contain the variables and the causal relations they consider most 
important. In a realistic situation clinicians may also consider these variables and relations, 
and they may verbalise them, although perhaps not all of them, when thinking aloud. The 
maps may further contain additional variables and especially causal relations between 
variables which clinicians would not normally consider, if they are not explicitly prompted 
to, and if they don’t have variables visualised as a memory aid.  
The variables that clinicians consider to be the most important may be those causal 
factors that affect most other factors: causally central or initiating variables (cf. Kim & Ahn, 
2002; Rehder & Kim, 2006). Additional variables, which clinicians may not normally consider, 
may be those that are less central in the maps. When clinicians believe that the most 
effective interventions are those affecting the most causally central variables (cf. Haynes & 
Williams, 2003; Yopchick & Kim, 2008), the maps will predict clinicians’ ratings of the 
effectiveness of interventions well, whether maps are drawn before or after rating the 
effectiveness of interventions.   
Clinicians’ knowledge about psychological problems may not consist of elaborate, 
coherent causal networks. Their knowledge base might resemble the physics knowledge base 
of physics students, which consists of loose fragments that are hardly connected in coherent 
causal theories (Di Sessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004). Further, it may not normally be 
necessary for clinicians to provide detailed explanations of mechanisms underlying clients’ 
problems. However, with coarse intuitions as to what causal factors are important and how 
these may exert their influence and with specific client information, clinicians might be able 
to construct complex mechanisms when they are prompted to do so (cf. Keil, 2003). It 
remains to be seen, however, how accurate such causal models are.  
Disagreement about causal models 
The analyses of clinicians’ think aloud protocols and their cognitive maps showed 
that their causal client representations are highly idiosyncratic. This finding is not new. 
Reliability among clinicians appears to be generally poor (Garb, 1998), and specifically so for 
causal inferences (Garb, 1998, 2005; Kuyken et al., 2005; Persons & Bertagnolli, 1999). What 
is striking in our findings is that disagreement starts as early as at the intake interview.  
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The low agreement among clinicians about causal client models might be explained 
by a lack of common scientific knowledge of the complex aetiology of psychological 
problems (Cicchetti & Sroufe, 2000; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; Kiesler, 1999). Also, 
clinicians will not usually get adequate feedback about the accuracy of their judgments 
(Caspar, 1997; Garb, 2005; Lichtenberg, 1997). Further, biases such as the availability bias, 
the representativeness bias, or the hindsight bias may increase the idiosyncrasy of the 
clinicians’ causal beliefs (Garb, 1998; Lichtenberg, 1997; Nezu & Nezu, 1993). Finally, 
differences in education and training, between institutions, and clients may contribute to the 
development of idiosyncratic causal beliefs.  
Experience 
In Chapter 5, we found that the causal structure of implicit theories affects reasoning 
of novices in clinical psychology. Novices rated symptoms with more diverse causal origins 
in their own theories as providing stronger evidence for a hypothesized disorder than 
symptoms with similar causal origins. This finding goes beyond those of Kim and Keil (2003) 
and Kim, Yopchick, and De Kwaadsteniet (2008), in two ways. First, our novices were 
beginners in their professional domain. They were close to graduating as a clinical 
psychologist, or had recently graduated. Participants in the studies of Kim and Keil (2003) 
and Kim et al. (2008) were psychology undergraduates who reasoned about real and artificial 
conditions in the medical domain, so they were lay people. Second, we assume that our 
participants used their own implicit theories, which were not directly available for inspection 
when doing the classification task. In contrast, in the studies of Kim and Keil (2003) and Kim 
et al. (2008) participants had studied causal structures immediately before the classification 
task, and had them available for inspection during it.  
We did not find that experienced clinicians, who had seen clients for at least ten 
years, judged clients with symptoms that are causally diverse in their own theories as more 
likely to have a hypothesized disorder than clients with symptoms that are causally 
proximal. Our task demand to fit causal assumptions into the diagram structures might have 
been too artificial. Still, for those diagrams that clinicians rated to be representative (see 
Chapter 5) we found no causal diversity effect with experienced clinicians, while we did with 
novices. To explain this difference we suggested that relying on causal diversity might be a 
useful strategy for novices only. The experienced clinicians may rely on experiential 
knowledge about the diagnosticity of symptoms, that is: knowledge about how likely it is 
that a client has a specific disorder given the presence of specific symptoms, rather than on 
causal structure of their theories. Diversity in a causal structure might be informative 
precisely when this knowledge about diagnosticity of symptoms is still lacking or less 
accessible, as with novices. With no further information about probabilities, it can be 
inferred that the presence of a root cause is more likely given that causally diverse evidence 
is present than when evidence with similar causal origins is present (cf. Horwich, 1982; 
Kincannon & Spellman, 2003).  
Findings of Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh, and Sanislow (2006) are interesting in this light. 
Novices seem to believe that mental disorders have a defining feature which causes the 
symptoms associated with them, and that disorders disappear if this defining feature is 
removed. They further appear to believe that experts will have knowledge about these 
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defining features. Experienced clinicians do not seem to share these beliefs. Thus, novices in 
our studies may assume there is one root cause of all symptoms associated with a disorder. 
Experienced clinicians on the other hand rather seem to believe that disorders can arise 
from different combinations of causes (Ahn et al., 2006), and that symptoms can have 
different causes. Experienced clinicians’ theories for how symptoms are caused in different 
disorders will thus be overlapping, while novices’ theories for different disorders will be 
more disjoint (cf. Murphy & Wright, 1984).  
Experience may also be expected to affect causal beliefs about individual clients. In 
the think aloud study we found no effects of experience, but this might be due to the small 
sample size. It cannot be ruled out that more experienced clinicians reason with higher level 
concepts, and skip elaborate, detailed causal reasoning (cf. Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993), or 
have developed scripts (Charlin, Tardif, & Boshuizen, 2000; Hamm, 2003). Research in the 
medical domain, however, shows that experienced doctors use both higher level concepts 
and detailed causal concepts in an integrated way (Rikers, Loyens, & Schmidt, 2004; Van de 
Wiel, Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 2000). Research on clinical case formulations shows that more 
experienced and higher qualified clinicians construct more complex, elaborate, and 
comprehensive client representations. Also, intervention choices seem to be more evidently 
linked to these representations (Eells & Lombart, 2003; Eells et al., 2005; Kuyken et al., 2005).  
Finally, we note that in the clinical domain, experience is generally not associated 
with better performance (Dawes, 1994; Eells et al., 2005; Garb, 1998; Krol, De Bruyn, & Van 
den Bercken, 1992; Lichtenberg, 1997; Witteman & Van den Bercken, 2007). Experience is 
however associated with confidence: with more experience clinicians become more confident 
about their judgments (Krol et al., 1992; Lichtenberg, 1997; Oskamp, 1965; see also Chapter 
2 and Chapter 4). 
Causal versus probabilistic reasoning versus other reasoning strategies. 
We tried to find evidence that clinicians reason causally, as Meehl (1954) proposed. 
Our findings indicate that clinicians do, although the extent to which they engage in causal 
reasoning seems to differ with different instructions, and with different clinicians. What 
about other reasoning strategies, such as probabilistic reasoning? In our discussion of the 
findings of our last series of studies we suggested that clinicians, at least experienced 
clinicians, may reason using probabilistic information, rather than causal information. 
Clinicians may also adopt other strategies, for example script-based reasoning (activating 
schemas, looking for schema-consistent information, and choosing interventions that are 
activated with the script, cf. Hamm, 2003), exemplar-based reasoning (activating memories 
of similar clients, and choosing the interventions that were effective for these clients), or 
rule-based reasoning (“if a specific set of symptoms is present, choose intervention X”).  
We have only looked for evidence for causal reasoning without taking into account 
alternative strategies. Therefore, we cannot make inferences about the proportion of causal 
reasoning compared to other reasoning strategies. It is likely that clinicians reason using 
different strategies, depending on the specific case, their experience, the task demands, 
individual reasoning styles, and so on (Brammer, 1997; Norman, Eva, Brooks, & Hamstra, 
2006). Different strategies may also be combined. For example, in diagnostic reasoning 
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causal and probabilistic knowledge will be combined, since causes are known to usually 
generate effects with some uncertainty (Rehder, 2007; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Niyogi, 2007).  
 
Implications 
Perhaps the clearest finding from our studies was that clinicians’ causal beliefs 
diverge (cf. Garb, 1998, 2005; Kuyken et al., 2005; Persons & Bertagnolli, 1999), and that they 
do so already at the intake. Further, we found that clinicians’ idiosyncratic causal models 
predict their ratings of the effectiveness of interventions better than shared beliefs do. This 
finding suggests that clinicians may arrive at different intervention decisions for the same 
client, as a consequence of their idiosyncratic causal client representations.  
Jensen-Doss and Weisz (2008) found that accuracy of clinicians’ classifications 
predicted improved treatment processes and outcomes. It might be expected that inaccurate 
identifications of causal mechanisms also may lead to poorer treatment outcomes. 
Handbooks prescribe that clinicians should integrate client information in case formulations 
that explain how clients’ problems are caused and maintained, so interventions can be based 
on them (e.g. Carr, 2006; De Bruyn, et al., 2003; Eells, 2007; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Wenar & 
Kerig, 2006). Nevertheless, one might argue that clinicians had better not draw causal 
inferences about the mechanisms underlying their clients’ problems. They might rather 
proceed by describing or classifying a client’s problems and, based on this description or 
classification, choose an empirically supported treatment, using available actuarial rules as 
Meehl and Grove (2006) proposed. For example, predictions about treatment success seem to 
be better when made with actuarial rules than when made by clinicians who use their own 
clinical methods (Ægisdóttir, et al., 2006; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 
1954). Further, empirically supported treatments seem to be more effective than the 
interventions that are usually adopted in practice (Weisz, Jensen-Doss, & Hawley, 2006). 
In practice clinicians often do not seem to follow actuarial rules (Ægisdóttir, et al., 
2006; Caspar, Berger, & Hautle, 2004; Meehl & Grove, 2006). Clinicians also often do not 
seem to use empirically validated treatments, and empirically validated treatments often do 
not seem to be integrated extensively in training programs (Addis & Krasnow, 2000; Gotham, 
2006; Weisz & Kazdin, 2003). Kendall and Beidas (2007) argued that inflexibility of treatment 
manuals may hamper the implementation of evidence-based practices (cf. Nelson & Steele, 
2008). They believe that clinicians will be more ready to follow treatment manuals when 
these leave room for flexible application to individual clients. We suggest that clinicians 
might find it difficult to combine actuarial methods and rigid treatment manuals with how 
they usually reason (Ahn & Kim, 2008; Caspar et al., 2004).  
It may be true that clinicians do not often choose empirically supported treatments 
based on descriptions or classifications of clients’ symptoms, but we should note that this 
procedure isn’t always as straightforward as it may seem. Although the number of 
empirically supported treatments increases, most treatments have not (yet) been tested 
empirically. Also, there are no empirically supported treatments for all disorders yet (Braet & 
Bögels, 2008; Weisz & Kazdin, 2003). Further, in the case of co-occurring disorders and when 
a treatment fails, treatment choice may become more difficult (Nelson-Gray, 2003). Finally, 
accurate description or classification of problems may not be straightforward in practice, 
General Discussion 
  119
because of unclear symptom presentation in clients, ambiguous definitions, or subjective 
interpretations (cf. Jensen & Weisz, 2002; Widiger & Clark, 2000). 
Although clinicians’ causal reasoning seems to be unreliable, causal reasoning can in 
itself be perfectly rational and validated. In an ideal situation, when well-corroborated 
theories are available the relevant constructs of which can be measured accurately, clinicians 
may arrive at reliable and accurate causal explanations (Grove, 2005; Meehl & Grove, 2006). 
In the medical domain it was found that students recall causal knowledge better, and make 
more accurate diagnoses when they have learned about the causal structure of some 
conditions, than when they had learned about probabilities for these conditions (Woods, 
Brooks, & Norman, 2005). Thus, because (i) clinicians do seem to reason causally (although 
perhaps not always profoundly so), (ii) they may need to engage in causal reasoning in 
complex cases, or cases for which no empirically supported treatments are available, (iii) 
causal understanding may provide clinicians with high levels of confidence (Keil, 2006; Pearl, 
2000) , and finally (iv) it seems difficult to convince clinicians to use other strategies than 
the ones they are used to (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006, Caspar, Berger, Hautle, 2004; Gotham, 
2006; Kendall & Beidas, 2007; Meehl & Grove, 2006), we suggest two ways in which clinicians’ 
performance might be improved, both focussing on clinicians’ causal reasoning strategies. 
First, clinicians may more often choose to use actuarial rules and empirically 
supported treatments when they are provided with their theoretical underpinnings. 
Clinicians may be especially interested in why treatments work, so they can use this 
knowledge in a causal reasoning process about what is the matter with a client and what 
intervention will be most effective (see also Kazdin, 2008). Knowing why an intervention is 
effective may convince clinicians to choose an intervention for a specific client sooner than 
just knowing that an intervention is often effective. 
Second, decision aids and training of clinicians should focus on making causal 
assumptions explicit and on testing causal assumptions. In our cognitive mapping study, 
drawing a causal model before predicting the effectiveness of interventions did not appear 
to change participants’ predictions. Also, the variation in the models that participants 
constructed was large. Still, we believe that techniques aimed at visualization of causal 
beliefs might be useful in clinical practice and in clinical research. For example, the theory-
neutral ‘causal modelling’ method of Morton (2004; see also Krol, Morton, & De Bruyn, 2004) 
prompts clinicians to explicate all biological, psychological, behavioural, and environmental 
factors that are relevant for a client, and to indicate the causal relations between these 
factors. Such a visualisation of complex ideas shows where additional assumptions are 
needed to arrive at a coherent explanation, and which specific tests should be done to test 
important assumptions. Further, visualization of causal models may be useful to 
communicate causal hypotheses to clients and to colleagues, and thus serve as a basis for 
discussion and adaptation (Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004). In particular, causal client models 
may be adapted by measuring treatment effects with individual clients (see e.g. Lambert, 
2001). It is interesting in this light that generating explicit explanations may lead to 
increased causal knowledge (Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Wellman & Liu, 2007). 
In sum, we suggest that dissemination and implementation of empirically validated 
treatment and assessment methods may be facilitated if clinicians learn about their 
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underlying theories. Further, clinicians should be careful when generating hypotheses about 
mechanisms underlying clients’ problems (Garb, 2005; Wood, Garb, Lilienfeld, & Nezworski, 
2003). Causal modelling methods may aid the construction and testing of causal client 
models (Haynes, Spain, & Oliveira, 1993; Morton, 2004; Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004).  
 
Further research 
From our studies it remains unclear to what extent clinicians engage in causal 
reasoning when processing client information: do clinicians construct mental causal client 
models that are complex and detailed, or rather simple and incomplete (cf. Keil, 2006)? To 
investigate this further, other methods could be used, for example measuring sentence 
reading times (cf. Cobos et al., 2008), measuring recall or recognition (cf. Ackerman, 1992), 
or priming tasks (cf. Leon & Perez, 2001) (see also Magliano, 1999). Also, we suggested that 
causal reasoning as it occurred in thinking aloud may be limited due to a lack of relevant 
causal knowledge. Thus, it would be interesting to see whether clinicians do indeed engage 
in more causal reasoning, and show this in think aloud protocols, if they are provided with 
relevant causal knowledge. Such a study may provide support for our findings of the think 
aloud study. Further, to learn more about clinicians’ reasoning, a wider range of possible 
reasoning strategies should be investigated, also taking into account individual differences 
in the use of these strategies. It seems that definitive results on clinicians’ thoughts will not 
appear soon, since they are so various and largely covert, and thus difficult to investigate 
(Caspar, 1997; Caspar et al., 2004).   
Research on clinicians’ intervention choices is scarce. We found that clinicians’ 
effectiveness ratings of interventions depend on their causal assumptions. However, 
clinicians may base their intervention choices not only on effectiveness ratings, but on many 
other factors too, such as available time and budget, client preferences, experience with 
specific interventions, etcetera (Beutler, Malik, Alimohamed, Harwood, Talebi, Noble, & 
Wong, 2004; Clarkin & Levy, 2004; Nelson & Steele, 2008). To understand clinicians’ actual 
choices, these other factors should also be investigated.  
In line with a suggestion made above, it seems to be of direct relevance for practice 
to investigate whether actuarial rules and standardized treatments will be used sooner, and 
more strictly adhered to, if clinicians understand the theoretical underpinnings. If this turns 
out to be true, this would emphasize the need for research on mechanisms of change of 
interventions (see also Kazdin, 2008). Also, the usefulness of causal modelling methods for 
constructing and testing causal client representations should be investigated: do such 
models increase reliability and validity of causal client models, and enhance treatment 
outcomes? 
Our studies in causal diversity effects might be followed up by investigating what 
strategies experienced clinicians use when they do not seem to rely on diversity. The 
structure of the causal knowledge of experienced clinicians may be investigated further to 
find out how it affects their reasoning. It is also of interest to find out how the structure of 
knowledge of experienced clinicians differs from that of novices, and whether differences in 
reasoning are related to such differences. Finally, we note that our diversity studies in 
Chapter 5 show that it is important to take clinicians’ experience into account when studying 
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clinicians’ reasoning. General conclusions about clinicians’ performance from tasks in which 
only novices participate may not be valid.    
 
To conclude 
I end with the observation that it will be equally impossible for researchers to arrive 
at a complete description of what a clinician does and why, as it is for clinicians to arrive at 
a complete description of how a client behaves and why. Thus, clinicians are opaque boxes 
to researchers, as are clients for clinicians. Researchers may have idiosyncratic causal 
models of clinicians, like clinicians have of clients. I hope the studies described in this 
dissertation, with all their limitations, will be perceived as sensible studies to learn more 
about clinicians’ reasoning. I also hope that their results are an increase, albeit small, in our 
understanding of clinicians and that they will inspire future studies, so that in the end 
people with psychological problems may profit.  
Chapter 6 
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Clinici als mecaniciens? 
Causaal redeneren in klinisch oordelen en beslissen 
 
Oordelen van clinici, zoals voorspellingen van gedrag en het toekennen van diagnoses, 
blijken vaak minder accuraat dan oordelen die tot stand komen door het combineren van 
informatie met behulp van statistische methoden (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Grove, Zald, 
Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000). Ook blijken oordelen van ervaren clinici niet beter te zijn dan 
die van beginnende clinici (Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005; Garb, 1998). 
Onderzoek naar klinische oordeelsvorming is dan ook relevant om na te gaan hoe dit proces 
verbeterd kan worden (Caspar, 1997; Witteman, Harries, Bekker, & Van Aarle, 2007). Dit 
proefschrift bevat een aantal studies waarin is gekeken naar causaal redeneren door clinici.  
In 1954 gaf Meehl een beschrijving van hoe een ervaren clinicus tot oordelen komt. 
Meehl vergeleek de clinicus met een mecanicien, die met behulp van kennis van 
werkingsmechanismen accurate voorspellingen kan doen. Met deze vergelijking vatte Meehl 
het denken van de clinicus op als een causaal redeneerproces. Deze beschrijving komt 
overeen met wat klinische handboeken voorschrijven. Clinici dienen een compleet beeld te 
vormen van hoe verschillende biologische, psychologische en sociale factoren samen de 
problemen van een cliënt veroorzaken en in stand houden, en op basis daarvan interventies 
te kiezen (zie bijv. Carr, 2006; De Bruyn, Ruijssenaars, Pameijer, & Van Aarle, 2003; Eells, 
2007; Groth-Marnat, 2003; Kuyken, Fothergill, Musa, & Chadwick, 2005; Wenar & Kerig, 
2006). 
Causaal redeneren wordt verondersteld fundamenteel te zijn in het denken van 
mensen. Door het construeren van causale representaties van informatie kunnen mensen 
niet alleen voorspellen wat er zal gebeuren, maar vooral ook welke acties het meest effectief 
zullen zijn om een gesteld doel te bereiken (Pearl, 2000; Sloman, 2005; Woodward, 
2003).Verschillende onderzoeken hebben aangetoond dat mensen inderdaad informatie 
verwerken in causale representaties, bijvoorbeeld bij het lezen van teksten, of het verwerken 
van informatie in een rechtzaak om tot een oordeel te komen (zie bijv. Graesser, Olde, & 
Kletke, 2002; Hastie & Pennington, 2000). Ook is gebleken dat mensen op basis van causale 
representaties besluiten welke interventies effectief zullen zijn, bijvoorbeeld om ziekten of 
milieuvervuiling te voorkomen (zie bijv. Böhm & Pfister, 2000; Green & McManus, 1995; 
Pliske & Klein, 2003). Zelfs classificaties, indelingen van onderwerpen in een categorie, 
blijken mensen te baseren op causale representaties (zie bijv. Ahn, 1998). 
Er is weinig onderzoek gedaan naar de wijze waarop clinici tot hun oordelen en 
beslissingen komen. Op basis van bovenstaande beschrijvingen en bevindingen 
veronderstellen we in dit proefschrift dat clinici door middel van causale representaties 
cliënten proberen te begrijpen en keuzen maken voor effectieve interventies. In hoofdstuk 2 
tot en met 5 worden studies beschreven die met verschillende onderzoeksmethoden de rol 
van causale representaties in klinische oordeelsvorming onderzoeken. 
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Methoden en resultaten 
In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 is beschreven hoe we causale denkprocessen van clinici hebben 
onderzocht door analyse van de uitingen van clinici die zij deden terwijl zij hardop 
nadachten over een cliënt. Hardop-denken is een methode om inzicht te krijgen in 
denkprocessen die zich voordoen wanneer mensen bijvoorbeeld een probleem moeten 
oplossen (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Twintig clinici kregen een video van een 
intakegesprek van een negenjarige jongen met zijn ouders te zien en de resultaten van 
negen verschillende tests met observaties die daarbij zijn gedaan. Tijdens en na het bekijken 
van de video en het bestuderen van de testresultaten dachten de clinici hardop na over de 
vragen: “Wat denkt u dat er aan de hand is met deze jongen?” en “Wat zou u voorstellen als 
vervolgstappen?”. 
Mentale representaties  
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we de uitingen geanalyseerd van clinici nadat ze de video 
hadden bekeken en de testresultaten hadden bestudeerd, om de structuur en de inhoud te 
achterhalen van de mentale representaties die de clinici hadden gevormd. We verwachtten 
dat clinici coherente causale representaties van cliëntinformatie zouden vormen en dat zij 
vervolgstappen zouden baseren op deze representaties. Om de structuur te achterhalen van 
de mentale representaties hebben we eerst onderscheid gemaakt tussen uitingen over de 
cliënt en uitingen over vervolgstappen. Vervolgens hebben we de causale en temporele 
verbindingen geïdentificeerd die clinici legden tussen uitingen over de cliënt en daarna de 
causale, temporele en redengevende verbindingen tussen uitingen over de cliënt en uitingen 
over vervolgstappen. Deze verbindingen hebben we tenslotte op grafische wijze weergegeven 
in causale modellen. Het bleek dat de meeste uitingen over de cliënt niet causaal met elkaar 
verbonden waren. De causale representaties die we hadden gereconstrueerd bestonden vaak 
uit verschillende losse delen en waren weinig complex. Verder bleek slechts een derde van de 
vervolgstappen die clinici voorstelden verbonden aan deze representaties. Opmerkelijk was 
dat bijna de helft van de vervolgstappen aan geen enkele uiting over de cliënt verbonden 
was.  
Om de inhoud van de mentale representaties te analyseren hebben we de “Case 
Formulation Content Coding Method” gebruikt van Eells, Kendjelic, Lucas en Lombart (zie 
Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005). We hebben gekeken of de uitingen 
beschrijvende, classificerende, of verklarende informatie bevatten, of gingen over 
vervolgstappen. Vervolgens zijn we nagegaan welke verklarende factoren clinici noemden en 
welke vervolgstappen. De meeste uitingen bleken beschrijvend en niet verklarend te zijn. 
Verder vonden we weinig overeenkomst in de verklarende factoren die clinici noemden of in 
de vervolgstappen die zij voorstelden.  
In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen, maar in overeenstemming met onderzoek 
naar de inhoud van case formulations (Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998; Kuyken et al., 2005), 
lijken clinici cliëntinformatie dus slechts in beperkte mate causaal te representeren en zijn 
causale representaties die clinici vormen weinig coherent. Ook lijken ze hun vervolgstappen 
grotendeels niet te baseren op deze causale representaties. 
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Causaal redeneren tijdens informatieverwerking 
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we de uitingen geanalyseerd van clinici tijdens het bekijken 
van de intakevideo. Onze veronderstelling was dat indien clinici proberen te komen tot een 
coherent causaal model, zij tijdens het verwerken van informatie voornamelijk causale 
afleidingen zullen maken (cf. Trabasso & Magliano, 1996). Ook veronderstelden wij dat 
clinici vooral naar meer informatie zouden vragen over mogelijke verklaringen voor de 
problemen van een cliënt.  
We zijn nagegaan in hoeverre clinici informatie uit de video herhaalden, in hoeverre 
zij nieuwe informatie afleidden (toevoegden) en in hoeverre zij vragen stelden of plannen 
formuleerden voor verder onderzoek. Voor de afleidingen die de clinici maakten hebben we 
vastgesteld of deze beschrijvend, classificerend, verklarend of voorspellend waren. Voor alle 
vragen en onderzoeksplannen hebben we vastgesteld of deze om beschrijvende, 
classificerende, of verklarende of informatie vroegen of naar verder verloop. Verder hebben 
we gekeken naar de specifieke inhoud van de classificerende en verklarende uitingen, met 
behulp van de CFCCM (Eells et al., 2005).  
In tegenstelling met onze verwachtingen maar in overeenstemming met de 
bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2 vonden we dat de meeste afleidingen die clinici maakten niet 
verklarend maar beschrijvend waren. Ook werd meestal niet gevraagd naar verklarende 
factoren, maar naar meer beschrijvende informatie. Verder vonden we dat verschillende 
clinici al bij het intakegesprek verschillende causale factoren naar voren brachten.  
De rol van causale representaties bij de selectie van effectieve interventies  
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we met een andere methode, “cognitive mapping”, onderzocht 
of clinici hun interventiekeuzen baseren op causale cliëntrepresentaties. Cognitive mapping 
is een methode om te achterhalen hoe mensen een probleem oplossen, door ze te laten 
tekenen hoe zij denken dat belangrijke factoren voor hun beslissing causaal gerelateerd zijn 
(Axelrod, 1976; Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004). We vroegen veertig clinici om twee 
cliëntbeschrijvingen te lezen en voor iedere cliënt een causaal model (“cognitive map”) te 
tekenen waarin ze aangaven hoe zij dachten dat de problemen van de cliënt werden 
veroorzaakt en in stand gehouden. Ook vroegen we ze om voor iedere cliënt interventies te 
rangordenen op verwachte effectiviteit. Om voor mogelijke volgorde-effecten te controleren 
vroegen we de helft van de clinici modellen tekenen voordat zij interventies rangordenden, 
de andere helft deed deze taken in omgekeerde volgorde. We hebben berekend hoe effectief 
de interventies waren volgens de causale modellen van de clinici en we hebben deze 
uitkomsten vergeleken met de rangordeningen die de clinici zelf hadden gegeven. Ook 
hebben we de rangordeningen van de clinici vergeleken met rangordeningen gebaseerd op de 
effectiviteitbeoordelingen van alle deelnemers samen.  
De rangordeningen voor verwachte effectiviteit van interventies die door clinici zelf 
waren gegeven bleken redelijk goed overeen te komen met de effectiviteit van de interventies 
zoals wij die hadden berekend uit de individuele causale modellen die de clinici hadden 
getekend. De door clinici gegeven rangordeningen hingen bovendien meer samen met de 
effectiviteit van interventies afgeleid uit hun persoonlijke causale modellen dan met de 
rangordeningen gebaseerd op de gezamenlijke beoordelingen. Uit analyse van de inhoud van 
de causale modellen bleek verder dat clinici verschillende factoren in hun modellen 
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gebruikten en verschillende causale relaties tekenden tussen factoren die ze 
gemeenschappelijk hadden. Ook bleek de overeenstemming over de effectiviteit van 
interventies laag tot matig.  
Clinici lijken dus de verwachte effectiviteit van interventies voor een cliënt af te 
leiden uit causale representaties die zij vormen voor die cliënt. Deze causale representaties 
blijken verschillend voor verschillende clinici en kunnen verschillen in oordelen over de 
effectiviteit van interventies verklaren.  
Causale diversiteitseffecten in het redeneren over stoornissen  
In de studies in hoofdstuk 5 hebben we gekeken naar de invloed van causale 
representaties van stoornissen op het redeneren van clinici. We hebben onderzocht of clinici 
een “causaal diversiteitseffect” laten zien wanneer zij redeneren over psychiatrische 
stoornissen. Leken op  medisch gebied blijken meer waarde te hechten aan symptomen die 
op verschillende wijze ontstaan uit een hoofdoorzaak voor een medische aandoening, dan 
aan symptomen die op gelijke wijze ontstaan uit die hoofdoorzaak, wanneer zij moeten 
beoordelen hoe waarschijnlijk een patiënt een medische aandoening heeft (Kim & Keil, 2003: 
zie ook Kim, Yopchick, & De Kwaadsteniet, 2008). 
In de eerste studie van hoofdstuk 5 hebben we 19 ervaren clinici informatie gegeven 
over hoe volgens recente wetenschappelijke theorieën symptomen op verschillende wijzen 
ontstaan uit een hoofdoorzaak, voor verschillende psychiatrische stoornissen. Vervolgens 
vroegen we hen om aan de hand van de gepresenteerde theorieën te kiezen wie van twee 
cliënten het meest waarschijnlijk een stoornis had. Eén cliënt toonde twee symptomen die 
op gelijke wijze ontstaan uit de hoofdoorzaak, de andere cliënt toonde twee “causaal diverse 
symptomen”: symptomen die op verschillende manieren uit de hoofdoorzaak ontstaan. De 
deelnemers bleken vaker te kiezen voor cliënten met causaal diverse symptomen, maar 
alleen wanneer zij eerst tussen dezelfde cliënten konden kiezen zonder gebruik te maken 
van de gepresenteerde theorieën, of als ze wisten dat ze dat later zouden kunnen. Blijkbaar 
beïnvloedde hun eigen kennis hun keuzen.  
In de tweede studie hebben we 17 ervaren clinici gevraagd om voor verschillende 
stoornissen te tekenen hoe zij dachten dat verschillende symptomen uit één hoofdoorzaak 
ontstaan. Op basis van deze individuele causale modellen hebben we vragen opgesteld met 
cliëntparen waarbij één cliënt symptomen had die volgens de clinicus op gelijke wijze uit de 
hoofdoorzaak ontstaan en één cliënt symptomen die volgens de clinicus op verschillende 
wijzen uit de hoofdoorzaak ontstaan voor een stoornis. We vroegen de clinici te kiezen 
welke cliënt het meest waarschijnlijk de stoornis had. Zij bleken niet vaker te kiezen voor de 
cliënt met causaal diverse symptomen. Deze studie hebben we herhaald met 
masterstudenten en clinici met maximaal drie jaar ervaring. Deze beginners bleken wel vaker 
te kiezen voor een cliënt met symptomen die in hun individuele model causaal divers waren. 
Informatie over verschillen in causale oorsprong van symptomen kan gebruikt 
worden om af te leiden hoe waarschijnlijk een stoornis is, als kennis over hoe waarschijnlijk 
een stoornis aanwezig is gegeven de aanwezigheid van specifieke symptomen ontbreekt. 
Deze kennis zullen beginners in tegenstelling tot ervaren clinici niet hebben (cf. Horwich, 
1982; Kincannon & Spellman, 2003). Verschillen in causale oorsprong van symptomen zullen 
daardoor informatiever zijn voor beginners dan voor ervaren clinici. 
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Discussie 
De resultaten uit de hardop-denkenstudie en uit de cognitive-mappingstudie lijken 
niet direct verenigbaar. Hoewel we met de causale modellen die clinici tekenden konden 
voorspellen welke interventies zij het meest effectief zouden vinden, bleek in de hardop-
denkprotocollen de mate van causaal redeneren beperkt te zijn. Ook bleken in deze 
protocollen vervolgstappen die clinici voorstelden vaak niet gebaseerd op causale 
representaties van cliëntinformatie. Onze resultaten over de complexiteit van causale 
representaties die clinici construeren en de mate waarin clinici vervolgstappen op deze 
representaties baseren lijken afhankelijk te zijn van de gebruikte onderzoeksmethoden. 
Mogelijk leiden de methoden in verschillende mate tot het expliciteren van mentale 
causale representaties. Misschien vinden we in hardop-denkprotocollen minder aanwijzingen 
voor causaal redeneren dan er daadwerkelijk plaatsvindt, doordat clinici mogelijk niet alle 
gedachten verwoorden die zij hebben over causale relaties, bijvoorbeeld wanneer 
verklaringen automatisch gegenereerd worden (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Bij cognitive 
mapping wordt de uitgebreidheid van causaal redeneren misschien juist overschat, door de 
expliciete instructie (cf. Hodgkinson, Maule & Bown, 2004). Ook kan het op papier zetten van 
causale representaties het causaal redeneren faciliteren (cf. Morton, 2004).  
Een gemeenschappelijke bevinding in de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 is de grote 
verscheidenheid in de causale representaties van clinici voor dezelfde cliënt. Deze 
verscheidenheid bleek al aanwezig tijdens een intakegesprek. Een mogelijke verklaring 
hiervoor is de incompleetheid van kennis over hoe biologische, psychologische en sociale 
factoren samen kunnen leiden tot psychologische problemen en gedragsproblemen (Kiesler, 
1999; Cicchetti & Sroufe, 2000). Ook ontbreekt kennis over wat behandelingen precies 
effectief maakt (Bieling & Kuyken, 2003; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006). Daarnaast kunnen 
verschillen in opleiding, werkervaring en theoretische voorkeur leiden tot verschillende 
opvattingen over de causale factoren die een rol spelen bij de problemen van clienten.  
Naast dat kennis incompleet is, zal de veelheid aan factoren die in interactie het 
ontstaan en in stand houden van problemen  beïnvloeden (De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; 
Haynes, 1992; Morton, 2004) het moeilijk maken voor clinici om tot een compleet en 
accuraat beeld te komen van hoe problemen van cliënten ontstaan en in stand worden 
gehouden. Accurate causale cliëntrepresentaties zullen complex zijn. Verder is het de vraag 
in hoeverre clinici in de praktijk coherente, complete causale representaties nodig hebben 
om te kunnen besluiten over interventies. Clinici maken interventiekeuzen mogelijk vooral 
op basis van beschrijvingen of classificaties (zie bijvoorbeeld Clarke, DeBar, & Lewinsohn, 
2003; Kendall, Aschenbrand, & Hudson, 2003). Groenier, Pieters, Hulshof, Wilhelm en 
Witteman (2008) vonden dat clinici het zoeken naar verklaringen voor problemen minder 
belangrijk vinden dan het beschrijven van problemen en kiezen van interventies.  
Uit de studies in hoofdstuk 5 blijkt dat de invloed van causale representaties van 
stoornissen op het redeneren van clinici verschillend is voor clinici met meer en minder 
ervaring. Met meer ervaring herkennen clinici wellicht patronen en gebruiken zij in mindere 
mate causale representaties om tot oordelen te komen. Het is echter niet duidelijk of de 
ervaren clinici in de studies beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 werkelijk in mindere mate afgaan op 
causale representaties van stoornissen dan beginners, of dat hun causale kennis over 
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stoornissen op een andere wijze is georganiseerd dan bij beginners. Clinici tekenden een 
geïsoleerd deel van hun theorieën in een vooraf gegeven vorm, wat dus slechts een beperkt 
beeld kan geven van de causale structuur van hun kennis. We vonden in de andere studies 
geen verschillen in de mate van causaal redeneren tussen meer en minder ervaren clinici. 
Wel is uit onderzoek naar case formulations gebleken dat meer ervaren en beter 
gekwalificeerde clinici meer complexe en omvattende case formulations vormen dan 
beginners en dat hun interventiekeuzen daar beter op aansluiten (Eells & Lombart, 2003; 
Eells et al., 2005; Kuyken et al., 2005).   
Implicaties en verder onderzoek 
Het is niet duidelijk geworden in welke mate clinici causaal redeneren. Daarom is 
verder onderzoek nodig naar causale redeneerprocessen van clinici, bijvoorbeeld met meer 
experimentele methoden (Einhorn et al., 1979; cf. Gaines, Brown, & Doyle, 1996; Magliano, 
1999). Daarnaast hebben we niet gekeken naar andere denkwijzen, zoals probabilistisch 
redeneren of redeneren aan de hand van schema’s of scripts (zie bijv. Hamm, 2003). Clinici 
zullen verschillende denkwijzen toepassen (Brammer, 1997; Norman, Eva, Brooks, & 
Hamstra, 2006). Zo zullen clinici causale and probabilistische kennis combineren, omdat 
oorzaken gewoonlijk met een mate van onzekerheid effecten genereren (Rehder, 2007; 
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Niyogi, 2007). Interessant is te onderzoeken welk effect het 
verstrekken van relevante causale kennis heeft op causaal redeneren van clinici. Mogelijk 
gaan clinici meer causaal redeneren, vormen zij meer coherente en complexe causale 
representaties en vertonen zij meer overeenkomst in hun causale representaties.  
Ook is nog niet duidelijk in welke mate interventiekeuzen die clinici maken afhangen 
van effectiviteitoordelen gebaseerd op causale representaties, of op andere factoren zoals 
beschikbaarheid van interventies, tijd of kosten (cf. Nelson & Steele, 2008). Wanneer causale 
representaties inderdaad belangrijk zijn voor interventiekeuzen, kan onderzocht worden of 
interventiekeuzen beïnvloed kunnen worden door het verstrekken van informatie over de 
werkingsmechanismen van effectieve interventies. Mogelijk worden interventies wanneer 
kennis over de werking ervan aanwezig is makkelijker geïntegreerd in causale 
cliëntrepresentaties dan wanneer niet bekend is waardoor interventies effectief zijn. Door dit 
te onderzoeken kan wellicht informatie verkregen worden over hoe de implementatie van 
effectief gebleken interventies gestimuleerd kan worden (cf. Kazdin, 2008).  
De vraag is of coherente causale cliëntrepresentaties leiden tot betere 
interventiekeuzen en uiteindelijk tot betere interventie-uitkomsten. Het identificeren van 
causale mechanismen lijkt soms maar niet altijd tot betere uitkomsten te leiden (Nelson-
Gray, 2003). In eenvoudige gevallen kunnen effectieve interventies vaak worden geselecteerd 
op basis van een classificatie. In meer complexe gevallen, bijvoorbeeld bij comorbiditeit, of 
wanneer eerdere behandelingen niet effectief zijn gebleken, zal een clinicus toch moeten 
proberen om tot een coherent beeld te komen van de oorzaken en in stand houdende 
factoren voor de problemen van cliënt (Nelson-Gray, 2003). Jensen-Doss en Weisz (2008) 
vonden dat accuraatheid van classificaties de uitkomst van behandelingen verbeterde. 
Mogelijk wordt de uitkomst van behandelingen ook beïnvloed door de accuraatheid van 
causale cliëntrepresentaties van clinici.  
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Gezien de verscheidenheid in causale representaties die verschillende clinici vormen 
voor een cliënt en de mogelijke invloed daarvan op de behandeling die clinici kiezen, zou in 
opleidingen en trainingen aandacht kunnen worden besteed aan het expliciteren en toetsen 
van veronderstellingen over causale factoren en verbanden. Specifieke methoden kunnen 
gebruikt worden om deze representaties te visualiseren, zoals “causal modelling” (Morton, 
2004). Hoewel visualisatie op zich niet tot betrouwbare en valide modellen leidt, kan 
visualisatie duidelijk maken waarin veronderstellingen verschillen en overeenkomen en hoe 
deze het beste getoetst kunnen worden (zie bijv. Haynes, Spain, & Oliveira, 1993; Staines, 
2007).  
Tenslotte: zo moeilijk als het is voor clinici is om de denkprocessen van cliënten te 
achterhalen (Meehl, 1954), zo moeilijk zal het voor onderzoekers zijn om de denkprocessen 
van clinici te achterhalen. 
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